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Executive Summary 
This report presents the findings of an exploratory study which evaluates the impact of 
incorporating production gains/losses and Government transfer payments (taxation and 
welfare) into the cost-effectiveness ratios of a selection of twenty two preventive health 
interventions. The project had two aims (i) to build a framework to conduct such an 
analysis and (ii) to run a selection of 20 interventions through the framework to test it. 
The context for the study arises from concerns raised in the “A Third Wave of National 
Reform” agenda in Australia, about the impact of chronic disease on labour force 
participation and productivity, as well as increased health care expenditure. It follows 
from the national reform agenda that careful consideration needs to be given to the 
possible inclusion of ‘human capital’ issues in priority setting processes adopted in the 
health sector.  
 
The term “production gains/losses” in the current project refers to absence from paid 
work due to premature death or retirement and/or short-term absences from paid work 
due to ill health. Impacts outside the paid workforce (i.e. on household production) are 
not included. The health interventions covered are listed in  
Table 1 and have been previously evaluated for their cost-effectiveness from a narrower 
health sector perspective within the Assessing Cost-Effectiveness (ACE) framework 
(Haby MM, Carter R et al. 2004; Lim S 2005). The health interventions were chosen for 
this analysis because of their relevance to current health policy, the existence of 
completed comparable cost-effectiveness analysis and to provide coverage of a range of 
diseases, risk factors, funders and intervention types (primary, secondary and tertiary) 
within the time frame of the study.  
Key Findings 
For all but one of the interventions, production gains reduce the cost to society of health 
interventions by increasing the gross income of individuals (range -$1.9M to +$840M). 
As a consequence, Government taxation income increases, while welfare payments 
decrease. These gains can be substantial depending on the number of people benefiting 
from the intervention and are very relevant to considerations of the affordability of 
interventions. A production loss resulted using the Friction Cost Approach for the brief 
GP intervention to reduce alcohol use. See Part D: Table 6 and Table 6. 
 
Turning to efficiency (as opposed to affordability), interventions that were already cost-
effective from a health sector perspective (most in this study), are further enhanced by 
inclusion of production gains. This is to be expected as production gains reflect health 
gains, which in turn rely on the effectiveness of the interventions. In this pilot study, the 
ranking of the analysed interventions using traditional cost-effectiveness assessment (i.e. 
from most cost-effective to least) was only marginally altered by inclusion of production 
gains and losses. See Table 2. Three interventions were both cost saving and health 
saving before consideration of production gains and became even more cost-effective 
after inclusion of the production gains (Community heart health program, SunSmart and 
Call back counseling for smoking cessation). Three further interventions have a net 
benefit to society after inclusion of production gains depending on the alternative 
evaluation methods trialled (Maintenance CBT for depression with a public psychologist 
and random breath testing using the Human Capital Approach and the brief alcohol GP 
intervention when using the Friction Cost Approach). 
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Table 1: Intervention List 
# Risk factor / 
disease 
addressed 
Health Intervention Title Brief Description 
1 Alcohol use Brief GP intervention Screening and counseling for 
harmful alcohol use 
2 Alcohol use Random breath testing Current practice 
3 Cervical Cancer Cervical cancer screening  Current practice 
4 Cardiovascular 
disease  
ACE inhibitors targeted at 10% risk 
group 
Blood pressure lowering drug 
5 Cardiovascular 
disease  
ACE inhibitors targeted at 5% risk 
group 
Blood pressure lowering drug 
6 Cardiovascular 
disease  
Beta blockers targeted at 15% risk 
group 
Blood pressure lowering drug 
7 Cardiovascular 
disease  
Beta blockers targeted at 5% risk 
group 
Blood pressure lowering drug 
8 Cardiovascular 
disease  
Combination therapies  targeted at 
15% risk group 
Community based prevention and 
drugs and diet 
9 Cardiovascular 
disease  
Community Heart Health Program Community education and 
marketing of health messages 
10 Cardiovascular 
disease  
Dietary counselling targeted at 10% 
risk group 
Dietician advisor 
11 Cardiovascular 
disease  
Dietary counselling targeted at 5% 
risk group 
Dietician advisor 
12 Depression Maintenance Cognitive Behavioural 
Therapy (CBT) for 5 years with 
private psychiatrist 
Ongoing maintenance to prevent 
repeat episodes of depression 
13 Depression Maintenance Cognitive Behavioural 
Therapy (CBT) for 5 years with 
public psychologist 
Ongoing maintenance to prevent 
repeat episodes of depression 
14 Depression Maintenance Selective Serotonin 
Reuptake Inhibitors (SSRIs) for 5 
years 
Ongoing maintenance with anti 
depressant drugs eg  Paroxetene, 
Prozac 
15 Depression Opportunistic screening and 
Cognitive Behavioural Therapy 
(CBT) for sub-clinical depression 
Screening and counseling for early 
depression 
16 Physical inactivity Active GP script Exercise plans and follow up 
17 Physical inactivity Exercise physiologist Exercise plans and follow up 
18 Schizophrenia Vocational rehabilitation Ongoing support in the workforce 
19 Tobacco Use Bupropion Zyban drug currently available 
20 Tobacco Use Call-back counselling Currently offered in some states of 
Australia 
21 Tobacco Use Nicotine replacement therapy Currently available 
22 Sunlight exposure SunSmart program Current practice 
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Table 2: Comparative ranking of interventions on cost-effectiveness ratios before and after inclusion of production gains 
Risk Factor 
 
Intervention Ranking 
before 
production 
gains 
Ranking 
after 
production 
gains 
HCA 
Ranking 
after 
production 
gains 
FCA 
ICER 
before 
production 
gains 
($) 
ICER 
after 
production 
gains ($) 
HCA 
ICER 
after 
production 
gains ($) 
FCA 
CVD risk factors Community Heart Health Program 1 1 1 Dominant Dominant Dominant 
Smoking Call back counselling 2 2 2 Dominant Dominant Dominant 
Sunlight exposure SunSmart program 3 3 3 Dominant Dominant Dominant 
Alcohol use Brief GP intervention 4 8 4 1,000 13,000 Dominant 
Depression Maintenance CBT for 5 years with public psychologist 5 5 5 2,000 Dominant 1,500 
Depression Maintenance CBT for 5 years with private psychiatrist 6 6 6 5,600 2,900 5,200 
Smoking Bupropion 7 7 7 8,600 3,000 7,900 
CVD risk factors Beta blockers targeted at15% risk group 8 11 9 18,000 18,000 18,000 
Smoking Nicotine Replacement Therapy 9 9 8 19,000 14,000 18,000 
CVD risk factors Dietary counselling targeted at 10% risk group 10 12 10 20,000 19,000 20,000 
Alcohol use Random Breath testing 11 4 11 21,000 Dominant 20,000 
Cervical Cancer Cervical Cancer Screening (current practice) 12 10 12 22,000 15,000 21,000 
Physical inactivity Active GP script 13 14 14 22,000 19,000 22,000 
Depression Maintenance SSRIs for 5 years 14 13 13 23,000 19,000 22,000 
CVD risk factors Dietary counselling targeted at 5%risk group 15 15 15 26,000 21,000 26,000 
CVD risk factors ACE inhibitors targeted at 10% risk group 16 17 17 29,000 29,000 29,000 
CVD risk factors Beta blockers targeted at 5% risk group 17 16 16 31,000 25,000 30,000 
CVD risk factors ACE inhibitors targeted at 5% risk group 18 18 18 39,000 34,000 38,000 
CVD risk factors Combination  targeted at 15% risk group 19 19 19 39,000 38,000 38,000 
Physical inactivity Exercise physiologist 20 20 20 49,000 38,000 48,000 
Depression Opportunistic screening + CBT 21 21 21 56,000 48,000 53,000 
Notes 
Table is sorted on ranking before inclusion of production gains Dominant means cost saving and health generating at the same time 
ICER before production gains is the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio calculated as the net cost of the intervention (to the health sector), divided by the health benefit of the intervention, measured in disability 
adjusted life years gained 
ICER after production gains is the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio calculated as the net cost of the intervention (to the broader society), divided by the health benefit of the intervention, measured in disability 
adjusted life years gained 
    
 
The ACE projects have used a threshold figure of $50,000 per Disability Adjusted Life-
Year (DALY) averted to represent cost-effectiveness (or “value-for-money”). Using this 
criterion, two interventions that have borderline cost-effectiveness from a health sector 
perspective (at just over $50,000/DALY), become cost-effective by inclusion of 
production gains (GP referral to an exercise physiologist and opportunistic screening for 
mild depression together with CBT). As notions of cost-effectiveness are inherently 
context specific, the appropriateness of this threshold with the inclusion of production 
gains is a policy judgment that warrants further consideration. Certainly within an 
academic setting, threshold values will remain contested for some time to come. 
 
These affordability and efficiency impacts will clearly have equity impacts, as the 
age/sex distribution of beneficiaries changes with each intervention. See Appendix 3. 
This suggests the importance of placing economic/financial analysis within a broader 
approach to priority setting for the health sector, which incorporates government 
objectives for social justice. 
 
Finally, whilst the results of this study are indicative rather than authoritative, and 
limitations in current data sources are acknowledged, the pilot has illustrated that the 
task of incorporating production gains into economic analysis is both feasible and useful 
in Australia. Areas where data bases could be improved to facilitate further analysis of 
this type are identified.  
Methods and Limitations 
Two established techniques for calculating production gains are compared, to identify 
the issues resulting from their application. These are the Human Capital Approach 
(HCA) and the Friction Cost Approach (FCA).The HCA produces far higher estimates 
of production gains than the FCA. The HCA was primarily designed to place a dollar 
value on human life in early cost benefit analysis in the health sector. It has an inherent 
assumption that people who die or leave the workforce permanently due to ill health are 
not replaced (this is equivalent to an economy with full employment). The production 
gains from preventing such deaths or premature departures from the workforce are 
calculated as the gross salary of the relevant workers for the remainder of their expected 
working life. As a dollar valuation of human life, the HCA sets a sensible ceiling 
estimate. As a technique to estimate impacts on the general economy, the HCA has 
limitations. The FCA was developed with this second task in mind – that is, to measure 
‘true’ productivity effects with more realistic assumptions where economies have some 
level of unemployment. The FCA assumes that departed workers will be replaced after a 
‘friction’ period of staff recruitment and training. The production gains calculated using 
the FCA comprise the gross salary of the workers only for the time period until they are 
replaced. This time period has been estimated as 3 months for Australia, and varied in 
sensitivity analysis to 6, 12 and 24 months. Refer to Appendix 4. 
 
The findings of this pilot study are based on a preliminary sample of twenty two 
potential health interventions which have undergone prior cost-effectiveness evaluation 
using standardised methods. While we endorse the rigour of these evaluations, it needs 
to be acknowledged that most have not yet been published and subjected to peer review. 
See Table 33 for details of their preliminary cost-effectiveness ratios.  
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Further, the production gains modeling uses cross-sectional data from the National 
Health Survey 2004/05 on risk factors and workforce behaviour, to estimate the changes 
in absenteeism and workforce participation of potential beneficiaries of the respective 
health interventions. As with all economic evaluations, a number of assumptions need to 
be made in order to conduct the analyses. These are stated explicitly and their impact on 
the results explored in sensitivity analysis.  
 
Finally, the work raises important equity considerations (both age and gender based) 
that may conflict with more widely held egalitarian social values. Health interventions 
aimed at the very young and the elderly will yield minimal production gains (as defined 
in this study). Health interventions aimed at the more highly paid working males are 
likely to generate larger production gains compared to females of all ages, or younger 
males. However the potential equity impact on carers, disabled persons and non-paid 
workers has not yet been studied largely due to the data requirements of such an 
undertaking.  
Conclusions and future directions 
Inclusion of production gains/losses in cost-effectiveness evaluations can be justified in 
normative economic theory, where the aim is to maximise social welfare with available 
resources. From this perspective, all the benefits and resource costs to society of health 
interventions should be included in cost-effectiveness evaluations; not just the impact on 
the health sector. Before its application to health funding decisions, however, users need 
to fully appreciate the social justice issues raised, the exploratory nature of the current 
project and the limitations in available data sets. 
 
In the absence of data which provides direct evidence of the impact of health 
interventions on workforce participation and absenteeism, tractable estimates can be 
made using cross-sectional data captured in National Health Surveys. Of the two 
established methods to calculate the production gains, the FCA is our preferred method 
as it is based on more realistic assumptions regarding the replacement of workers who 
leave the workforce. This exploratory analysis illustrated that the absolute size of the 
production gains, taxation and welfare effects can be substantial, while the change in 
relative ranking of interventions on cost-effectiveness criteria may be only marginal. 
 
Future work on the possible inclusion of ‘human capital’ issues in priority setting 
processes adopted in the health sector would benefit from: 
 
• extension of the pilot list of 22 interventions to a more comprehensive list of 
interventions, to better tease out the efficiency and equity implications; 
• further work to develop the data bases that would facilitate more rigorous 
measurement of production gains/losses (particularly longitudinal studies of the 
impact of health interventions on workforce absenteeism and participation); 
• further discussion in the policy community about an acceptable framework for 
priority setting in the health sector (in particular, balancing the competing 
objectives of cost-effectiveness, equity, strength of evidence, affordability, 
acceptability, feasibility and sustainability); and  
• further work in the academic community to develop standardised methods for 
the identification and measurement of production gains/losses. 
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Structure of Report 
 
This report is organized into seven main parts or sections. 
 
Part A contains an overview of the project as well as concise answers to the eight key 
tender questions raised in the project brief by the Department of Treasury and Finance. 
 
Part B details the context and theoretical background of the project which act as the 
formal introduction and justification to the methods utilized within the project. 
 
Part C describes the development of modeling methods for the estimation of production 
gains in Australia, together with strengths and caveats surrounding the analysis.  
 
Part D details the empirical application of the production gains model to 22 health 
interventions. 
 
Part E describes the potential application of the same modeling methodology to diseases 
where interventions have not yet been evaluated for their effectiveness nor cost-
effectiveness and its potential usefulness in priority setting. 
 
Part F discusses the key conclusions, recommendations and future directions of this 
project. 
 
There are also a series of Appendices to this report in Part G, which provide extra detail 
both with respect to theoretical and methodological issues for the interested reader.  
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Glossary of abbreviations 
Abbreviation Meaning 
ABS Australian Bureau of Statistics 
ACE Assessing Cost Effectiveness 
ACE inhibitors Angiotensin Converting Enzyme inhibitors (class of drug to 
reduce blood pressure) 
ACS Acute Coronary Syndromes. Term used to describe unstable 
angina pectoris and acute myocardial infarction 
AIHW Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 
AUDIT Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test 
BMI Body Mass Index 
BP Blood Pressure 
C1 Health sector costs 
C2 Other sector costs 
C3 Patient family/carer costs 
C4 Productivity losses 
CBA Cost Benefit Analysis 
CBT Cognitive Behavioural Therapy 
CCV Cancer Council of Victoria 
CEA Cost Effectiveness Analysis 
CHD Coronary Heart Disease 
CHHP Community Heart Health Program 
CI Confidence Interval around a statistic 
CUA Cost Utility Analysis 
CURF Confidentialised Unit Record File 
CVD Cardio Vascular Disease 
DALY Disability Adjusted Life Years ( a health outcome measure 
of time lost to premature death and years lived with 
disability adjusted for severity)  
DBF Disease Based Framework 
DCIS Disease Costs and Impact Study 
Dominant Used to describe health interventions that are concurrently 
saving cost and health 
DHS Department of Human Services 
DPC Department of Premier and Cabinet 
DRG Diagnosis Related Group 
DSM IV Diagnostic and Statistical manual of Mental disorders 4th 
edition 
DTF Department of Treasury and Finance 
E Ethical rational in priority setting 
FCA Friction Cost Approach 
GBD Global Burden of Disease studies 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GFW Gender Free average Wage rates 
GP General Practitioner 
HBG Health Benefit Group 
HCA Human Capital Approach 
HMG-CoA reductase Drugs (statins) that reduce cholesterol 
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Abbreviation Meaning 
inhibitors 
HRG Health Resource Group 
ICD-10 International Statistical Classification of Diseases and related 
health problems 10th revision 
ICER Incremental Cost Effectiveness Ratio (a ratio of health 
benefit to net cost) 
LL Lower Limit of a range of values 
LYS Life Years Saved 
M Million 
MB Marginal Benefit 
MC Marginal Cost 
MEEM Macro Economic Evaluation Model 
NCSP National Cervical Screening Program 
NHMRC National Health and Medical Research Council 
NHS National Health Survey 
NMSC Non-Melanoma Skin Cancer 
NRA National Reform Agenda 
NRT Nicotine Replacement Therapy 
NSMHWB National Survey of Mental Health and Wellbeing 
P Pragmatic rationale in priority setting 
PBAC Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee 
PBMA Program Budgeting and Marginal Analysis 
PBS Pharmaceutical Benefit Scheme 
PN Practice Nurse 
pYLD Person Years Lived with Disability 
QALY Quality Adjusted Life Year 
RAF Resource Allocation Formulae 
RBT Random Breath Testing 
RCT Randomised Controlled Trial 
RR Relative Risk 
RTA Road Traffic Accident 
SE Standard Error 
SSRI Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors (drug) 
T Theoretical rationale in priority setting 
Threshold Arbitrary cut off point or hurdle 
U User considerations rationale in priority setting 
UI Uncertainty Interval (95%) 
UK United Kingdom 
UL Upper Limit of a range of values 
US United States of America 
WTP Willingness To Pay 
YLD Years Lived with Disability 
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Part A: Overview & Tender Questions 
1 Background 
The context of the present study arises from concerns raised in the “A Third Wave of 
National Reform” 1 agenda in Australia, about the impact of chronic disease on labour 
force participation and productivity, as well as increased health care expenditure. It 
follows from the national reform agenda that careful consideration needs to be given to 
the possible inclusion of ‘human capital’ issues in priority setting processes adopted in 
the health sector. For the purposes of this initial research, the focus is on ‘human capital’ 
issues as they impact on the general economy through three types of workforce absence: 
i) short term absences due to ill-health; ii) long term withdrawal from the workplace due 
to ill-health; and iii) long term withdrawal due to premature death from avoidable ill-
health. These impacts on the paid workforce are called ‘production gains or losses’ in 
this report. We acknowledge that there are important ‘human capital’ issues associated 
with household production and other activities outside the paid workforce, but these are 
not the subject of this report.  
 
The potential role of production gains/losses is explored from both a theoretical and an 
empirical perspective. Starting from normative economic theory of whether there is a 
case for inclusion of production gains/losses, we proceed to offer: i) an applied approach 
to priority setting in the health sector (i.e. the ‘ACE’ approach) that can incorporate 
production gains/losses; ii) a linked spreadsheet model to calculate potential production 
gains/losses (as well as taxation/welfare effects), and iii) the application of the model to 
over 20 preventive health interventions that focus on the national health priority areas, to 
tease out the tractability of the approach and its strengths and weaknesses. In so doing, 
we have addressed the following eight questions posed in the tender brief: 
 
a. On the basis that there is a case for including production gains in health economic 
evaluation, how and when should these gains be included? What issues may arise 
from including production gains? 
b. What is an appropriate method or methods for measuring production gains and 
losses in an evaluation framework? Is the choice of method dependent upon the 
condition or intervention being examined or other factors? 
c. What is an appropriate framework for identifying suitable interventions for inclusion 
in this project? 
d. Which interventions are appropriate for application of the evaluation framework? 
e. Are there any preventive health interventions that have a net benefit when assessed 
with the newly developed evaluation framework? 
f. What is the distribution of costs and benefits of the selected health interventions? 
g. How sensitive are the evaluation results to underpinning assumptions, such as the 
method for measuring production gains and losses, the age of the intervention 
recipient, and discount rate? 
                                                 
1 This agenda has been endorsed by the Council of Australian Governments as the National Reform 
Agenda. 
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h. How do the results of applying the evaluation framework compare with conventional 
cost-effectiveness analysis? Does the new methodology affect the ranking of 
interventions? 
 
2 Answers to Tender questions 
 
Question One: i) Case for including production gains in health economic evaluation; 
ii) how and when should these gains be included; and iii) what issues may arise from 
including production gains? 
Production gains/losses (often termed ‘productivity costs’) and the associated debate 
surrounding their inclusion and measurement within economic evaluation studies, are 
discussed within the key health economic evaluation text books (Gold, Siegel et al. 
1996; Drummond and McGuire 2001; Drummond, Sculpher et al. 2005). There is also a 
substantial peer-reviewed literature addressing productivity costs, but its focus is on the 
positive question of how to quantify the value of lost productivity due to illness, rather 
than the normative issue of which aspects of productivity costs should be included in 
social decision-making about health care resource allocation. 
 
The answer to the normative question of whether productivity effects should be included 
cannot be definitive at this stage for two reasons: i) because there are different 
normative economic foundations2 and the strength of the case varies between them; and 
ii) because there are inherent judgment issues in answering this question in any given 
decision context.  
 
Having acknowledged this, it is fair to conclude that a strong case can be made for the 
inclusion of productivity impacts, providing certain criteria are met, including: i) clarity 
about the study perspective and which productivity effects are being measured and 
valued; ii) assurance that there is no double counting (i.e. production gains counted in 
both the health status impact as well as a cost offset); and iii) that the equity issues 
raised by the inclusion of production costs are understood and accepted by the evaluator 
and end-user of the evaluation. 
 
The over-riding rationale for the inclusion of production gains/losses is the efficiency 
argument for adopting a ‘societal perspective’. This argument relates to the principles of 
welfare economic theory, which indicate that, a given policy change may have a series 
of effects on individuals and groups and that an overall assessment of the efficiency of 
the policy needs to consider all of these implications. Although many economic studies 
in the health sector adopt a narrower perspective, such as ‘3rd party funder’ or 
‘provider’, there is a strong normative argument for a societal perspective, if social 
welfare is to be maximized with available resources. 
                                                 
2 Three normative foundations are mentioned in the health economics literature, viz: ‘orthodox welfare 
economics’ which rests squarely on notions of individual utility as the foundation of analysis and is given 
practical expression through cost-benefit analysis; ‘extra-welfarism’, which supplements individual 
utilities with broader sources of societal value (such as health status, equity, social justice) and is given 
practical expression through cost-utility analysis; and the ‘decision-making school’, which argues that the 
arguments in the social welfare function should be those things of concern to decision-makers and is given 
expression through techniques such as Program Budgeting and Marginal Analysis (PBMA), which 
embrace stakeholder consultation. 
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The over-riding rationale for exclusion of production gains/losses is the equity 
argument, that traditional methods of measuring production gains will favour 
interventions that return more productive individuals (as measured by wages) to work, 
as opposed to other interventions that may help the poor, the elderly or the disabled. The 
egalitarian principle that exists in many countries in publicly-funded health care 
provision has led to an evaluation focus on cost-effectiveness analysis, where health 
gain is valued equally regardless of who benefits, so the inclusion of productivity costs 
within the arithmetic may be considered inconsistent. 
 
The key issues arising from a decision to include production gains/losses therefore are: 
• To ensure productivity effects are interpreted within an appropriate overall 
priority setting framework for the health sector, that gives due recognition and 
balance to a variety of government objectives (e.g. effectiveness; efficiency; 
equity; affordability; acceptability to stakeholders; feasibility of implementation; 
etc) 
o production gains impact on efficiency (as measured by the ICERs) and 
equity (as measured by ACE 2nd stage filter analysis); 
o health sector cost offsets; taxation effects and welfare payments impact 
on affordability and equity in terms of who pays or receives. 
• To ensure that there is sufficient rigour in the measurement/valuation process, so 
that the production gain estimates facilitate sensible judgments. There are a 
number of factors involved here, particularly the need for: 
o ongoing recognition of the strengths and limitations of methods, 
assumptions and available data bases, including: 
 the intervention assessment model that generates estimates of the 
anticipated changes in morbidity and mortality; 
 and the production gains assessment model that takes these 
changes and generates the anticipated impacts on workforce 
participation, absenteeism, taxation and welfare payments  
o ongoing focus on the quality of the evidence base and the important role 
of sensitivity/uncertainty analysis 
 ensuring results are reported as ranges and not just as simple point 
estimates 
o ongoing awareness that results from individual interventions cannot 
always be simply summed together, because of issues like jointness 
across the interventions and the diseases/risk factors they address. 
• To ensure that the production gains assessment model, while sufficiently 
rigorous, is tractable in terms of utilising current data sources and being able to 
embrace new data sources as they become available.  
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Question Two: i) What is an appropriate method or methods for measuring 
production gains and losses in an evaluation framework; and ii) is the choice of 
method dependent upon the condition or intervention being examined or other 
factors? 
There are three main approaches commonly debated in the literature. The oldest and 
most utilised is the Human Capital Approach (HCA). Essentially HCA determines “the 
present value of the additional stream of life income for individuals as a result of a 
health care programme” (Sculpher, 2001). Opponents of this approach state that it 
significantly overvalues true market-based production costs.  
 
The second major approach is called the Frictional Cost approach (FCA). The 
proponents of FCA argue that it provides a more realistic estimate of true market-based 
production costs by only including costs associated with the “friction” period (referring 
to the period it takes to recruit and train a new worker from the ranks of unemployment 
to replace the lost worker who has either died or is unable to work due to illness).  
 
The third approach, derived from the US Panel on Cost-Effectiveness (Gold et al, 1996), 
suggests that productivity effects be incorporated within the quality of life outcome 
metric (such as QALYs). Importantly, the Panel delineated the components of 
production costs and made specific recommendations about how each should be 
included within a cost-effectiveness study framework (e.g. the effect of lost work time 
on the individual should be reflected in the QALY measure, however, external effects 
such as taxation and employer effects should be valued in monetary terms as per the 
FCA approach). Opponents of this approach note that none of the multi-attribute utility 
instruments commonly used in cost-utility analyses have explicitly considered 
productivity effects in the scaling of the scoring weights. Certainly the weights used in 
the Australian DALYs utilised in the ACE studies, do not explicitly consider such 
effects. 
 
In terms of currently adopted methods and data tractability, there is little choice but to 
start with the HCA and FCA approaches. There is still debate as to whether HCA or 
FCA is preferable. Part of this debate reflects the fact that the same two methods can be 
used to answer two quite different research questions and the fact that their relative 
merit varies according to the question being addressed. One question is to place a 
monetary value on human life, where the HCA provides a sensible ceiling estimate 
(logically, people should be prepared to pay as least their potential income to avoid 
death). The second question (our issue here), is to place a monetary value on 
productivity effects in the general economy (where the HCA has problems due to over-
estimation and FCA has stronger claims).  
 
While the FCA is our clear first choice for method, we recognise that productivity 
effects is not an area where conventions have been established and widely accepted, and 
have taken both methods forward into practical application. HCA/FCA are an important 
first step in exploring this topic, as they link in with available burden of disease data sets 
and will provide a sound basis for any further refinement in methods, either from a 
‘bottom-up’ perspective (i.e. starting with the disease burden) or a ‘top-down’ 
perspective (starting with likely impact on economic growth). 
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Question Three: What is an appropriate framework for identifying suitable 
interventions for inclusion in this project? 
The key requirements for this exploratory piece of research were: i) a sufficient range of 
diseases and risk factors to illustrate the strengths, weaknesses and implications of 
addressing production gains within a health sector resource allocation context; and ii) 
detailed access to cost-effectiveness results provided from an existing intervention 
assessment model of sufficient rigour, within the short timeframe of the project. 
 
Fortunately, both these needs were met through developing close links with the ACE 
research project, which also provided a suitable intervention selection framework 
developed for a health sector priority setting context. Within the ACE projects the 
following selection criteria have been used to guide the selection of interventions and 
were considered appropriate for this study: 
1) Size of the health problem addressed; 
2) Relevance to current policy decision-making; 
3) Availability of evidence of efficacy/effectiveness to support the analyses;  
4) Indications that additional investment for an intervention would lead to 
significant health gain or, conversely, that decreased investment would lead to 
little or no reduction in health outcomes; 
5) The ability to specify the intervention in clear concrete terms to facilitate 
meaningful evaluation; 
6) The inclusion of a mix of interventions from across the prevention pathway and 
from a range of settings; 
7) Considerations of program logic (for example, the inclusion of an option that is 
ineffective as a stand-alone intervention or for which there is poor effectiveness 
evidence, but which is integral to the success of a package of interventions). 
 
Question Four: Which interventions are appropriate for application of the production 
gains evaluation framework? 
There are two considerations here: i) interventions which because of their design or 
target group(s) are not suitable for inclusion in a production gains assessment; and ii) 
interventions for which we have no data or insufficient data to apply the production 
gains model.  
 
Examples of the first rationale would be interventions which focus on target groups who 
do not participate in the workforce because of their age (i.e. older than 65) or other 
circumstances (e.g. institutionalized). Interventions focusing on children would be a 
challenging group, because while they are clearly relevant to workforce participation 
issues, modelling of both the health effects and the production impacts may require 
heroic assumptions about impacts across a long time horizon. 
 
Examples of the second rationale are related to limitations in the National Health Survey 
(NHS) data base, which provides the participation and absenteeism information by risk 
factor and illness condition. Some groups, for example, do not fill in the NHS because: 
i) they are institutionalized (e.g. in hospitals, nursing homes or prisons); or ii) have acute 
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mental health issues (e.g. people with acute psychotic disorders). Other NHS issues may 
arise for minority groups and/or for rare health conditions, where we might question 
whether they are adequately represented in the survey. 
 
Question Five: Are there any preventive health interventions that have a net benefit 
when assessed with the newly developed evaluation framework? 
Yes. Six interventions have a net benefit after consideration of production gains (see 
Table 3). Three interventions (Community heart health program, SunSmart program and 
Call back counseling for smoking cessation) have a net benefit (i.e. were cost saving) 
before incorporating production gains. Whether the HCA or FCA is used to assess the 
production gains for these three interventions, greater net benefits occur after inclusion 
of production gains. Two interventions (Maintenance CBT for five years with a public 
psychologist and Random breath testing) become cost saving after inclusion of 
production gains using the HCA, but not using the FCA. One intervention (the brief GP 
intervention to address high risk alcohol use) becomes cost saving using the FCA, but 
not using the HCA. This unusual result occurs because of the positive association in the 
National Health Survey with high risk drinking and higher workforce participation. The 
higher participation rate of high risk drinkers is more important in the calculation of the 
production gains using HCA (over a far longer period) compared to the FCA.  
The size of the production gains measured in this study also indicates that there is a 
definite potential for preventive health interventions to have a net benefit if the 
production gains assessment model was applied to a broader range of interventions. 
 
Note also that while production gains and taxation/welfare effects cannot be added 
together (as this would involve double counting), the taxation and welfare effects will 
impact on the affordability of interventions to the government as ‘3rd party’ funder. 
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Table 3: Preventive health interventions with a net benefit after taking production gains into account 
Risk Factor 
 
Intervention  
(modeled for Australia-wide 
application) 
Incidents 
averted  
(deaths 
averted) 
Production 
Gains 
(Losses) 
HCA 
($M) 
Production 
Gains 
(Losses) 
FCA 
($M) 
Net cost 
before 
production 
gains 
Net cost 
(saving) 
after 
production 
gains 
HCA 
Net cost 
(saving) 
after 
production 
gains 
FCA 
        
CVD risk 
factors 
 
Community Heart Health Program 57,000 (2,200) 1,700 270 (620) (2300) (880) 
Sunlight 
exposure 
 
SunSmart program 33,000 (750) 420 140 (7) (430) (140) 
Smoking 
 
Call back counseling 26 (1.2) 0.27 0.04 (0.48) (0.740) (0.52) 
Alcohol use 
 
Brief GP intervention 160 (6) (1.9) 0.19 0.17 2.1 (0.03) 
Depression Maintenance CBT for 5 years with 
public psychologist 
 
16,000 (250) 320 53 240 (88) 180 
Alcohol use Random Breath testing 1100 (96) 93 2 55 (39) 52 
Notes: 
HCA: Human Capital Approach 
FCA: Friction Cost Approach 
Rounding to two significant digits has occurred 
Net costs are negative when the intervention saves costs 
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Question Six: What is the distribution of costs and benefits of the selected health 
interventions? 
 
This question requires consideration for each intervention of:  
 
• Market and non- market production gains; 
• Benefits to individuals of changes in gross wages; 
• Benefits to Government of changes in transfer payments (taxation and 
welfare payments); and 
• Costs to different levels of Government: Commonwealth and 
State/Territory. 
 
First, it should be noted that only market-based production gains are included in this 
report since data for impact of health interventions on the workforce activities of carers 
and non-market based production (home and volunteer production) was very poor. We 
acknowledge that the impact of health interventions on home-based production is likely 
to be sizeable, but have not as yet developed a method for incorporating estimates of 
production gains for this sector. The impact of health interventions on the ability of 
carers to return to the workforce or increase their level of participation if they wanted 
to, is likely to be far smaller and has not been pursued. 
 
The distribution of production gains and transfer payments for each intervention is 
included in Part D, Table 6 and Table 7. Table 6 applies the HCA to the calculation of 
production gains while the Table 7 applies the FCA. The absolute size of the 
production gains is related to the effectiveness of the intervention, the size of the health 
problem it addresses, the acceptability of the intervention to potential beneficiaries and 
the comparator situation (doing nothing or current practice in 2003) against which the 
intervention is compared.  Some of the largest production gains arise when comparing 
the health intervention to the alternative of doing nothing (CHHP, cervical cancer 
screening, and SunSmart program). The other large production gains occur where the 
intervention is widely applied and/or reasonably effective (ACE inhibitors and Beta 
blockers to groups at low risk (5%) of a cardiovascular event, maintenance anti-
depression drug therapies). For other interventions the production gains are closely 
related to the number of people benefiting from the intervention. The size of the 
taxation effects are directly related to the size of the production gains, which is 
influenced by the distribution across genders and ages of the production gains. The size 
of the change in welfare payments is largely determined by the respective workforce 
participation rate of individuals that benefit from an intervention. Lower workforce 
participation rates among potential beneficiaries generate lower welfare payment 
changes; higher workforce participation rates among potential beneficiaries generate 
higher welfare payment changes. 
 
The distribution of the costs of interventions across different levels of government and 
private individuals is presented in detailed tables. See Table 9 to Table 30 within Part D 
of this report. 
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Question Seven: How sensitive are the evaluation results to underpinning 
assumptions, such as the method for measuring production gains and losses, the age 
of the intervention recipient, and discount rate? 
 
The evaluation results are very sensitive to the choice of method and the underpinning 
assumptions. This occurs at two key levels: 
 
• At the broad design frame level there are threshold issues such as whether: 
1.  Household production is included or excluded. Including household 
production effects would increase the production gains considerably but not 
have any impact on transfers; 
2. Carers are included or excluded. Including the production effects of carers 
being able to return to the workforce or participate more as a result of an 
intervention which assists the person they care for, is not expected to alter 
the production gains estimates very much at all; 
3. Inclusion or exclusion of presenteeism (i.e. being at work but not working at 
full capacity). The extent of presenteeism and its relationship to the risk 
factors and diseases addressed by interventions in this work is unknown; 
and 
4. Choice of method (HCA or FCA). The HCA is dominated by longer term 
absences from the workforce since it measures production gains as the gross 
wages over the entire remaining working life of people who leave the 
workforce. In contrast the FCA is dominated by shorter term absences and 
gives a far lower value to permanent workforce departures. Production gains 
are therefore much larger when using the HCA rather than the FCA. 
 
• At the analytic level, there are a range of factors that will also impact on the size 
of production gains such as: 
 
1. The number of beneficiaries, their age and gender distribution, which are 
important in the quantification of production gains. The number of 
beneficiaries is in turn largely determined by the effectiveness of the health 
intervention. Details of the evidence of effectiveness are provided in 
Appendix 1: Table 33. 
2. Choice of wage rate (age/sex specific versus age/average). Males in 
Australia have higher wage rates than females at all ages. The gender mix of 
the beneficiaries of an intervention determines the initial size of the 
production gains. If an intervention largely benefits females, the use of non 
gendered average wage rates leads to a large increase in the size of the 
production gains. If an intervention benefits males predominantly, there is a 
small decrease in the size of the production gains introduced by using non-
gendered average wage rates. Choice of the wage rate thus has important 
consequential equity implications disadvantaging interventions that benefit 
women when gender specific wage rates are used. 
3. Choice of discount rate. The choice of a discount rate is important over the 
long term. We appreciate that a discount rate of 3.5% is the preferred option 
for the Department of Treasury and Finance and has been used in the base 
case analysis. 
4. Choice of friction period. The length of the friction period is totally 
irrelevant when using the HCA. Using the FCA, the base case has been 
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analysed using a friction period of 3 months. Increasing the friction period 
to 6, 12 or 24 months does increase the production gains, but by a less than 
proportional amount. (i.e. doubling the friction period does not double the 
production gains.) This occurs because the FCA is more influenced by 
change in short term absenteeism which is expected to occur for the 
remainder of the workers’ working lives, rather than the longer term 
permanent departures from the workforce. If there is an intervention which 
predominantly changes mortality and longer term ill health, the relationship 
between length of the friction period and the production gains may become 
more proportional. 
5. Age/sex specific variations in the labour force participation rate (for HCA). 
The HCA calculates production gains over the remainder of the workers’ 
working lives and is thus most influenced by changes in mortality and 
permanent departures from the workforce and workforce participation rates 
in future years, rather than the change in short term absenteeism that might 
be expected to occur for the remainder of the workers’ working lives. 
Interventions that benefit young age groups (< age 30) receive favourable 
treatment using HCA compared to FCA since the remainder of their 
working lives is substantial. This raises further equity considerations when 
comparing the affordability of health interventions that benefit different age 
groups. The distribution of participation rates is provided for each 
intervention in Part D: Figure 1 to Figure 8 and the distribution of 
production gains across age groups is provided for each intervention in 
Appendix 3. 
6. Age/sex specific variation in the absenteeism rates (for FCA). The FCA is 
more influenced by change in short term absenteeism which is expected to 
occur for the remainder of the workers’ working lives, rather than the longer 
term permanent departures from the workforce due to mortality or ill health, 
as they are only represented by gross wages for the friction period.  The 
distribution of absenteeism rates for each intervention is provided in Part D 
within Figure 1 to Figure 8. 
7. Use of the wage multiplier to recognise compensation effects. Workplace 
response varies when an individual is absent for short periods of time, 
depending on the nature of the work and the industry. Some workers must 
be replaced while others may be able to catch up on their return or have 
colleagues stand in for them. We use a wage multiplier of greater than 1 to 
reflect the higher gross wages paid when a worker must be replaced at short 
notice (e.g. nursing) and a value of less than one to reflect circumstances 
when the work can safely be delayed until return or performed by 
colleagues. The variability in the results of this analysis is greatly influenced 
by the range of possible wage multiplier values used. If we were able to 
obtain better information about the spread of this compensatory behaviour in 
the workforce, the range of results we report for production gains and losses 
would be narrower.  
 
Detailed reports for each intervention, illustrating the impact of choice of method 
(either HCA/FCA), discount rates (zero, 3.5%, 5%, 7%), friction period (3, 6, 12 and 24 
months), and wage rates (gender based or gender free) on the production gains and 
transfer payments are presented in Appendix 4. 
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Around each point estimate of total production gains, taxation and welfare effects, is a 
range of values referred to as the uncertainty interval. This interval represents a range 
of values in which we are 95% certain that the “real” point estimate lies. The width of 
the uncertainty interval around output variables will be narrowed if the input variables 
have small standard errors around their mean values (i.e. if we are relatively certain of 
the inputs). We have been able to identify the input variables that contribute most to the 
uncertainty of the output variables using @RISK software3. The results are presented in 
Appendix 5 for both HCA and FCA. The most frequently nominated parameters for 
production gains are the participation rates, absenteeism rates and wage multiplier. If 
we were able to obtain better quality estimates of these input variables we would be 
able to generate narrower uncertainty intervals around our results. This is a potential 
guide for future useful analysis. 
 
Question Eight: How do the results of applying the evaluation framework compare 
with conventional cost-effectiveness analysis? Does the new methodology affect the 
ranking of interventions? 
 
From this sample of health interventions, the inclusion of production gains did not have 
much of an impact on the cost-effectiveness rankings, but there is certainly potential for 
this to happen. The ICER reflects the relative efficiency of the respective interventions 
(against a comparator) in generating health gain for a cost. Some of the most cost-
effective interventions (CHHP, SunSmart, cervical cancer screening and random breath 
testing) have been compared against ‘current practice’ defined as ‘doing nothing’, 
while for others ‘current practice’ has more active components . This has influenced the 
original relative rankings. The changes in ranking of these interventions also reflect 
movement in the entire intervention list and would be quite different if a different 
sample of interventions had been selected. See Part D: Table 8. 
 
At a more detailed level:  
 
• Three of the 22 interventions analysed became dominant (i.e. cost saving and 
health generating). The interventions were very cost-effective from a health 
sector perspective and become even more so from a wider social perspective. 
The interventions that become dominant were: 
o the brief alcohol intervention by a GP; 
o maintenance cognitive behavioural therapy for five years with a public 
psychologist for depression; and  
o random breath testing.  
• ICERs for two interventions fell within the $50,000 per DALY threshold of 
cost-effectiveness, after inclusion of production gains. The interventions 
affected were  
o the exercise physiologist; and  
o the opportunistic screening and cognitive behavioural therapy for sub-
clinical depression.  
                                                 
3 This is an add-on piece of software to EXCEL which allows multivariate probabilistic sensitivity 
analysis to be undertaken with an EXCEL spreadsheet. We use Monte Carlo simulation modelling with 
2000 repeats to determine the 95% uncertainty interval. That is, the model is re-calculated 2000 times 
drawing different values from the range of values we have specified within the EXCEL model. Different 
results are therefore calculated each time and an uncertainty range can therefore be determined. 
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It is important to note in considering Question 8 that sole consideration of ICER 
rankings overlooks the importance of the affordability issue for decision-makers (i.e. 
size of taxation effects, welfare payments). Affordability, along with broader social 
justice concerns, are usually considered to be important factors, in addition to 
efficiency, when resource allocation decisions are being taken in the health sector.  
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Part B: Introduction 
1. Strategic project objectives 
The context of the present study arises from concerns raised in the “A Third Wave of 
National Reform” 4 agenda about the impact of chronic disease within the Australian 
population on labour force participation and productivity, as well as increased health 
expenditure. 
 
The aim of this study is to establish an economic evaluation framework for preventive 
health interventions focusing on the national health priority areas. The context of the 
reform agenda necessitates that the framework encompasses ‘human capital’ issues 
with respect to ability to participate in the Australian labour force, as well as more 
general health gain issues. 
 
The economic evaluation framework proposed here, builds upon the framework 
developed for the ACE studies (described in the next section). Fundamentally this 
involves the addition of productivity gains and losses into the ACE framework. 
  
2 Decision making context - priority setting in health 
‘Ideal’ Approach to Priority Setting and the ACE Economic 
Evaluation Framework 
 
While the international literature on priority setting in the health sector suggests that the 
importance and need for priority setting is clearly established, the central question of 
how priority setting is to be achieved remains strongly contested. There are a variety of 
approaches and models available, offered from a variety of disciplines. There are 
models offered by behavioural scientists based on achieving consensus; there are 
models offered by epidemiologists/clinicians based on needs assessment; there are 
models offered by philosophers based on notions of social justice; and of course, there 
are a variety of approaches offered by economists based on efficiency. An important 
step in assessing these various approaches is to reflect on the question of what 
constitutes an “ideal” approach to priority setting. 
 
The logical starting point to address this question is to develop a checklist based on 
clearly specified rationale. Appendix 2 to this paper contains a checklist developed by 
Carter (Carter R 2001), together with examples of its application to selected models of 
priority setting offered by economists and non-economists. There are ten criteria in the 
Carter checklist, which are based on four general considerations:  
 
• guidance from a review of economic theory, both applied economic evaluation 
methods, as well as their theoretical foundations in normative economics; 
• the lessons from empirical experience with priority setting, both at the national 
level (Oregon; The Netherlands; the Nordic countries; New Zealand; the UK 
and Australia), and controversial individual case studies;  
                                                 
4 This agenda has been endorsed by the Council of Australian Governments as the National Reform 
Agenda 
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• guidance from a review of the literature on the role of ethics and social justice 
in priority setting; and 
• reflection on the pragmatic needs of decision-makers, evident from the 
empirical experience and the key issues of context and setting discussed above.  
 
We are happy to provide further briefing material that addresses these normative 
foundations to our proposed framework for priority setting. An expert briefing paper, 
for example, entitled “Priority Setting in Health: Processes and Mechanisms”, has been 
prepared for Commonwealth Health Ministers at the request of the Commonwealth 
Secretariat in London. Some of the key points made in that paper were that: 
 
• There are no simple solutions to the challenges posed by the need for priority 
setting. Complexity is inherent in the range of stakeholders involved; the various 
levels at which decisions are taken; the need for both vertical and horizontal priority 
setting; and the importance attached to ethical values and principles.  
 
• There are a wide variety of approaches to priority setting available, offered from a 
range of disciplines (economics; epidemiology; behavioural science; philosophy; 
etc). An important step in assessing these various contenders is to reflect on the 
question of what constitutes an “ideal” approach to priority setting? The logical 
starting point is to develop a checklist based on clearly specified criteria. 
Surprisingly, very few guidelines exist in the literature that are focused on priority 
setting and that take a suitably broad-based approach. 
 
• Technical methods alone will never be able to deal with the complexity and 
contested nature of priority setting, but “due process” should ideally utilise the sort 
of information on effectiveness, efficiency, equity and needs provided by technical 
approaches. Both elements need to be involved in any approach to priority setting 
that is seeking strong theoretical foundations and empirical validity.  
 
• The key question is the extent to which each is used and the respective emphasis on 
these different alternatives. In this regard, experience to date suggests that: 
• the use of technical approaches within restricted roles (such as vertical 
priority setting; guideline development; strategies to address specific 
diseases or health services) have generally been well-regarded, but 
ambitious attempts to cover the whole health sector have not performed 
well; 
• data tractability remains a challenging problem for technical approaches and 
economists need to develop approaches that have specific regard for the 
priority setting context; 
• the choice of equity concept (need; health status; access) is critical because 
achieving one dimension may compromise the others; and 
• while equity concepts help to identify when a need exists, they are less 
useful in deciding how much health care is required (unless combined with 
efficiency-based approaches). 
 
• If priority setting is to be seen as legitimate by citizens and other stakeholders, then 
a strategic approach is required that involves infrastructure support; a long-term 
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commitment; and techniques drawn from economics/epidemiology as well as 
debate about due process.  
 
• There is no logical way of resolving divergent ethical views other than a 
convergence of thinking through structured discussion and recognition of the 
legitimacy of alternative viewpoints. This recognition reinforces the importance of: 
• due process in priority setting exercises, whereby objectives, the concept of 
benefit and values, are clarified and deliberative judgements are taken after 
meaningful discussion; 
• the important role for empirical evidence on the values that are held to be 
important by the community, particularly in relation to concepts of 
distributive and procedural justice;  
• the role of government (and ultimately the Parliament) as “circuit breaker” 
to decide ethical values; and 
• understanding the context-specific nature of ethical judgments. 
 
• Attempts to specify core services have proven difficult, with increasing interest 
being shown in setting priorities by drawing up guidelines. The focus has changed 
from which types of services to exclude, to which patients should have access and 
at what level of intensity. 
 
The ACE approach reflects our attempts to meet the guidelines set out in Appendix 2. 
The ACE approach has been applied over a series of studies that have been financed 
either through competitive NHMRC grants or by government. We would argue that the 
approach has thus stood the test of both peer review and relevance to policy-makers. 
This innovative approach to priority setting involves: the use of a standardized 
economic evaluation protocol to overcome methodological confounding (Haby MM, 
Carter R et al. 2004); the close involvement of policy-makers, clinicians and other key 
stakeholders; and a concept of benefit based on health gain, but which also includes 
broader issues that impinge on policy decisions. The end product of all studies is the 
development of a ‘menu’ of cost-effective interventions with due consideration of other 
important issues associated with each intervention (such as feasibility of 
implementation, acceptability to stakeholders and equity). Previous ACE studies have 
been undertaken in cancer, mental health, heart disease and obesity. The current ACE 
study being undertaken in collaboration with the University of Queensland is called the 
ACE-Prevention study.  
 
The research question being addressed by all ACE studies is whether there are options 
for change that could improve the effectiveness and efficiency of current Australian 
health services by: 
• Directing available resources towards “best practice” cost-effective services; 
• Providing best practice cost-effective services that address “unmet needs” in the 
Australian community;  
• Modifying cost-ineffective services to improve their cost-effectiveness (“need met 
ineffectively”); 
• Discontinuing inefficient use of resources; 
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• Targeting services to those in need as opposed to people with low risk profiles who 
are unlikely to benefit in a cost-effective manner (i.e. eliminating “meet unneeded 
services”; and 
• Informing policy makers about the best bundle of interventions, given alternative 
levels of budget availability. 
 
All ACE studies are underpinned by economic protocols which detail the evaluation 
methods to: i) provide transparency for stakeholders and potential users of the research 
results, allowing scrutiny of the scientific merit of all elements of the study; and ii) to 
provide guidance to the ACE research team in the development and application of their 
individual studies to ensure comparability of results. 
 
A brief summary of the important components of the ACE economic protocol is 
outlined to identify the decisions taken in measuring the incremental cost-effectiveness 
ratios (ICERs) for selected health interventions evaluated using the ACE framework.  
 
• The economic evaluations are undertaken as an integral part of the priority setting 
task, rather than relying on pre-existing studies in the literature (to avoid the 
problem of methodological confounding and to ensure the most relevant options for 
change are analysed). 
• The rationale for selecting interventions is clearly specified and consistently applied 
(a key factor in operationalising “opportunity cost”). 
• The economic evaluations are based on modelling best available information on 
costs and benefits from a range of data sources for demography, health system costs 
and cost offsets, disease incidence/prevalence, risk factors and disease burden that 
best describe the context of Australian health services. 
• A common setting (the Australian population) and decision making context 
(recommendations for change that can be applied on an Australia-wide basis) is 
applied across all interventions and options for change. 
• The economic evaluation methods are standardised, documented and open to 
scrutiny, including:  
– the choice of ‘health sector’ or ‘societal’ as study perspective, with a 
particular focus on government as third-party payer;  
– the definition of ‘benefit’ as reflected in the incremental cost-effectiveness 
ratios (ICERs) is based on the Disability-Adjusted Life Year (DALY)5, 
which includes both a mortality element and a morbidity element, and thus 
provides a common metric across disparate options for change; 
– the qualification of these benefits by applying a number of broader policy 
relevant criteria (such as ‘quality of the evidence base’, ‘equity’, ‘feasibility 
                                                 
5 A DALY for a disease or health condition is calculated as the sum of the years of life lost due to 
premature mortality in the population and the equivalent ‘healthy’ years lost due to disability for incident 
cases of the health condition. The loss of healthy life due to the health condition requires estimation of 
the incidence of the disease or injury in the specified time period. For each new case the number of years 
of healthy life lost is obtained by multiplying the average duration of the condition (to remission or 
death) by a severity weight that quantifies the equivalent loss of healthy years of life due to living with 
the health condition or its sequelae Begg S, Vos T, et al. (2007). The burden of disease and injury in 
Australia 2003. Canberra, AIHW. 
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of implementation’ and ‘acceptability to stakeholders’) in a ‘2nd stage filter 
analysis’; 
– the choice of ‘current practice’ in Australia as the base case comparator; 
– the standardised identification, measurement and valuation of costs, cost 
offsets and consequences;  
– the choice of discount rate (3 per cent) and a single reference year 
(historically 1996, 2000 or 2003); 
– extensive uncertainty testing6, together with sensitivity analysis, and 
reporting of a range of results (rather than singular point estimates). 
• Concern for technical rigour and an evidence-based approach in the economic 
evaluations is balanced by awareness of the need for due process in priority 
setting. This is achieved by: 
– involving stakeholders in the project steering committees and/or technical 
advisory panels; 
– taking into account broader considerations that impact on resource 
allocation decisions but are less amenable to quantification (through our 
2nd stage filter approach); and 
– giving all stakeholders on the Steering Committees and Technical Advisory 
Panels the opportunity to express their views and seeking consensus 
decisions after informed discussion. 
 
3 The case for inclusion of production gains and losses in 
economic evaluation  
 
Productivity costs and the associated controversies surrounding the inclusion and 
exclusion of these costs within economic evaluation studies are discussed within all the 
key health economic evaluation text books (Gold, Siegel et al. 1996; Drummond and 
McGuire 2001; Drummond, Sculpher et al. 2005). Furthermore there is a substantial 
peer-reviewed literature addressing productivity costs ((Sculpher 2001) provides a 
succinct summary). There are solid grounds for concluding that the inclusion of 
productivity costs in economic evaluation is appropriate from either a ‘Welfarist’, 
‘Extra-welfarist’ , or ‘Decision-Making School’ normative perspective7, providing 
                                                 
6 ‘Uncertainty testing’ is defined to cover variation in those technical parameters (usually economic and 
epidemiological inputs) that impact on disease incidence/prevalence, efficacy/effectiveness, attendance, compliance 
rates, complication rates, unit costs and so on.  ‘Sensitivity testing’, on the other hand, is defined to cover variation 
in social value parameters and/or the scenario under evaluation. Variations in the scenario might include changes in 
the study perspective, in the choice of comparators or inclusion of contentious cost impacts (such as production 
losses). Social value parameters include issues such as the choice of discount rate (social rate of time preference), 
weighting the health gain for equity (who receives the health gain) or for those most in ‘need’ (having regard to 
those severely ill and their fate if left untreated). It is useful to separate the technical calculation of the anticipated 
health gain from the social valuation placed on the anticipated health gain.  
7 Three normative foundations are mentioned in the health economics literature, viz: ‘orthodox welfare 
economics’ which rests squarely on notions of individual utility as the foundation of analysis and is given 
practical expression through cost-benefit analysis; ‘extra-welfarism’, which supplements individual 
utilities with broader sources of societal value (such as health status, equity, social justice) and is given 
practical expression through cost-utility analysis; and the ‘decision-making school’, which argues that the 
arguments in the social welfare function should be those things of concern to decision-makers and is 
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certain criteria are met, including: i) clarity about the study objective and which 
production costs are being measured and valued; ii) assurance that there is no double 
counting; and iii) that all the equity issues raised by the inclusion of production costs 
are understood and accepted by the evaluator and end-user of the evaluation. 
 
What are productivity gains and losses 
 
An agreed definition of ‘production gains and losses’ is useful, as this term has often 
been misused in the literature. The economics literature refers to either “indirect costs” 
or “productivity gains and losses” to describe the impact of absence from work, related 
to premature mortality and/or morbidity (Luce BR, Manning WG et al. 1996). We 
adopt the term ‘production gains and losses’ to include this impact on individuals, 
employers, and government. This is in keeping with the Productivity Commission’s 
((Productivity Commission 2006) use of the term ‘human capital stream’, which it 
stipulates is directed at “improving workforce participation and productivity”.  
 
Therefore in the current context productivity gains/losses refers to the effect of ill-
health on a person’s ability to participate in the paid work force, as well as 
improvements to productivity while at work. Importantly, the work force participation 
rate is defined as the proportion of people either in paid employment or actively 
looking for paid employment divided by the total population. Currently in Australia the 
workforce participation rate is 64.9% 
(http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs%40.nsf/mf/6202.0).  
 
The unemployment rate is defined as the proportion of people unemployed and actively 
looking for work divided by the total number of people participating in the workforce. 
The current Australian unemployment rate is 4.4% (Australian Bureau of Statistics 
2007).  
 
In coming to terms with the definition of production gains and losses, it is important to 
distinguish between changes in the magnitude of the ‘disease burden’ (i.e. morbidity 
and/or premature death impacts) and the resource costs of providing the interventions 
that bring about those changes. The common factor here is ‘time away’ from 
work/usual activities; but the disease burden component is time away due to the illness 
itself, while the intervention time component is a resource cost involved in the 
intervention production function. This distinction is reflected in various typologies of 
costs in economic analysis. Thus Drummond et al (2005), separate resources consumed 
in health care (costs) into four categories. C1 is health sector, C2 is other sectors, C3 is 
patient/family and C4 is productivity losses. Drummond separates out time costs 
(which fall under the C3 category and can include leisure time or even time away from 
work) from productivity gains and losses (the C4 category - which is largely about 
productivity losses due to work absence – that is losses which are not re-couped upon 
return to work and include costs attributable to employers8). 
 
                                                                                                                                              
given expression through techniques such as Program Budgeting and Marginal Analysis (PBMA), which 
embrace stakeholder consultation. 
 
8 The C4 category in the Drummond text includes real losses to production which are irretrievable.  
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There is little contention about time costs associated with providing the intervention 
(traveling time; waiting time; treatment time); from a societal perspective they should 
clearly be included in assessments of cost-effectiveness. In practice, budget limitations 
and/or a narrower study perspective may see them excluded, but the theory is clear9. 
There is contention, however, about the inclusion of the disease burden component – 
this is the ‘time away’ component that is normally referred to as ‘production gains and 
losses’. 
 
Depending on the purpose and perspective of the evaluation, quite different valuations 
of time away from work/usual activity can be used. Production losses (due to the 
disease) or gains (early return to work due to the intervention), can only be justified if 
there is good evidence that the disease and/or its treatment lead to real production 
losses or gains.  
 
In the ACE studies to date, it is the intervention time component – not the potential for 
production gains – that have been included. It is acknowledged that this time may be 
work time or leisure time, but the two are not considered separately and a weighted 
average valuation of time has been used (that is, the $ value of time is determined from 
the wage rate and a leisure rate adjusted for proportions of the population in paid work). 
 
In contrast, the present framework explicitly wishes to include the effect on production 
of various health interventions in terms of maintaining (or returning) people to the work 
force who otherwise may have dropped out due to either early mortality or morbidity 
associated with ill-health. Importantly, simply returning someone to the work force 
does not guarantee paid employment and in some instances may simply mean a change 
in transfer payment status – from disability pension to unemployment benefits!  
 
It is important to appreciate that the effects of health improvements on broader 
economic gains (defined as increases in per capita Gross Domestic Product [GDP]) is 
far from certain. In fact recent evidence presented at an international conference 
(Conference on Health Improvements for Economic Growth) hosted by Harvard 
University suggests that if these effects are there, they are likely to be small (source: 
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/ksgnews/Features/news/060607_economic_development_
health.html and http://www.cid.harvard.edu/events/health07/index.html).  
 
Moreover, these effects are moderated by variables such as educational attainment and 
population growth (including fertility increases). Similarly, the Productivity (2006) 
Commission found that National Reform Agenda (NRA) consistent health initiatives 
could increase the participation rate by only 0.6% points. Interestingly this study 
reported that labour productivity of Australia (in terms of GDP per hour worked) was 
below that of US (ranked 8th), even though the US has much worse health indices in 
comparison. This suggests that there is not a simple linear relationship between health 
                                                 
9 There are minor concerns however, such as: i) what should be included in the intervention time costs 
(e.g. whether recuperation time should be included); ii) the need to make sure the patient was not already 
away from work due to illness, before attributing time costs to interventions (this latter issue 
distinguishes health promotion interventions provided to the well, from those treatment interventions 
provided to the unwell); and iii) time costs that are an integral part of providing the health service itself 
(such as treatment time) versus time costs that are a direct consequence of providing the intervention 
(such as time in taking children to physical activities, time in preparing healthier meals etc). 
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improvements and work force participation and productivity. Many factors are 
important, including industry mix, population density and capital penetration (or the 
extent to which economies absorb new and innovative technologies). Therefore it is 
important to appreciate that improving the health of the Australian work force will not 
necessarily translate into broader macro-economic effects in a simple linear way, based 
upon current evidence.    
 
In summary, we are defining production gains and losses in the current study as the 
impact of health interventions on people’s ability to participate in the paid work force. 
We do not wish to make any definitive statements and predictions about the impact on 
broader economic indices such as GDP growth or productivity increases.   
 
Economic evaluation of health interventions and the inclusion of 
production gains and losses 
 
There are four key concerns with respect to the inclusion of production gains 
(Drummond, Sculpher et al. 2005) within health economic evaluation. The first is 
disagreement about the most appropriate methodology to use when measuring and 
valuing productivity costs. There are three main approaches commonly debated. The 
first and most utilised is the Human Capital Approach (HCA). Essentially HCA 
determines “the present value of the additional stream of life income for individuals as 
a result of a health care programme” (Sculpher, 2001). The major concern associated 
with HCA is its reliance on neoclassical theory of labour markets (with the implicit 
assumption that there is no voluntary unemployment). Opponents of this approach state 
that it significantly overvalues true market-based production costs. The second major 
approach is called the Frictional Cost Approach (FCA) (Koopmanschap and van 
Ineveld 1992). The proponents of FCA argue that it provides a more realistic estimate 
of true market-based production costs by only including costs associated with the 
“friction” period (referring to the period it takes to recruit, and train a new worker from 
the ranks of unemployment to replace the lost worker who has either died or is unable 
to work due to illness).  
 
The third approach is derived from the US Panel on cost-effectiveness10 (Gold et al, 
1996). One of the most controversial decisions of the panel was the recommendation 
regarding productivity effects of health interventions. The Panel suggested that the 
valuation of health intervention productivity effects be incorporated within the 
preference-based health related quality of life outcome metric (such as QALYs11).  
Importantly, the Panel delineated the components of production costs and made specific 
recommendations about how each should be included within a cost-effectiveness study 
framework (e.g. the effect of lost work time on the individual should be reflected in the 
QALY measure, however, external effects such as taxation and employer effects should 
be valued in monetary terms as per the FCA). The Panel’s recommendations have 
received considerable criticism, including the fact that none of the multi-attribute utility 
instruments commonly used in cost-utility analyses have explicitly considered 
                                                 
10 This was a multidisciplinary panel convened by the US public service in 1993 to develop guidelines on 
how to undertake economic evaluation of health care interventions. The recommendations of the panel 
are published in Gold et al (1996). 
11 The reason for this was concerns about double-counting which will be further considered in the next 
paragraph). 
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productivity effects in the scaling of the scoring weights. Certainly the weights used in 
the Australian Burden of Disease studies from which the DALYs are estimated (and 
used in the ACE studies) do not explicitly consider such effects (Stouthard MEA, 
Essink-Bot M et al. 1997).  
 
Willingness-To-Pay (WTP) studies (including the more recent discrete choice 
modelling approaches) are gaining more attention within the health economic 
evaluation literature and may be thought of as a fourth method of measuring and 
valuing productivity gains/losses. WTP is an attempt to monetarize health and non-
health benefits into a cost-benefit framework. There are several problems with pursuing 
a cost-benefit approach within a priority setting context. Setting to one side the more 
contentious issue of whether the WTP approach has reached a point in terms of the 
underlying methods as to be acceptable as a common metric12, the key problem relates 
to data tractability. There is simply no comparable data base to the DALY across all 
diseases and risk factors that would make broad-based priority setting feasible using 
WTP. There is little choice at the moment, other than to use the DALY and the cost-
utility approach in this decision context.  
 
The second area of controversy concerns the issue of double counting. It has been 
suggested that to include production effects in the numerator of cost-effectiveness 
ratios can amount to double counting, if the effect on production has already been 
considered in the denominator of such ratios (usually as part of the health outcome 
measure in cost-effectiveness/utility studies or even as part of the WTP estimate in 
cost-benefit studies). As stated above, this was a primary concern of the U.S. Panel, 
particularly where preference-based outcome measures are used. However the extent to 
which this has occurred in reality may be quite small, as most measures have not 
explicitly considered production effects (though empirical testing is required to confirm 
whether people implicitly consider such effects in their valuations). 
 
The third key concern is associated with the objectives and perspective of the study. It 
has been mooted (Gerard and Mooney 1993, in Drummond et al, 2005) that the choice 
of a health outcome measure in economic evaluation suggests that it is only the health 
specific costs and outcomes which should be included (i.e. symmetry between costs and 
outcomes). Drummond et al (2005) convincingly argue that while the fundamental 
outcome of interest in health care economic evaluations will always be health 
outcomes, it is not useful to impose artificial boundaries around evaluations, and that it 
is always preferable to adopt a broader societal perspective in evaluations to ensure that 
all relevant costs and consequences are accounted for and important perversities are not 
missed. In sum, ‘relevance’ is more important than ‘symmetry’. 
 
Finally, equity considerations have played a major role in the productivity cost debate. 
The inclusion of productivity effects in economic evaluations will favour working-age 
populations who are capable of paid employment (hence disadvantage the elderly and 
the disabled populations, such as people with chronic mental illness or intellectual 
disability). It is predominantly for this reason that many evaluations have not included 
                                                 
12 In a review of outcome measures undertaken for the Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee 
(PBAC) in 1999, for example, Richardson and colleagues concluded that WTP had not reached the point 
where it could be recommended as the common metric for economic analysis, in preference to quality of 
life measures. 
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productivity gains13. Olsen and Richardson (Olsen and Richardson 1999) state that the 
inclusion of productivity gains is a normative issue and recommend that it is only the 
external effects of these gains which should be included (i.e. taxation or personal 
income which flows back to the health sector). These authors acknowledge that such 
inclusions will incur ‘distributional effects’ (that is advantage working age able-bodied 
populations) and the extent to which this is acceptable is a societal decision requiring 
empirical determination, rather than recourse to improbable economic theories.   
 
4 Framework for economic evaluation of production gains 
and losses 
 
Our approach is to add production gains and losses to the ACE economic evaluation 
framework as described above. This means that the traditional ‘health sector’ 
perspective used in most ACE studies14 is expanded to a ‘partial societal perspective’. 
This is because other impacts on education, justice etc continue to be omitted from 
consideration in the current work15.  
 
Importantly, as stated above, we are also making the inherent assumption that the 
health benefit used in the ACE studies (DALYs) does not include consideration of 
production effects. We consider this reasonable as the weights used in the Australian 
Burden of Disease studies (which estimate DALYs across a range of diseases and form 
the backdrop to the measurement of benefit in the ACE studies) are largely drawn from 
disability weights developed in the Netherlands whereby the valuers of health states 
were not explicitly asked to consider the impact of these health states on people’s 
ability to participate in the work force (Stouthard MEA, Essink-Bot M et al. 1997).  
 
The methods for assessing the potential production gains and losses of health 
interventions are outlined in the following sections. In terms of currently accepted 
methods and data tractability, there is little choice but to start with the human capital 
(HC) and friction cost (FC) approaches.  
 
The rest of this section will: 
 
• Specify the techniques we have used to measure and value production gains and 
losses; and 
                                                 
13 The ACE studies are examples of this. 
14 Except ACE: Obesity, which adopted a broader societal perspective, due the extent of the inter-sector 
interventions and impacts in this area. 
15 An alternative would be to broaden the perspective to a full ‘societal perspective’, which includes all 
costs and impacts across all sectors of the economy, irrespective of who is affected. A societal 
perspective would thus include impacts on non-health sectors (such as education, food supply, 
police/courts, etc), in addition to the health sector impacts and productivity effects specified above. This 
may be important for some diseases/risk factors that involve interventions outside the health sector (e.g. 
illicit drugs, alcohol or obesity prevention). When non-health sector impacts are important to an 
intervention (either on the cost or outcome side), it will be important to: i) flag the issue; and ii) 
undertake sensitivity analysis to assess the significance of adopting the broader perspective. The 
alternative of adopting a full societal perspective for the whole study is simply not feasible, given the 
limited time and resources available. 
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• Describe important variations to the ACE framework required for the current 
research (time horizon and costs). Note that the measurement of health benefits 
has not altered from the ACE framework. 
  
Techniques used in the measurement of production gains and 
losses 
 
The impact of production gains and losses has been measured in terms of numbers of 
people who can now stay in the work force, who otherwise would not have been able to 
participate. The Incremental Cost Effectiveness Ratio (ICER) within the ACE 
framework is expressed as:  
 
BCI
O
HH
HCHC
−
−          Equation 1 
 
Where: 
 
HC = health care costs of the intervention 
HCO = health care offsets (including resources no longer being used as well as longer-term health expenditure 
savings if incident cases of disease are averted) 
HI = health outcome associated with the intervention (direct benefits in non-monetary units – in our case DALYs) 
HBC = health outcomes associated with the base case (or comparator condition) 
 
 
Therefore the production gains associated with each intervention are included within 
the numerator of the above ratio (equation 2) and expressed in monetary terms 
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−
−−− )(                                                   Equation 2 
Where: 
 
PC = production costs of comparator intervention  
PBC = production costs of base case  
**Note that the production costs act as a cost saving to the intervention hence are deducted from the costs of the 
intervention 
 
 
As stated above, there are two key techniques which have been most frequently used in 
economic evaluation to measure and value productivity gains and losses: The Human 
Capital Approach (HCA) and the Friction Cost Approach (FCA). There is still debate in 
the literature about which method is preferable (see Liljas, 1998; Koopmanshap & 
Ruten, 1996; for two alternative views). The HCA is still the dominant methodology 
utilised to measure production costs in much of the published cost of illness studies, 
despite its limitations. The FCA, however, has been used more frequently in recent 
studies. There is still controversy as to which method is preferable. 
 
Part of this debate reflects the fact that the same two methods can be used to answer 
two quite different research questions and the fact that their relative merit varies 
according to the question being addressed. One question is to place a monetary value 
on human life, where the HCA provides a sensible ceiling estimate (logically, people 
should be prepared to pay as least their potential income to avoid death). The second 
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question (our issue here) is to place a monetary value on productivity effects in the 
general economy (where the HCA has problems due to over-estimation and FCA has 
stronger claims). 
 
Considering the controversial nature of production gains/losses, both the HCA and the 
FCA are used in the project. 
 
Human Capital Approach 
 
Essentially the HCA determines “the present value of the additional stream of life 
income for individuals as a result of a health care programme” (Sculpher, 2001). 
 
The human capital approach is based on estimated output losses due to cessation or 
reduction of production due to morbidity and mortality; or conversely, from gains made 
in human capital (both in terms of work force participation and productivity increases) 
due to investments in health care (Sapsford and Tzannatos 1993). This is estimated 
from gross employee earnings in the case of the paid work force (which involves 
various assumptions about the relationship between employee wages and production) 
and from the imputed value of unperformed housekeeping tasks for those not in the 
paid work force (Hodgson & Meiners, 1982). The values of other nonmarket activities, 
such as leisure, study, housework etc can also be included under production costs, but 
do not appear in economic indices such as GDP, and hence are often excluded in the 
calculation of such HCA estimates (due to the difficulty of measuring and defining 
such costs). This method also excludes other psychosocial costs of illness such as pain, 
suffering and stress etc., which impact on quality of life. Whilst sometimes included in 
Cost-of-Illness studies, such impacts are picked up in the outcome measure of 
economic evaluations.  
An important assumption of this method is that there is near full employment 
(Canadian Agency for Drugs and Technologies in Health 2006). While this assumption 
has been the main criticism of this method in the literature (Koopmanschap MA and 
Rutten FF 1994), the current Australian labour market may be close to meeting this 
assumption (due to low unemployment rates). Secondly, this approach has the problem 
of forecasting future rates of unemployment, growth and productivity over the 
remaining normal working lifetime of the prematurely dead/retired (Collins DJ and 
Lapsley HM 1996), which can not be accurately predicted. However sensitivity 
analysis of results can assess the impact of important labour market assumptions made 
in the calculations. 
In computing productivity impacts with HCA we use a methodology based on the 
Disease Costs and Impact Study (DCIS) (see Mathers et al, 1998). This methodology is 
based on usual human capital approach techniques and is simple to implement. The 
only issue is that DCIS is largely a descriptive study whereas ours is an evaluation. 
However the techniques for counting and valuing the key components of the HCA are 
the same. The only difference is that the incremental difference between productivity 
costs with and without the intervention needs to be determined.  
This procedure involves the determination of three sets of costs:  
• Mortality costs due to premature death;  
• Morbidity costs due to hospitalization; and  
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• Morbidity costs due to absenteeism to attend medical and allied health 
professionals (i.e. taking time off work and household production to attend 
medical appointments etc.) or disability due to illness. 
 
We exclude unpaid work (in terms of household production and study), as the evidence 
on this is sketchy at best and importantly, falls outside the key remit of the National 
Reform Agenda. 
 
However the issue of carers was raised by the NRA as a group potentially impacted by 
preventive health investments. While this may be true, the evidence base around the 
impact of various health interventions on carers is sparse at best. Furthermore, existing 
surveys are somewhat vague and ambiguous (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2003). We 
therefore exclude the production gains and losses to carers of various health 
interventions in the current study. This may be an important additional area of 
work for future research as better quality data becomes available.  
 
The key assumptions behind the determination of production gains/losses of health 
interventions using the HCA are set out below. Note that how each type of cost is 
calculated may vary according to the specific disease and intervention chosen for 
evaluation. For example, the work force participation rate differs between different 
diseases. People with mental disorders have a participation rate which is 29% lower 
than the average, whereas people with musculoskeletal disorders have a differential rate 
of only 5.4% (Productivity Commission 2006). Therefore the scope of improving the 
work force pool will vary according to which disease is being evaluated.  
 
It is also important to appreciate that there may be differential effects on the work force 
participation rate depending on whether a disease is prevented from ever occurring, or 
alternatively, whether the intervention involves the treatment of an established disease. 
A poignant example is schizophrenia, where the work force participation rate for 
people with established schizophrenia is approximately 1/3 of the general population. 
An Australian economic evaluation of vocational rehabilitation for people with 
schizophrenia has shown that such interventions probably cost more than the monetary 
benefits which accrue to them (in terms of income, taxes and even reduced welfare 
benefits). This is largely due to structural rigidities within the welfare system which 
create disincentives to full-time work for people who earn largely lower incomes 
(Chalamat, Mihalopoulos et al. 2005). Such considerations were picked up in the 2nd 
stage filter analysis of the ACE-Mental Health study. Therefore differential work force 
effects may be present for people on disability benefits compared to those on no 
benefits or unemployment benefits. This varies according to which disease is being 
considered16. 
HCA: Mortality Costs 
Mortality costs refer to lost production which has occurred as a result of premature 
death. Work related production losses due to premature mortality are generally 
calculated by multiplying the potential years of life lost between the ages of 15 and 65 
attributable to the disease in question by the work force participation rates (data from 
ABS) and the average annual earnings for men and women separately (data from ABS). 
                                                 
16 Note that we cannot offer definitive guidance at this pilot stage on how such issues will be addressed 
until it is known which interventions and diseases the general framework will be applied to. 
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Decisions regarding which work force participation rates to use will depend on which 
diseases and interventions are being evaluated. Key data sources include: 
• Empirical estimates based on disease surveys – usually cross-sectional surveys. 
Examples include the National Health Survey and the National Survey of 
Mental Health and Well-Being, as well as other disease or risk factor surveys; 
and  
• Recourse to expert opinion if empirical estimates are not available. 
 
HCA: Morbidity Costs 
Morbidity costs refer to time which is lost from production, because the person is 
required to take time off work to attend medical appointments etc. or leaves the work 
force prematurely permanently due to ill health.  
 
Valuation 
Ideally the opportunity cost of the time spent pursuing or receiving an intervention by 
the relevant target population should be measured. If an individual is a worker 
substituting time at work for time spent receiving the intervention, then the opportunity 
cost is his/her hourly wage. If the time component of an intervention is large and 
differing wage rates are used (e.g. younger women (pap screening) and older men 
(prostate screening)), the use of the relevant wage rates of the affected target population 
can lead to differences in the analysis that may be considered unacceptable in our 
society (Luce BR, Manning WG et al. 1996). The production gains will be greater in 
the interventions aimed at well paid males.  On the other hand, to use average wage 
rates instead of the market based sex specific rates introduces other potentially 
unacceptable estimates.  This may cause interventions aimed at the lower paid groups 
to appear more beneficial than they otherwise would appear. Furthermore, issues such 
as the timing of appointments (during work time versus after hours) can incur disparate 
unit prices (leisure time is usually valued less than work time). Due to lack of adequate 
data, we assume that such appointments occur during work time. 
 
We use gender based wage rates for all interventions, combined with sensitivity testing 
to identify the degree of importance the wage rate makes to the results. 
 
In summary the following parameters are required to calculate the production gains and 
losses of interventions using the HCA: 
 
1. Incremental numbers of lives saved and years of life up to retirement age saved, 
by the intervention (compared to current practice) by age and sex (to calculate 
mortality costs); 
2. Work force participation rates of the target population for the interventions (by 
age and sex); 
3. Gross and net average salary for premature deaths prevented by the 
interventions (by age and sex); 
4. Gross and net average salary of the people within the intervention’s target 
population (by age and sex) who experience absences from work due to 
morbidity;  
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5. The impact of compensation mechanisms (sometimes called the ‘elasticity of 
labour’) in the intervention target population;  
6. Quantity and length of short term absences from the workplace (by age and 
sex); and 
7. The proportion of absences covered by leave entitlements. 
 
Friction Cost Approach 
 
The proponents of FCA argue that it provides a more realistic estimate of true market-
based production costs by only including costs associated with the “friction” period. 
The friction period is the time it takes to recruit and train a new worker from the ranks 
of the unemployed to replace the lost worker who has either died or is unable to work 
due to illness (Koopmanschap MA, Rutten FF et al. 1995). Proponents of this method 
argue that there are no production losses evident after a new worker is trained to 
replace the lost worker. In essence the friction method determines the costs to 
employers of losing workers due to illness and conversely the savings to employers 
from health improvements as well as lost individual income during the friction period. 
The FCA has been recommended as the methodology of choice by a number of 
international bodies including the Canadian Agency for Drugs and Technologies In 
Health (Canadian Agency for Drugs and Technologies in Health 2006). 
 
However the biggest drawback of this methodology is that it is requires extensive data 
to estimate accurately the losses in the friction period, as these can vary widely across 
and within sectors. Furthermore, recruitment and training costs can vary significantly 
and are often not publicly available for use in economic evaluations. It is mainly for 
this reason that this method has not been widely adopted. Some of the data 
requirements are similar to the HCA; particularly with respect to the incremental 
numbers of people returned to work (in terms of both reduced mortality and morbidity) 
and labour force participation rates, wage rates and productivity levels. The only 
additional data requirements are the estimation of the friction period and associated 
recruitment and training costs. 
 
In some of our previous work we have used a conventional ‘rule of thumb’ to estimate 
the friction period costs associated with stroke (Mihalopoulos, Cadilhac et al. 2005). 
This rule of thumb is 10% of the human capital cost estimates. However we refine this 
in the current study and attempt to source empirical estimates of frictional periods. It is 
noted again that the Australian economy is operating at near full employment, and that 
some workers may not have been replaced when they die or retire. The additional data 
requirements to determine the FCA include: 
 
1) Key industries in which the target populations are employed in (from 
descriptive surveys or evaluation literature); 
2) Frictional periods of the industries (labour economics sources – to be further 
refined); and 
3) Employer costs (sourced from either published labour economic surveys/studies 
or possible directly from a sample of representative companies). 
 
Finally, for illnesses which involve only short absences from work, both methods will 
produce similar results. However for chronic diseases and diseases with high mortality, 
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the two methods produce quite different results. The impact on the ICERS and 
subsequent league table needs to be carefully considered, as well as being properly 
explored in the sensitivity analyses. 
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Part C: The Production Gains Model as applied to 
Australia 2003  
 
This section outlines the application of a mathematical model developed in Excel, 
which estimates the potential impact on production gains/losses, taxation effects and 
welfare effects in the Australian economy of any single preventive health intervention.  
There are three work force benefits modeled, arising from the health intervention which 
may include reduced premature mortality, reduced premature retirement and reduced 
short term absences.  
 
The model follows a theoretical cohort of Australians who participate in a health 
intervention either in 2003, or over a longer period. The model follows the participants 
through time, until they die or retire after reaching 65 years of age, estimating the 
production gains/losses, taxation effects and welfare effects of the health benefits that 
accrue during working years of life, from a health intervention. The interventions 
analysed in the study involve reductions in exposure to behavioural risk factors 
including alcohol, physical inactivity, sun exposure and smoking. Other preventive 
health interventions address screening for cervical cancer and sub-clinical depression, 
or treatment to prevent cardiovascular events or recurrent major depression. 
 
The work force benefits of an intervention are measured as changes in permanent 
removal from the work force due to premature death, or permanent premature 
retirement due to ill health and changes in short term absences during the remaining 
working life of the exposed risk group. These benefits could be expected to occur 
(under certain assumptions outlined in detail later) if the exposed or at-risk group were 
to change their work force behaviour and experienced instead, now and in future, the 
work force participation and absenteeism rates of the average Australian population.  
 
The dollar value of the measured work force benefits are derived using the HCA and 
FCA models presented in Part B. 
1 Inputs 
In an ideal setting this study would follow a cohort of Australians participating in a 
health intervention for the rest of their working life, along with a cohort of population 
controls who were not exposed to the intervention, measuring their respective 
mortality, workplace absenteeism and longer term work force participation decisions. 
In the absence of such detailed information, since most health intervention studies 
collect health outcome data only, an alternative model has been constructed using 
available cross sectional survey data. The model requires considerable data inputs from 
a range of Australian and other data sources. A complete list of inputs, their sources 
and the specification of uncertainty around the estimates is provided in Table 4. 
 
The production gains/losses model uses data on population size; work force status 
(employed full time/part time, unemployed, not in the work force); absenteeism rates; 
and annual earnings of the general Australian population and the comparative data for a 
relevant population subgroup that will participate in the health intervention. Data on an 
age/sex specific basis are sourced from the most recent sources available or for the 
study year 2003. Data on the work force status and absenteeism rates (over a ten day 
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period) for the Australian population and the respective intervention target populations 
are sourced from the National Health Survey of 2004/05 (ABS CURF). Average 
earnings and the number of days worked by part time workers are sourced from 
regularly generated labour-market surveys (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2007). Data 
on the 2003 Australian population are sourced from the ABS (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics 2003).  
 
To account for potential work place behaviour in response to short term absences, a 
wage multiplier is incorporated to more accurately reflect the value of production lost 
to short term absences. There is some overseas evidence that compensatory behaviour 
in the workplace by employees on their return to work and/or by colleagues in response 
to short term absences may occur (Koopmanschap MA and Rutten FF 1996; Pauly M, 
Nicholson S et al. 2002; Jacob-Tacken K, Koopmanschap MA et al. 2005; Nicholson S, 
Pauly M et al. 2006). The presence of compensation mechanisms in the workplace is 
likely to be dependent on factors such as the skill set of the absentee, the team-based 
nature of the work, time-sensitivity of deadlines and spare staff capacity in the 
workplace. In the absence of data on the nature of the industry in which the intervention 
participants work, we apply the likelihood of compensatory mechanisms when 
measuring the value of all short term absences. Longer term absences valued using the 
FCA also incorporates the possibility of compensatory behaviour. 
 
Data on the number of people likely to take up the intervention, the number of 
beneficiaries of the intervention (reduced incidence of disease or reduced prevalence of 
disease) and the number of deaths averted due to the intervention, are largely sourced 
from respective disease models developed in the 2003 ACE:Prevention project. Where 
a disease model has been developed for another purpose, the intervention description 
will provide details of the nature of the disease model and its purpose (See Part D). 
 
The marginal income tax rates applying in 2003 sourced from the Australian Taxation 
Office, are used to determine the taxation effects on estimates of gross wages. An 
estimate of recruitment and training costs is taken from the outsourced Human 
Resources consultant to the Department of Treasury and Finance (email communication 
Craig Michaels DTF).  
 
To be able to make reliable estimates of welfare effects of a health intervention requires 
a wide range of data for the sub population of interest. This includes data on the 
Disability Support Pension rates in 2003, the proportion of the population married or 
single to whom the appropriate pension rate applies, and an estimate of eligibility 
(asset/income/residency status etc).  A Centrelink guide to pensions (Centrelink 2007) 
is used to estimate the pension value in 2003. The 2001 Census data provides data on 
social marital status and an assumed estimate of 0.5 and 0.4 eligibility factors is made 
to address the issue that 75% of Australians are covered by superannuation, but an 
unknown number have disability pension options within their superannuation. While it 
was planned to examine the number of people (for all Australians and the exposed 
population of interest) self-reporting on disability support pensions in the National 
Health Survey 2004/05, this has not occurred within the project timeframe and is not 
expected to provide useful representative data in smaller sub-populations due to small 
numbers. 
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Table 4: Technical parameters, source of data and uncertainty distribution  
Data Item Source Values Distribution Comments 
Australian work 
force participation 
rate  
National Health 
Survey 2004/05 
Mean , n Binomial By 10 age groups and 
sex. 
Disease or risk 
factor specific work 
force participation 
rate 
National Health 
Survey 2004/05 
Mean , n Binomial By 10 age groups and 
sex. 
Australian 
absenteeism rate 
National Health 
Survey 2004/05 
Mean , SE Normal By 10 age groups and 
sex. Number of days 
away from work in 
the last 2 working 
weeks. 
Disease or risk 
factor specific 
absenteeism rate 
National Health 
Survey 2004/05 
Mean , SE Normal By 10 age groups and 
sex. Number of days 
away from work in 
the last 2 working 
weeks. 
Days worked in a 
year at full-time 
status 
Assumed 240 N/A 5 days for 48 weeks 
Days worked in a 
year at part-time 
status 
ABS 6310.0 
Aug 2003 table 
7. Weekly 
earnings in 
main job - by 
hours paid for 
in main job.  
52% work 60 
days 
31% work 147 
days 
17% work 192 
days 
Cumulative Assuming an 8 hour 
day and 48 
weeks/year worked. 
Wage multiplier  Pauly 
Nicholson, 
Koopmanschap 
0.275 to 1.3 Uniform Applied to reflect 
compensation 
mechanisms in 
workplaces. 
Hiring and Training 
costs 
Dept Treasury 
and Finance 
Human 
Resources 
Contractor 
15 to 20% of 
gross wage for 
persons < 35 
years. 
 
35 to 50% of 
gross wage for 
persons > 35 
years 
Uniform 2007 proportions 
applied to 2003 wage 
rates. Higher rates 
apply to higher wages 
Australian average 
weekly earnings 
ABS 6310.0 
August 2003 
Mean , SE Normal By 10 age groups and 
sex.  
Real Wages 
Growth 
Dept Treasury 
and Finance 
internal 
document 
0.016 N/A Introduced to yield 
consistent 
comparisons with 
other DTF projects 
Health Price index AIHW Health 
Expenditure 
Australia 2002-
03 Table 37. 
Total health 
price index 
 (reference year 
2001-02=100) 
 N/A Used to inflate 2000 
costs to 2003. 
Friction Period 
(months) 
Koopmanschap 3, 6, 12, 24  N/A Varied in sensitivity 
analysis. 
Discount rates  0, 0.035, 0.05, N/A Varied in sensitivity 
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Data Item Source Values Distribution Comments 
0.7 analysis. 
Retirement age  65 N/A assumed 
Welfare payments 
Disability support 
pension 
A guide to 
Centrelink 
payments 2006 
$361/fnight 
married 
$431/fnight 
single 
N/A By married and single 
status. 
Social Marital 
status 
Australian 
Census 2001 
59% Married 
41% Single 
N/A By 10 age groups and 
sex. 
Eligibility for a 
disability support 
pension 
Assumed  0.3, 0.5, 0.9 
< 40 years 
Triangular . 
Eligibility for a 
disability support 
pension 
Assumed  0.2, 0.4, 0.8 
> 40 years 
Triangular . 
Employment status 
full time and part 
time of diseased or 
risk factor exposed 
population 
National Health 
Survey 2004/05 
Mean SE Normal By 10 age groups and 
sex. 
Diseased or risk 
factor exposed 
population 
benefiting from an 
intervention 
ACE-
Prevention 
disease models  
Intervention 
specific 
N/A By 10 age groups and 
sex. 
Deaths averted by 
the intervention 
ACE-
Prevention 
disease models  
Intervention 
specific 
N/A By 10 age groups and 
sex. 
Notes: 
SE: standard error 
n: sample size 
2 Processing 
 
The production gains/losses model calculates the value of lost production that would be 
averted if people with a health condition, or people exposed to a risk factor were to 
modify their behaviour (for example: by either reducing exposure to the risk factor or 
participating in screening or taking medications/ advice) and thereby avoid the negative 
health effects of illness in future. For example, people who quit smoking may avoid 
future premature mortality and permanent early departure from the work force (i.e. 
reduced participation in the work force due to long term ill health) as well as 
experiencing fewer short term absences (days off in a year) due to smoking-related ill 
health. All calculations in the model use age and sex specific data. Production effects 
are valued in real prices for the reference year (2003) after incorporating a wages 
growth factor of 0.016 per annum at the request of Department of Treasury and 
Finance. 
 
The model measures the difference in the surveyed workplace behaviours of the sub-
population of people potentially benefiting from a health intervention (e.g. smokers 
who quit) compared to the surveyed workplace behaviours of the Australian average 
population in the year 2003 on the following parameters: 
  
1. the work force participation rate ((employed and unemployed)/total 
civilian population); and 
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2. the absenteeism rate (days off work in the last two weeks, converted to 
annual rate.) 
 
The measured differences are converted to time away from the workplace and valued at 
the relevant current and future age and sex-specific wage rates, as the people grow 
older, to ascertain the future gross wages gained/lost. Discounting of future production 
gains/losses, taxation effects and welfare effects to the year 2003, in the base case 
analysis uses a rate of 3.5% which is varied in sensitivity analysis to zero, 5% and 7%. 
 
Simulation modelling techniques (with Monte Carlo sampling) using @RISK software 
are used to allow the presentation of an uncertainty range around the estimates of 
production gains/losses, the taxation effects and the welfare effects (Palisade 
Corporation 2005). This approach is recommended by the Canadian Coordinating 
Office for Health Technology Assessment and is also mentioned as one of a number of 
methods of exploring uncertainty in the 1996 US Consensus Panel on Cost-
Effectiveness in Health and Medicine (Gold MR, Siegel JE et al. 1996; Palisade 
Corporation 2005; Canadian Agency for Drugs and Technologies in Health 2006).  
 
The probability distributions around the input variables are based on survey standard 
errors, survey proportions, or taken from the literature. The range of parameter values is 
taken from surveyed data, quoted in or calculated from the literature or from expert 
advice. In addition to enabling the presentation of the uncertainty surrounding results, 
@RISK analysis can identify the input parameters with the greatest influence on the 
uncertainty surrounding the final results. It would be these input parameters that need to 
be prioritised in future research if greater accuracy of results (narrower ranges) is 
considered desirable. 
 
As the model executes, it randomly selects a value of a parameter from the distribution 
of potential values for the age/sex specific exposed group and calculates the difference 
from a randomly selected value of the same parameter from the distribution of potential 
values for the age/sex specific all-Australian group. The model iterates in this way 2000 
times generating a range of likely outcomes, from which the median and the 95% 
uncertainty interval (UI) are reported. Since in most interventions analysed for this 
project, exposure status (smoking, drinking or having cardiovascular disease for 
example) is the only change occurring to intervention participants, it would be 
unreasonable to allow the model to choose a high parameter value for the exposed 
group to compare with a low value selected at random from the Australian average 
distribution of the same parameter and vice versa. To prevent this occurrence, (which 
could lead to unrealistic results), the distributions of selected parameters are correlated. 
Absenteeism rates and participation rates pertaining to the general population and the 
sub population of interest are the only parameters that are correlated by sex and 
relevant age groups within each intervention. 
 
The three types of work place absence are outlined separately, viz: 
 
• short term absence due to ill health; 
• long term withdrawal from the workplace due to premature death; and  
• long term withdrawal from the workplace due to ill health 
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Short term absences 
 
The short term absences potentially avoided by a preventive health intervention 
conducted in 2003 or over a longer period, are measured as the difference in reported 
days off work that would occur if the exposed sub-population were to take days off 
work at the rate of the Australian average. Absenteeism rates at most ages are generally 
higher among exposed and diseased sub-populations compared to the Australian 
average. Where this is not the case in some sex/age groups and sub-populations (e.g. 
high risk drinkers), no adjustments to the survey data are made17. It is possible that 
under or over reporting of short term absences are present in the survey, but the extent 
is unknown and not adjusted for.  
 
The model randomly selects a value of absenteeism rate from the distribution of 
potential values for the age/sex specific exposed group (as specified by the mean and 
standard deviation) and calculates the difference from a randomly selected value of 
absenteeism from the distribution of potential values for the age/sex specific Australian 
population.  
 
The difference in absenteeism rate, converts to work days gained/lost, after multiplying 
by the number of working days in a year (240 for full time workers; a range of values 
for part time workers), weighted by the proportion of the exposed sub population in full 
time and part time work in 2003. The range of number of days worked per annum for 
part time employees is estimated using the distribution of number of hours worked in 
main job, taken from the ABS 6310.0, Aug 2003, Table 7. Weekly earnings in main job 
- by hours paid for in main job (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2003). We assume an 8 
hour working day and 48 weeks worked per year. 
 
The difference in days off work in each future year due to the intervention, are 
calculated at the relevant future age specific rates as an annual stream until the worker 
reaches 65 (i.e. following the cohort of beneficiaries through time). The reduced days 
off work during the remaining working life of each beneficiary are converted to years. 
These gains/losses due to short term absences are valued under both the HCA and the 
FCA, in the same way. The age/ sex specific participation rate and gross annual wage is 
adjusted by the wage multiplier to account for compensatory workplace behaviour and 
multiplied by the total of years gained/lost and multiplied by the number of people at 
each age who benefit from the intervention in 2003.  
 
Long term absences due to premature death 
 
The first type of long term workplace absence potentially avoided by a health 
intervention in 2003 or a longer period, comprise the premature deaths that will be 
avoided in current and future years up to the age of 65, due to the reduction in the 
excess mortality risk of the exposed sub-population, when they change their risk 
behaviour (or receive treatment for established disease using a life-saving intervention). 
For example, the risk of mortality at all ages is higher for smokers than non-smokers 
and ex-smokers (Bertram M, Lim S et al. 2007). Quitting smoking leads to differences 
in male mortality risks which decline from 11% for quitters aged 20 to 25, to a 1% 
                                                 
17 This issue was extensively discussed by the project Steering Committee and it was decided to remain 
faithful to observed data rather than impose any “artificial smoothing” of counter-intuitive results. 
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difference for quitters aged 60 to 65. For females the reduced mortality risks are 8% for 
ages 20 to 25 declining to 1% for quitters aged 60 to 65. Mortality risk in older age 
groups remains relatively high since the damage of long term smoking is not as readily 
reversed as in the younger age groups. The young have most to gain by quitting 
smoking. 
 
Deaths avoided after the age of 65 are not considered in this project. The time lag to the 
avoided deaths is determined by the distribution of mortality risk in the exposed 
population and varies with each risk factor and disease. For example, the change in 
mortality risk among young depressed persons is quite immediate while the change in 
mortality risk associated with smoking is more distant. Many of the avoided deaths due 
to behaviour change at each age are expected to occur beyond retirement age and are 
therefore not included in the production gains estimates.  
 
The number of deaths avoided and their distribution across ages and time are 
determined in the disease models created for the ACE-Prevention study for each 
intervention. Averted deaths are dependent on such factors as intervention effectiveness 
and the modeled reach of the intervention across the population at risk.  The 
effectiveness estimates and the main source of the unpublished effectiveness results for 
each intervention are included in Appendix 1 Table 33. Most of these models have been 
adapted for this project to identify the necessary inputs (deaths and disease incidence 
averted). All health outcomes used in the ACE-Prevention project are discounted at 3% 
to 2003 equivalents according to a protocol developed for the project. 
 
While both the HCA and FCA count deaths in the same way, they assign different 
monetary values to a lost working life.  Using the HCA long term absence is valued at 
the net present value of the current and future gross wages stream using age specific 
work force participation rates and wage rates, until the deceased employees would have 
reached retirement age. Using the FCA, long term absences are valued as a fraction of 
the current year only, at current gross wage and work force participation rates, adjusted 
by the wage multiplier, on the understanding that the employee will be replaced and 
compensation mechanisms may occur. The production gains/losses model uses a base 
friction period of 3 months (Koopmanschap MA, Rutten FF et al. 1995), which is 
varied to 6, 12 and 24 months in sensitivity analysis. 
 
Long term absences of permanent withdrawal from the workplace due to ill 
health 
 
The second type of long term absence that is potentially avoided by a health 
intervention arises because of permanent premature retirement from the work force due 
to ill health. These longer term absences are estimated (incorporating a number of 
assumptions outlined later), by using the difference between work force participation 
rates of sub-groups exposed to risk factors or disease and the participation rates of 
average Australians. For example the National Health Survey reveals that older 
smokers report lower work force participation rates than average Australians of the 
same age, reflecting the possible influence of the incidence of smoking-related diseases 
(See Table 5). 
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Table 5: Work force participation rates of average Australians and smokers by 
sex.  
 Australian average Smokers 
 male female male female 
15-19 0.624 0.664 0.830 0.743 
20-24 0.877 0.816 0.890 0.743 
25-29 0.940 0.765 0.911 0.719 
30-34 0.954 0.729 0.924 0.713 
35-39 0.936 0.701 0.895 0.677 
40-44 0.931 0.780 0.882 0.719 
45-49 0.922 0.771 0.834 0.718 
50-54 0.876 0.725 0.767 0.677 
55-59 0.769 0.559 0.740 0.577** 
60-64 0.534 0.307 0.562** 0.289 
Source: National Health Survey 2004/05 
 
The participation rate difference assessed at each age is multiplied by the number of 
live people benefiting from the intervention (that is incidence of disease averted) to 
estimate the number of people who will not be leaving the work force permanently 
early. 
Long term absences for morbidity are valued differently depending on the HCA and 
FCA.  Using the HCA long term absence is valued at the net present value of the 
current and future gross wages stream using age specific work force participation rates 
and wage rates, until employees would have reached retirement age. Using the FCA, 
long term absences are valued as a fraction of the current year only, at current gross 
wage and work force participation rates, adjusted by the wage multiplier, on the 
understanding that the employee will shortly be replaced and compensation 
mechanisms may occur. The production gains/losses model uses a base friction period 
of 3 months (Koopmanschap MA, Rutten FF et al. 1995).which is varied to 6, 12 and 
24 months in the sensitivity analysis. 
 
Taxation effects 
 
The taxation effects for all short term absences (HCA and FCA) are determined by 
applying the relevant marginal tax rates of 2003 to the days of absence averted, 
converted to years, valued at net present value of the gross annual wages of the relevant 
age and sex group (incorporating participation rates and the wage multiplier). Using the 
HCA, longer term taxation is valued as the net present value of the current and future 
tax payable based on the future income stream of the people who benefit from the 
intervention, (dead or prematurely retired due to ill health), ignoring the impact of 
potential compensation mechanisms. Using the FCA, the taxation effects of long term 
absences are determined by applying the relevant marginal tax rates of 2003 to gross 
annual wages earned in the friction period (incorporating participation rates and the 
wage multiplier, since compensation mechanisms may occur).  If the friction period is 
three months, one- quarter of an equivalent year’s tax is included; if the friction period 
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is six months, half an equivalent year’s tax is included in the calculation. Calculating 
the tax effects this way we assume the taxation impact occurs instantly the employee 
retires prematurely, and that no employee sickness benefits are paid. Data on the 
proportion of employees covered by long term sickness benefits would be needed to 
refine the model further. 
 
Welfare effects 
 
Welfare effects are estimated using a proportion of the excess of long term non-
participation rate in the exposed/ diseased group compared to the Australian 
participation rate. Eligibility for Disability Pension status is dependent on multiple 
factors that include health and non-health status such as marital status, other income, an 
asset test, and residency status. In 2003, 90% of employees had superannuation 
entitlements (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2003) but it is difficult to predict how 
many of them had disability cover as part of their superannuation entitlements. We 
have assumed that 50% of the non-participating exposed/ diseased group below 40 
years of age and 40% of male and female non-participating exposed/ diseased group 
over 40 years of age would be eligible for Disability pensions if permanently removed 
from the work force due to ill health. The net present value of the current and future 
welfare payments to age 65 is estimated using the disability pension payment rate for 
2003, discounted at the base rate of 3.5%.  
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3 Assumptions  
The following lists a number of important assumptions that have been required:  
 
1. Forty eight weeks are worked per year. 
2. Retirement age is 65 for both men and women. 
3. Short term absences from the workplace are caused by ill health. 
4. A reduction in ill health will lead to fewer short term absences, other factors 
remaining equal. 
5. Short term absences cover visits to both health professionals and hospital stays. 
6. Exposed/ diseased groups reduce their rate of short term absences to the 
Australian average rate, in the year of the intervention. Risk reduction is 
actually likely to take some time to manifest itself in fewer absences in the 
coming years. These time delays to risk reduction are not incorporated into the 
model.  
7. Work force participation rates are related to health status. 
8. An improvement in health status will lead to higher work force participation, 
other factors remaining equal. 
9. Wages are expressed in real terms with 0.016 real growth per annum 
incorporated. 
10. The current wage rates and structure across age and gender will be maintained 
into the future. 
11. Current taxation rates remain constant until all beneficiaries of any health 
intervention reach retirement age or death. 
12. Taxation effects occur as soon as an employee retires prematurely.  
13. Training and recruitment costs are a percentage estimate of gross wages which 
rises in parallel with wage rates. 
14. Eligibility for a disability support pension occurs in 50% of employees under 
the age of 40 and 40% above that age.  
15. Self report data from the National Health Survey is sufficiently valid and 
reliable on exposure to risk factors and illnesses of interest to the project. 
16. Presenteeism (being present at work but working at less than full productivity) 
is not incorporated. 
17. The presence of multiple risk factors in employees has not been incorporated. 
Each risk factor has been evaluated in isolation. 
18. Population of 2003 is held static into the future. 
19. Disease epidemiology does not incorporate any trends. 
  53
4 Outputs 
 
We can report the 95% uncertainty interval around the median values of total 
production losses, for each intervention and scenario tested. These reports for the base 
case are presented in Part D for each intervention. These reports answer the questions: - 
Does an intervention switch from being a cost to the health sector to being a net gain 
to society, after inclusion of production gains? Do the HCA and FCA generate 
different estimates of production gains, for the same intervention? 
 
We report in detail for each intervention, and each scenario tested, the HCA and the 
FCA point estimates of production gains expected from an intervention, broken down 
by age and sex. The production gains are separated into mortality and morbidity 
components. The taxation effects and welfare effects are separately reported by age and 
sex. The base case is presented for each intervention in Appendix 3. This report 
answers the questions: - What is the distribution of production gains, taxation and 
welfare across age groups and gender? What is the comparative contribution of 
mortality and morbidity to total production gains for each intervention? How do 
these distributions and contributions vary by HCA and FCA? 
 
We can present production gains, taxation and welfare effects for each scenario where 
important input variables are changed, including discount rates of zero, 3.5%, 5% and 
7%; friction period of 3, 6, 12 and 24 months; and both gender-based and gender-free 
annual wages. Reports for each intervention are presented in Appendix 4. This report 
answers the questions: - Are the production gains and impact per DALY sensitive to 
any of the parameter values incorporated into the base model? Do these sensitivities 
vary by HCA and FCA? 
 
Simulation results from @RISK can be provided highlighting graphically the likely 
distribution of the outputs of interest, and the most important inputs contributing to the 
uncertainty in the results under each scenario. A summary of the most important input 
variables for each intervention is presented in Appendix 5: Table 42 and Table 43. 
These reports identify the input variables that are most important to the variation 
surrounding the estimates of production gains, taxation effects and welfare effects 
using HCA and FCA: These are most likely to include (a) participation rates among 
Australians and the exposed/diseased group for the most affected age groups; (b) the 
wage multiplier; and (c) absenteeism rates among Australians and the exposed group 
for the most affected age groups.  
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Part D: Application of Production Gains Model to 22 
Interventions  
1 Comparative analysis overview  
 
A number of criteria were identified for the selection of suitable interventions. The pool 
of interventions to be considered within the current study was largely drawn from 
completed analyses within the previous and current ACE studies. Within the ACE 
projects the following selection criteria have previously been used to guide the 
selection of interventions from all the possible health interventions that may exist: 
1. Size of the health problem addressed; 
2. Importance in terms of current investment; 
3. Relevance to current policy decision-making; 
4. Availability of evidence of efficacy/effectiveness to support the analyses;  
5. Indications that additional investment for an intervention would lead to 
significant health gain or, conversely, that decreased investment would lead to 
little or no reduction in health outcomes; 
6. The ability to specify the intervention in clear concrete terms to facilitate 
meaningful evaluation; 
7. The inclusion of a mix of interventions from across the prevention pathway and 
from a range of settings; 
8. Specific relevance to the health of Indigenous Australians (for the Indigenous 
component of the analysis); and 
9. Considerations of program logic (for example, the inclusion of an option that is 
ineffective as a stand-alone intervention or for which there is poor effectiveness 
evidence, but which is integral to the success of a package of interventions). 
 
For this production gains and losses project, a number of additional criteria were 
identified to help focus the selection of the pilot evaluations. These were: 
1. A range of priority diseases and risk factors need to be represented (mental, 
cardiovascular, diabetes, cancer, obesity, alcohol use, physical inactivity, smoking); 
2. The need to consider a range of primary and secondary prevention as well as 
treatment options;  
3. Previous economic evaluation taking a health sector perspective needs to be 
completed or be near to completion within the current project timelines; 
4. Production gains and losses are to be attainable within a 25 year timeframe 
(excluded at June 26 Steering Committee meeting, as not relevant and a 
potential cause of bias in results ); 
5. Production gains and losses are to be measurable within the project timelines (by 
Dec 2007); 
6. A range of funders are to be considered; and 
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7. Any other more recent issues that might affect the acceptability of the intervention 
e.g. HPV vaccine will take effect in the near future, modifying need for cervical 
cancer screening as practiced or modeled. 
 
These criteria were used to guide the selection of the interventions. It became clear 
during the course of the project that interventions aimed at the disease diabetes or pre-
diabetes, were not going to be available within the project timeframe. For this reason a 
threshold analysis is offered and included in Part E of this report for diabetes only.  
League tables  
The following 2 tables (Table 6 and Table 7) present a snapshot of our findings for each 
of the interventions, while Table 8 ranks them on the criterion of their of incremental 
cost effectiveness ratio (ICER). The major findings include: 
 
1. In general the production gains due to a health intervention reduce the net cost to 
society of health interventions by generating additions to the gross income of 
individuals, increasing taxation payments and reducing welfare payments.  
2. Two interventions become ‘dominant’ (i.e. saving health and saving money) after 
consideration of production gains with HCA (Maintenance CBT for 5 years and 
random breath testing). 
3. The largest production gains using HCA occur with the Community Heart Health 
program which is compared against a ‘do nothing’ comparator.  
4. Eight interventions return production gains above $100M using HCA. 
5. Only one intervention (the brief GP alcohol intervention) does not generate 
production gains using HCA.  
6. The taxation effects are larger than the welfare effects using HCA, but not 
necessarily so with FCA. 
7. Three interventions were dominant before consideration of the production gains 
using HCA or FCA and become more dominant after this analysis. 
8. Only one intervention becomes dominant after consideration of production gains 
with FCA (Brief GP alcohol intervention). 
9. The same interventions appear at the top of the league table based on median 
production gains for both HCA and FCA. The SunSmart and Cervical Cancer 
screening interventions compare current practice to a ‘do nothing’ and reflect 
programs running over 15 or 20 years.  
10. The largest production gains using FCA occur with the Community Heart Health 
program. 
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Table 6: Comparative production gains using the Human Capital Approach: base case scenario - 3.5% discount and gender based 
wages 
Risk 
Factor 
 
Intervention Comparator Incident 
cases 
averted 
(deaths 
averted) 
Median 
Production 
Gains 
(Losses) 
($M) 
Uncertainty 
interval 
($M) 
Net cost 
(benefit) 
to health 
sector 
($M) 
Net cost 
(benefit) 
to 
society 
($M) 
Taxation 
effects 
($M) 
Welfare 
effects 
($M) 
          
1 Alcohol use Brief GP intervention Current 
practice 
156 (6) (1.9) (4) – (0.4) 0.17 2.1 (0.44) (0.81) 
2 Alcohol use Random Breath testing Doing nothing 1100 (96) 93 80 - 110 55 (39) 15 0.31 
3 Cervical 
Cancer 
Cervical Cancer 
Screening (current 
practice) 
Doing nothing 14,000 (4,900) 840 740 - 950 2600 1700 65 (18) 
4 CVD risk 
factors 
ACE inhibitors targeted at 
10% risk group 
Current 
practice 
2,300 (120) 21 10 - 33 1000 990 1.9 0.23 
5 CVD risk 
factors 
ACE inhibitors targeted at 
5% risk group 
Current 
practice 
24,000 (820) 400 200 - 610 3100 2700 41 15 
6 CVD risk 
factors 
Beta blockers targeted at 
15% risk group 
Current 
practice 
120 (14) 2.2 1.7 – 2.8 460 450 0.14 (0.010) 
7 CVD risk 
factors 
Beta blockers targeted at 
5% risk group 
Current 
practice 
16,000 (620) 280 150 - 420 1600 1300 27 9.4 
8 CVD risk 
factors 
Combination  targeted at 
15% risk group 
Current 
practice 
4,700 (250) 51 25 - 80 5500 5500 4.4 1.6 
9 CVD risk 
factors 
Community Heart Health 
Program 
Doing nothing 57,000 (2,200) 1,700 1,000 – 2,500 (620) (2300) 230 60 
10 CVD risk 
factors 
Dietary counselling 
targeted at 10% risk group 
Current 
practice 
1600 (70) 14 5 - 22 260 250 1.3 0.20 
11 CVD risk 
factors 
Dietary counselling 
targeted at 5% risk group 
Current 
practice 
10,000 (290) 150 73 - 240 790 640 16 6.5 
12 Depression Maintenance CBT for 5 
years with private 
psychiatrist 
Current 
practice 
16,000 (250) 320 290 - 360 670 350 46 34 
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Risk 
Factor 
 
Intervention Comparator Incident 
cases 
averted 
(deaths 
averted) 
Median 
Production 
Gains 
(Losses) 
($M) 
Uncertainty 
interval 
($M) 
Net cost 
(benefit) 
to health 
sector 
($M) 
Net cost 
(benefit) 
to 
society 
($M) 
Taxation 
effects 
($M) 
Welfare 
effects 
($M) 
13 Depression Maintenance CBT for 5 
years with public 
psychologist 
Current 
practice 
16,000 (250) 320 290 - 360 240 (88) 46 34 
14 Depression Maintenance SSRIs for 5 
years 
Current 
practice 
24,000 (240) 390 340 - 440 2400 2000 56 52 
15 Depression Opportunistic screening + 
CBT 
Current 
practice 
7,700 (12) 49 40 - 59 320 270 7.5 9.5 
16 Physical 
inactivity 
Active GP script Current 
practice 
1700 (120) 22 16 - 30 150 130 1.6 0.073 
17 Physical 
inactivity 
Exercise physiologist Current 
practice 
430 (34) 9 7 - 12 38 29 0.68 0.097 
18 
Schizophrenia 
Vocational Rehabilitation Current 
practice 
0 (0) 5.4 3.3 – 8.3   0.3 1.3 
19 Smoking Bupropion Current 
practice 
2,000 (190) 52 44 - 61 81 29 4.2 2 
20 Smoking Call back counselling Current 
practice 
26 (1.2) 0.27 0.20 - 0.34 (0.48) (0.74) 0.018 0.012 
21 Smoking Nicotine Replacement 
Therapy 
Current 
practice 
2,800 (260) 72 61 - 85 250 180 5.8 2.7 
22 Sunlight 
exposure 
SunSmart program Doing nothing 33,000 (750) 422 (200) – 1,100 (7) (430) 95 (47) 
Notes: 
Net cost to health sector is the cost of the health intervention minus the cost offsets to the health sector, before consideration of production gains 
Net cost to society is the net cost to all sectors after inclusion of production gains and losses  
Uncertainty interval represents the range of values within which 95% of production gains are expected to occur 
Rounding to 2 significant digits has been applied. Greater detail is included in individual intervention summaries 
Table is sorted alphabetically on risk factor and intervention name 
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Table 7: Comparative production gains using the Friction Cost Approach; base case scenario - 3.5% discount and gender based wages 
and 3 months friction period. 
Risk 
Factor 
 
Intervention Comparator Incident 
cases 
averted 
(deaths 
averted) 
Median 
Production 
Gains 
(Losses) 
($M) 
Uncertainty 
interval 
($M) 
Net cost 
(benefit) 
to health 
sector 
($M) 
Net cost 
(benefit) 
to society 
($M) 
Taxation 
effects 
($M) 
Welfare 
effects 
($M) 
          
1 Alcohol use Brief GP intervention Current 
practice 
156 (6) 0.19 (0.15) – 0.83 0.17 (0.03) 0.04 (0.81) 
2 Alcohol use Random Breath testing Doing nothing 1100 (96) 2 1 - 3 55 52 0.11 0.31 
3 Cervical 
Cancer 
Cervical Cancer Screening 
(current practice) 
Doing nothing 14,000 (4,900) 91 64 - 130 2600 2500 8 (18) 
4 CVD risk 
factors 
ACE inhibitors targeted at 
10% risk group 
Current 
practice 
2,300 (120) 5 3 - 8 1000 1000 1.1 0.23 
5 CVD risk 
factors 
ACE inhibitors targeted at 
5% risk group 
Current 
practice 
24,000 (820) 63 33 - 120 3100 3000 20 15 
 
6 CVD risk 
factors 
Beta blockers targeted at 
15% risk group 
Current 
practice 
120 (14) 0.4 0.3 – 0.6 460 460 0.054 (0.010) 
7 CVD risk 
factors 
Beta blockers targeted at 5% 
risk group 
Current 
practice 
16,000 (620) 44 23 - 79 1600 1500 13 9.4 
8 CVD risk 
factors 
Combination  targeted at 
15% risk group 
Current 
practice 
4,700 (250) 12 7 - 20 5500 5500 2.6 1.6 
9 CVD risk 
factors 
Community Heart Health 
Program 
Doing nothing 57,000 (2,200) 270 120 - 510 (620) (880) 96 60 
10 CVD risk 
factors 
Dietary counselling targeted 
at 10% risk group 
Current 
practice 
1600 (70) 3 2 - 6 260 260 0.78 0.20 
11 CVD risk 
factors 
Dietary counselling targeted 
at 5% risk group 
Current 
practice 
10,000 (290) 25 12 - 49 790 770 8.3 6.5 
12 Depression Maintenance CBT for 5 
years with private 
psychiatrist 
Current 
practice 
16,000 (250) 53 36 - 73 670 620 5.5 34 
13 Depression Maintenance CBT for 5 Current 16,000 (250) 53 36 - 73 240 180 5.5 34 
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Risk 
Factor 
 
Intervention Comparator Incident 
cases 
averted 
(deaths 
averted) 
Median 
Production 
Gains 
(Losses) 
($M) 
Uncertainty 
interval 
($M) 
Net cost 
(benefit) 
to health 
sector 
($M) 
Net cost 
(benefit) 
to society 
($M) 
Taxation 
effects 
($M) 
Welfare 
effects 
($M) 
years with public 
psychologist 
practice 
14 Depression Maintenance SSRIs for 5 
years 
Current 
practice 
24,000 (240) 76 52 - 110 2400 2300 8.2 52 
15 Depression Opportunistic screening + 
CBT 
Current 
practice 
7,700 (12) 19 13 - 26 320 300 
 
1.7 9.5 
16 Physical 
inactivity 
Active GP script Current 
practice 
1700 (120) 3 2 - 5 150 140 0.47 0.075 
17 Physical 
inactivity 
Exercise physiologist Current 
practice 
430 (34) 1 1 - 2 38 37 0.15 0.097 
18 
Schizophrenia 
Vocational Rehabilitation Current 
practice 
0 (0) 5.4 3.3 – 8.3   0.3 1.3 
19 Smoking Bupropion Current 
practice 
2,000 (190) 7 4 - 10 81 75 0.97 2 
20 Smoking Call back counselling Current 
practice 
26 (1.2) 0.04 0.013 – 0.073 (0.48) (0.52) 0.006 0.012 
21 Smoking Nicotine Replacement 
Therapy 
Current 
practice 
2,800 (260) 9 5 - 14 250 240 1.3 2.7 
22 Sunlight 
exposure 
SunSmart program Doing nothing 33,000 (750) 135 32 - 344 (7) (140) 47 (47) 
Notes: 
Net cost to health sector is the cost of the health intervention minus the cost offsets to the health sector, before consideration of production gains 
Net cost to society is the net cost to all sectors after inclusion of production gains and losses  
Uncertainty interval represents the range of values within which 95% of production gains are expected to occur 
Rounding to 2 significant digits has been applied. Greater detail is included in individual intervention summaries 
Table is sorted alphabetically on risk factor and intervention name 
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Table 8: Comparative ranking of interventions on cost-effectiveness ratios before and after inclusion of production gains  
Risk Factor 
 
Intervention Ranking 
before 
production 
gains 
Ranking 
after 
production 
gains 
HCA 
Ranking 
after 
production 
gains 
FCA 
ICER 
before 
production 
gains 
($) 
ICER 
after 
production 
gains ($) 
HCA 
ICER 
after 
production 
gains ($) 
FCA 
CVD risk factors Community Heart Health Program 1 1 1 Dominant Dominant Dominant 
Smoking Call back counselling 2 2 2 Dominant Dominant Dominant 
Sunlight exposure SunSmart program 3 3 3 Dominant Dominant Dominant 
Alcohol use Brief GP intervention 4 8 4 1,000 13,000 Dominant 
Depression Maintenance CBT for 5 years with public psychologist 5 5 5 2,000 Dominant 1,500 
Depression Maintenance CBT for 5 years with private psychiatrist 6 6 6 5,600 2,900 5,200 
Smoking Bupropion 7 7 7 8,600 3,000 7,900 
CVD risk factors Beta blockers targeted at15% risk group 8 11 9 18,000 18,000 18,000 
Smoking Nicotine Replacement Therapy 9 9 8 19,000 14,000 18,000 
CVD risk factors Dietary counselling targeted at 10% risk group 10 12 10 20,000 19,000 20,000 
Alcohol use Random Breath testing 11 4 11 21,000 Dominant 20,000 
Cervical Cancer Cervical Cancer Screening (current practice) 12 10 12 22,000 15,000 21,000 
Physical inactivity Active GP script 13 14 14 22,000 19,000 22,000 
Depression Maintenance SSRIs for 5 years 14 13 13 23,000 19,000 22,000 
CVD risk factors Dietary counselling targeted at 5%risk group 15 15 15 26,000 21,000 26,000 
CVD risk factors ACE inhibitors targeted at 10% risk group 16 17 17 29,000 29,000 29,000 
CVD risk factors Beta blockers targeted at 5% risk group 17 16 16 31,000 25,000 30,000 
CVD risk factors ACE inhibitors targeted at 5% risk group 18 18 18 39,000 34,000 38,000 
CVD risk factors Combination  targeted at 15% risk group 19 19 19 39,000 38,000 38,000 
Physical inactivity Exercise physiologist 20 20 20 49,000 38,000 48,000 
Depression Opportunistic screening + CBT 21 21 21 56,000 48,000 53,000 
Notes 
Table is sorted on ranking before inclusion of production gains Dominant means cost saving and health generating at the same time 
ICER before production gains is the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio calculated as the net cost of the intervention (to the health sector), divided by the health benefit of the intervention, measured in disability 
adjusted life years gained 
ICER after production gains is the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio calculated as the net cost of the intervention (to the broader society), divided by the health benefit of the intervention, measured in disability 
adjusted life years gained 
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Strengths and weaknesses of the data sources 
 
1. Longitudinal cohort data would be the best data to use in this analysis, as we are 
estimating the impact on work force behaviour of reduction/elimination of risk 
factors in the working age population. This data may become available in future as 
Australian cohort studies (in cancer) publish long term data. In the absence of such 
longitudinal cohort data we have relied on the most recent cross sectional National 
Health Survey which includes an examination of the work force status and work 
place behaviours of Australians, and allows us to compare sub populations that 
have disease or risk factors, with other Australians. Data captured in the National 
Health Survey is self-reported and not verified. This may lead to overstatement or 
understatement of the work place behaviour differences in sub populations used in 
this analysis, compared to the Australian average.  Many health conditions are 
poorly understood or recognized by the general population - diabetes and obesity in 
particular are known to be under-reported (Vos T and Begg, S. 2001) as are the 
behavioural risk factors of smoking and alcohol use. Cancers, cardiovascular 
disease and depression could similarly be under- or over-diagnosed by survey 
participants. It is difficult to know the direction of the bias this may have introduced 
to the calculation of production gains. 
2. The number of people included in the National Health Survey, within age groups 
varies by sub-population examined and can introduce volatility to estimates of 
workplace behaviour.  
3. We believe the higher than average work force participation rates in some age 
groups, of some sub-populations, (for example smokers and risky drinkers), reflects 
non-health characteristics of the relevant groups. By not modifying the relevant 
participation rates, we may underestimate the total production gains, taxation and 
welfare effects by introducing negative impacts in these sub-populations. 
4. The calculation of the welfare effects in this analysis is particularly simplified 
because reliable data on eligibility criteria for welfare payments of sub populations 
is not readily available. Data was not taken from the National Health Survey and is 
based on estimates of eligibility with out strong empirical basis. The estimates have 
not as yet been compared to any reported statistics of total disability welfare 
payments. The definition of disability used in the eligibility criteria for welfare 
payments varies from the chronic disease frame of reference applied in this model 
also, rendering comparisons difficult if not meaningless.  The assumptions 
incorporated into the excel model can however be varied and the subject of 
additional sensitivity analysis, if additional data becomes available.  
5. Estimates of the taxation effects are likely to be overstated to the extent that people 
continue to earn their usual salary while on sick leave for some extended period. 
We have assumed a rapid transition to welfare status when an individual leaves the 
workforce due to ongoing serious ill health. 
6. The health impact analyses, on which these results are based, have limitations of 
their own within the estimates of cost-effectiveness (these are detailed within 
available briefing papers for the ACE-Prevention and other ACE studies)18. All 
                                                 
18 Please contact the authors of this report for further details regarding any ACE briefing papers or 
publications relevant to the 22 interventions evaluated in this study. 
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efforts have been made to ensure accurate, reliable data has been used, but errors 
and omissions are possible and have been brought to our attention wherever 
possible. The cardiovascular model is currently subject to revision, but will not be 
available within the timeframe of this study. The impact of the revision is expected 
to be marginal only. The second filter assessment of each intervention identifies the 
strength of the evidence on which the estimates are based. 
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2 Detailed analysis of 22 interventions  
Alcohol harm prevention programs 
 
The absenteeism rates and workforce participation rates of male and female high risk 
drinkers over a 7 day period compared to the Australian average is presented in the four 
charts in Figure 1. These high risk drinkers tend to have more days off at younger ages 
but participate at higher levels in the workforce than average (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics 2004 - 05) possibly reflecting non- health characteristics of the population. 
This phenomenon would lead us to expect net production losses (using the current 
simple production gains/losses model) by alcohol harm prevention programs which 
target high risk drinkers. If we were able to compare the absenteeism and participation 
rates of people with alcohol related health problems, rather than high risk drinkers, we 
would expect lower participation rates and higher absenteeism to be reflected across all 
ages.  
 
Figure 1: Workforce participation and absenteeism rates of people who drink at 
moderate and high risk levels over a week and average Australians, by age and 
sex, National Health Survey 2004/5. 
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1 Brief GP alcohol intervention 
 
a. Description of intervention and its costs and benefits from a health 
sector perspective 
 
This is a nation-wide implementation of routine screening of Australian GP patients for 
hazardous and harmful drinking levels followed by opportunistic GP advice to reduce 
drinking levels. An effective brief intervention consists of: screening by a GP using the 
Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test (AUDIT); counselling provided by the GP 
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on the level of alcohol consumption and advice to decrease consumption to safer levels; 
the provision of written materials to reinforce the GP message and provide a reference 
regarding what is considered to be safe drinking levels; and a follow-up consultation to 
monitor and provide any further advice relevant to alcohol consumption. The target 
population is hazardous and harmful drinkers presenting to a GP. In ACE: Prevention 
the cost perspective is that of the health system, including all government and patient 
contributions to drug costs and medical visits. Life time costs and cost offsets were 
modelled for the cohort of 18 to 80 year olds, until death or age 100 years with a 
discount rate of 3%. Costs of the intervention have been calculated on the basis of 
1.54% of high risk drinkers being offered the brief GP intervention. The key costs of 
this intervention included: GP consult and follow up, written materials and the AUDIT 
questionnaire. In 2003 if 1.54% of high risk drinkers participated in this brief GP 
intervention, from a health sector perspective, the intervention would have a net cost of 
$1,044 for each DALY averted. See Table 9. 
 
b. Intervention specific assumptions and caveats related to health 
 
Assumptions include that drinkers visit a GP at the same rate as non-drinkers, that 22% 
of GPs screen for drinking behaviour, that 84% of GPs can detect drinking behaviour 
using AUDIT, that 10% of GPs offer the intervention and that 70% of high risk 
drinkers return for follow-up consultation. Under these assumptions 1.54% of the 1.8 
million hazardous and harmful drinkers in Australia in 2003 between the ages of 18 and 
80 would be offered the intervention. 
 
c. Second stage filters as appropriate 
 
GPs are already busy and unlikely to increase detection unless a more intensive 
recruitment effort/ support package is provided. 
 
d. Intervention specific assumptions and caveats related to production 
gains 
 
The risk level associated with alcohol use (moderate and high) was determined by 
reference to drinking patterns measured over a seven day period, assessed using the 
National Health Survey 2004/5 
  
e. Mortality and morbidity benefits among workforce age group 
 
The main outcome measure was the Disability Adjusted Life Years averted. The risk of 
alcohol-related mortality and morbidity is reduced in former high risk drinkers 
compared to lower risk drinkers, as excess risk is reversed both immediately (e.g. 
reduced accidents) and over time (e.g. cancer risk and liver damage). The intervention 
saves very few lives while the reduction in morbidity is greater in the younger age 
groups compared to older ages. Seventy percent of morbidity reduction occurs in 
people under the age of 35. 
 
f. Production gains, taxation and welfare effects 
 
The production gains model calculates the value of lost production that would be 
averted if people were to reduce their alcohol consumption and avoid the negative 
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health effects of alcohol-related accidents and illness. The model indicates that the 
inclusion of production gains would increase the cost to society over the health sector 
costs alone because of the surveyed higher workforce participation rate of heavy 
drinkers compared to the average for all Australians (both male and female) (Australian 
Bureau of Statistics 2004 - 05). The small production gains due to reduced mortality are 
outweighed by the larger morbidity based production losses of this intervention. Using 
the HCA method from the wider societal perspective after incorporating production 
losses of $2.09 million (95% UI -$4.18 – +$0.26), the intervention has a net societal 
cost of $2.25 million (95% UI -$4.47 – +$0.36). The intervention has less than a 10% 
chance of generating production gains. Using the FCA method, the intervention has a 
50% chance of becoming dominant at $0.01 million (-$0.45 – +$0.9) after 
incorporating only $0.18 million (-$0.16 - +$0.80) production gains.  See Table 9.  The 
impact on the cost per DALY saved is an increase from $1,044 to $14,067 using the 
HCA method or reduction from $1,044 to dominant (saving costs and improving 
health) using the FCA method.  
 
Table 9: Summary base case. Brief GP intervention 
Brief GP alcohol intervention
3 months , 3.5%, gender wages median LL 2.5% UL 97.5% median LL 2.5% UL 97.5%
$M $M $M $M $M $M
Cost of intervention State Govt $1.40 $0.92 $2.00 $1.40 $0.92 $2.00
Cost (offsets) $1.23 $0.63 $2.09 $1.23 $0.63 $2.09
Net cost to Health Sector $0.17 $0.29 ($0.10) $0.17 $0.29 ($0.10)
Production gains ($1.92) ($4.06) $0.41 $0.19 ($0.15) $0.83
Net cost to society $2.08 $4.34 ($0.51) ($0.03) $0.44 ($0.93)
DALYs saved 160 92 250 160 92 250
Net cost per DALY saved Health sector $1,044 $3,141 ($394) $1,044 $3,141 ($394)
Net cost per DALY saved All sectors $13,008 $47,377 ($2,052) dominant
Impact on cost/DALY ($11,964) ($44,236) $1,658
Human Capital Approach Friction Cost Approach
 
 
g. Most important contributor to the uncertainty of results 
 
The input variable that is most important to the variability in the estimates of 
production gains using HCA is the participation rate among risk exposed males aged 20 
- 29. HCA estimates are usually dominated by the long term absences but in this 
intervention the benefits are mostly reductions in morbidity among young males.  
 
The input variable that is most important to the variability in the estimates of 
production gains using FCA is the absenteeism rate among males risk exposed aged 30 
- 39. Short term absences are relatively more important in the FCA than the HCA. 
 
The input variable that is most important to the taxation effects using HCA is the 
participation rate among risk exposed males aged 20 - 29. The taxation effects are 
directly based on production gains. 
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The input variable that is most important to the taxation effects using FCA is the 
absenteeism rate among males risk exposed aged 35 – 39 and 50 - 54. Short term 
absences are relatively more important in the FCA than the HCA. The taxation effects 
are directly based on production gains. The higher wage rates of the older age groups 
also affect the calculation of taxation effects. 
 
The input variable that is most important to the welfare effects using HCA or FCA is 
the participation rate of the males risk exposed aged 20 – 29 where most health benefits 
occur. 
 
h. Sensitivity analysis – effects of discount rates, friction period, wages 
rates 
 
In scenario analysis, the conclusion of the HCA method is not altered by changing the 
discount rates or wage rates while the results of the FCA method are sensitive to 
discount rates since there is only a 50% chance of the production gains exceeding the 
net cost of the intervention to the health sector. 
 
i. Interpretation of results 
 
This is a very cost effective intervention from a health sector perspective but it has 
restricted reach, averting less than 200 cases of morbidity and less than 10 deaths. The 
source data which shows that people who drink at high risk levels have higher than 
average workforce participation rates leads to the unusual results.  
 
2 Random Breath Testing 
 
a. Description of intervention and its costs and benefits from a health 
sector perspective 
 
Untargetted random breath testing (stationery supplemented by mobile testing) has a 
deterrent effect on the practice of driving under the influence of alcohol, if the testing is 
highly visible, rigorously enforced and extensively advertised. The effect of the 
intervention is the reduction in fatal and non-fatal road traffic accidents and applies to 
all drivers, not only those who drink to risky levels. The RBT intervention reduces all 
road traffic accidents (RTAs) (fatal and nonfatal) by 15%. Other types of accidents are 
unaffected. The comparator is the do nothing case (null).  
 
The ACE prevention alcohol model reduces incident Years Lived with a Disability 
(ylds) by 15% mostly in the year of the intervention with some remaining influence into 
the future. In ACE: Prevention the cost perspective is usually that of the health system, 
including all government and patient contributions to drug costs and medical visits. 
This intervention is undertaken in the State Government police sector. Life time costs 
and cost offsets were modelled for the cohort of 18 to 80 year old drivers, until death or 
age 100 years with a discount rate of 3%. Costs of the intervention have been calculated 
on the basis of one random breath test per driver per year. The key costs of this 
intervention included: police enforcement of the intervention, annualised vehicle costs 
and media publicity. The cost of license suspension to the driver is not included. In 
2003 if random breath testing is enforced, from a State Government sector perspective 
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the intervention would have a net cost of $55 million ($51 - $55) and a net cost of 
$21,400 for each DALY averted. See Table 10. 
 
b. Intervention specific assumptions and caveats related to health 
 
The intervention as currently modelled runs for one year only. 
 
c. Second stage filters as appropriate 
 
No concerns identified at this stage. 
 
d. Intervention specific assumptions and caveats related to production 
gains 
 
This intervention differs from other targeted alcohol harm reduction interventions. We 
add assumptions to the production gains model to incorporate the potential impact on 
all drivers rather than a target group (high risk drinkers) whose workplace behaviour is 
reflected in surveyed participation rates and absenteeism (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics 2004 - 05). We assume all the possible non-fatal illness in the community that 
could explain absenteeism in the Australian workforce in any one year is represented 
by total prevalent ylds. Prevalent ylds represent one year of ill health undiscounted 
weighted for severity of the health state. Person years lived with a disability (Pylds) for 
RTAs represent one year of disability due to long term current and past injuries. RTAs 
account for 5 - 35% of all pylds for males and 2-13% for females in 2003, across all 
age groups. The reduction in incident RTA ylds due to the RBT intervention is 
deducted from the prevalent ylds for RTAs and the proportional change determined in 
total pylds in 2003 by age group and sex. This percentage reduction in total pylds is 
interpreted as the percent reduction in short term absenteeism and workforce 
participation rate across the workforce population that is averted due to the RBT 
intervention. The percent reduction for males varies between 0.1 and 0.5% and for 
females between 0.1 and 0.2%. 
 
e. Mortality and morbidity benefits among workforce age group 
 
The main outcome measure was the Disability Adjusted Life Years averted through a 
reduction of the risk of alcohol-related mortality and morbidity. The intervention 
reduces fatal accidents by 15% and is assumed to reduce non-fatal accidents by the 
same proportion. The greatest impact is on single vehicle, night time accidents. Seventy 
percent of the mortality and morbidity reduction occurs in people under the age of 35 
and between 6 and 8 times more frequently in males. 
 
f. Production gains, taxation and welfare effects 
 
Using the HCA method (base case incorporating 3.5% discount rate and gender based 
wages) from the wider societal perspective incorporating the production gains of 
quitting of $93 million ($80 – $110), the intervention becomes dominant (saving health 
and dollars). Using the FCA method, the intervention remains a net cost to society of 
$52 million ($50 – $53) after incorporating production gains of only $2 million ($1 - 
$3). See Table 10. The impact on the cost per DALY saved is greater than $21,000 
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achieving dominance using the HCA method, or a small reduction of $810 from 
$21,400 to $20,600 using the FCA method. 
 
Table 10: Summary base case. Random breath testing 
Random breath testing
3 months , 3.5%, gender wages median LL 2.5% UL 97.5% median LL 2.5% UL 97.5%
$M $M $M $M $M $M
Cost of intervention State Govt $71 $57 $85 $71 $57 $85
Cost (offsets) $16 $6 $29 $16 $6 $29
Net cost to Health Sector $55 $51 $55 $55 $51 $55
Production gains $93 $80 $107 $2 $1 $3
Net cost to society ($39) ($28) ($51) $52 $50 $53
DALYs saved 2548 895 4418 2548 895 4418
Net cost per DALY saved Health sector $21,402 $57,217 $12,550 $21,402 $57,217 $12,550
Net cost per DALY saved All sectors dominant intervention $20,592 $55,550 $11,919
Impact on cost/DALY $810 $1,667 $631
Human Capital Approach Friction Cost Approach
 
 
g. Most important contributor to the uncertainty of results 
 
The input variable that is most important to the variability in the estimates of 
production gains using HCA is the participation rate among males aged 20 - 24. This 
age group benefits the most from the intervention in reduced incidence of illness and 
deaths. HCA estimates are dominated by the long term absences.  
 
The input variable that is most important to the variability in the estimates of 
production gains using FCA is the comparative absenteeism rate among males aged 35 
- 39. Short term absences are relatively more important in the FCA than the HCA. 
 
The input variable that is most important to the taxation effects using HCA is the 
participation rate among males aged 20 - 24. The taxation effects are directly based on 
production gains. 
 
The input variable that is most important to the taxation effects using FCA is the 
absenteeism rate among males aged 35 – 39. Short term absences are relatively more 
important in the FCA than the HCA. The taxation effects are directly based on 
production gains.  
 
The input variable that is most important to the welfare effects using HCA or FCA is 
the participation rate of the males aged 20 – 24 where most health benefits occur. 
 
h. Sensitivity analysis – effects of discount rates, friction period, wages 
rates 
 
Changing the length of the friction period or the discount rates in scenario analysis does 
not alter the main conclusion. In contrast using gender free wage rates does 
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dramatically reduce the amount of production gains and changes the conclusion of 
dominance under the HCA method since this intervention greatly benefits young males. 
 
i. Interpretation of results 
 
This very cost effective intervention becomes dominant using the HCA and marginally 
improved using the FCA. 
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Early detection of cervical cancer 
3 Cervical cancer screening 
 
a. Description of intervention and its costs and benefits from a health 
sector perspective 
 
Current practice for cervical cancer screening is a 2-yearly screening by conventional 
Pap test delivered through the National Cervical Screening Program (NCSP). All 
women aged 18 to 69 who have ever been sexually active and have no symptoms or 
history suggestive of cervical pathology should receive routine Pap screening 
biannually. Women aged over 70 who have never had a Pap smear, or who request a 
Pap smear, should also be screened. Health outcomes are estimated as deaths averted, 
cervical cancer incidence prevented, and QALY gained using disability weights from 
the Australian BoD study (2003). The number of deaths averted and cervical cancer 
incidence prevented due to screening is calculated from the difference of mortality and 
incidence rates between the null scenario and the intervention. The costs of cervical 
cancer screening are assessed in two components, (a) screening program costs; and (b) 
costs associated with abnormal screening results. An average cost for each stage of 
cervical abnormality is estimated by pathway analysis with an analytic decision model. 
The number of abnormal cases is multiplied by the average cost for each stage of 
cervical abnormality to obtain the total cost. Cost offset is achieved by reducing the 
costs of treatment of invasive cervical cancer through early detection and treatment of 
the cervical precancerous lesions. With the current participation rate in the NCSP 
(AIHW 2006), there would be 9,570 QALY gained in the Australian population in 
2003 over a 15 year screening program. The present value of 15-years health gain 
would be 114,244 QALYs with a total cost of $2,765 million dollars ($225 million each 
year for 15 years, discounted at 3%). The cost-effectiveness ratio of the cervical cancer 
screening is estimated at $22,332 per QALY (refer to Table 11). 
 
b. Intervention specific assumptions and caveats related to health 
 
A stochastic simulation model, called the ACE Cervical cancer screen model, was 
developed for assessing the cost effectiveness of different cervical screening strategies. 
The model uses a continuous algorithm to simulate the natural history of cervical 
cancer and distinguishes various stages along the cancer growth path. By allowing one 
member of the cohort into the model at a time, the model can track individual life 
histories which vary from person to person. The intervention uses the same life history 
as the null scenario (do nothing) but adds the screening parameters. The model is 
simulated in a single life table cohort for 100,000 women and compares the 
intervention to the null scenario. The difference in mortality and incidence obtained 
from the model is multiplied by the Australian population in 2003 to estimate the 
single-year health gains from the 2-yearly screening by conventional Pap test program. 
Discounting is not applied for the single-year health benefit. The health gain in a single 
year is held constant for the next 15 years and discounted at 3% to the present values in 
2003. QALYs have been used instead of DALYs. (1 QALY= 1-the DALY disability 
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weight). There is no calculation of uncertainty in the current model, which will be 
developed further for ACE-Prevention. 
 
c. Second stage filters as appropriate 
 
Not yet evaluated by ACE-Prevention. 
 
d. Intervention specific assumptions and caveats related to production 
gains 
 
The workforce participation rate and absenteeism experience of persons with any type 
of cancer was applied to beneficiaries of this intervention as it was not possible to 
extract from the basic NHS 2004/05 the workforce experience of women with cervical 
cancer. See 4 charts in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Workforce participation and absenteeism rates of people with any 
cancer compared to average Australians by age and sex, National Health Survey 
2004/5 
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e. Mortality and morbidity benefits among workforce age group 
 
This intervention prevents the equivalent of 10,000 cases of invasive cervical cancer 
and 4,800 deaths over the 15 year period (discounted back to 2003). 
 
f. Production gains, taxation and welfare effects 
 
Using the HCA method (base case incorporating 3.5% discount rate and gender based 
wages) from the wider societal perspective incorporating the production gains of $839 
million ($736 – $951), the intervention remains a net societal cost of $1,700 million. 
Using the FCA method, the intervention remains a net societal cost of $2,500 million, 
after incorporating production gains of only $91 million ($64 - $130). See Table 11. 
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The impact on the cost per DALY saved is a reduction from $22,000 to $15,000 using 
the HCA method or reduction from $22,000 to $21,500 using the FCA method.   
 
Table 11: Summary base case. Cervical cancer screening 
Cervical Screening Program:
3 months , 3.5%, gender wages median LL 2.5% UL 97.5% median LL 2.5% UL 97.5%
$M $M $M $M $M $M
Cost of intervention $2,765 $2,765
Cost (offsets) $214 $214
Net cost to Health Sector $2,551 $2,551
Production gains $839 $736 $951 $91 $64 $130
Net cost to society $1,712 $2,461
QALYs saved 114244 114244
Net cost per QALY saved Health sector $22,332 $22,332
Net cost per QALY saved All sectors $14,989 $21,540
Impact on cost/QALY $7,343 $792
Human Capital Approach Friction Cost Approach
 
 
g. Most important contributor to the uncertainty of results 
 
The input variable that is most important to the variability in the estimates of 
production gains using HCA is the participation rate among risk exposed females aged 
30 - 39. HCA estimates are dominated by the long term absences due to mortality in 
females.  
 
The input variables that are most important to the variability in the estimates of 
production gains using FCA are: (a) the wage multiplier and (b) training costs in the 35 
– 39 age group. Absences due to mortality and morbidity are equally important in this 
intervention using FCA. 
 
The input variables that are most important to the taxation effects using HCA are: (a) 
the wage multiplier and (b) participation rate among risk exposed females aged 30 - 34. 
The taxation effects are directly based on production gains. 
 
The input variables that are most important to the taxation effects using FCA are: (a) 
the wage multiplier and (b) absenteeism rate among females risk exposed aged 45 – 49. 
Short term absences are relatively more important in the FCA than the HCA. The 
taxation effects are directly based on production gains. The higher wage rates of the 
older age groups also influence the calculation of taxation effects. 
 
The input variables that are most important to the welfare effects using HCA or FCA 
are the participation rates of the females risk exposed aged 30 – 39 where the difference 
between the Australian average and women with cancer is greatest. 
 
h. Sensitivity analysis – effects of discount rates, friction period, wages 
rates 
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Using non-gendered wage rates raises the production gains by approximately 50% 
without altering the main conclusions. The intervention remains a net cost to the wider 
society. 
 
i. Interpretation 
 
This is a cost effective intervention which is improved by the incorporation of 
production gains. 
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Cardiovascular Disease Prevention  
High risk vs broad population based approaches 
Broadly speaking, prevention can be aimed at high-risk individuals or at the population 
as a whole (Rose 1992). These approaches are complementary. The high-risk approach 
aims to improve the efficiency of prevention by targeted intervention towards those 
who are judged to be most likely to develop disease. The population-wide approach 
aims to improve risk factor levels in the population as a whole. It is based on the 
concept that the greatest absolute number of disease cases occurs in the majority of the 
population that are not at high-risk. Therefore, small changes in risk factors in many 
people can produce greater absolute benefits than large changes in a few (Kottke, 
Gatewood et al. 1988). 
 
The effectiveness of individual-based interventions for the prevention of cardiovascular 
disease (CVD) rests on the ability to identify those persons who are most at risk of 
CVD. A range of multifactorial absolute risk equations have been generated (Kannel, 
Neaton et al. 1986; Haq, Jackson et al. 1995; Wilson, D'Agostino et al. 1998; New 
Zealand Guidelines Group 1998 -2002; D'Agostino, Russell et al. 2000; Jackson 2000; 
D'Agostino, Grundy et al. 2001; Pocock, McCormack et al. 2001; Thomsen, Davidsen 
et al. 2001). These functions aim to take into account the multifactorial causes of CHD, 
the gender difference in risk, the steep increase in risk with age as well as continuous 
measures of risk factors (smoking, elevated cholesterol, elevated blood pressure, bmi). 
The most commonly used risk equations are those based on the Framingham Heart 
Study (e.g. (Wilson, D'Agostino et al. 1998; D'Agostino, Russell et al. 2000)). 
 
High risk target groups 
The target population of CVD interventions analysed in this project, is Australian 
adults aged 35-84 in the year 2003 without previous acute coronary syndromes (ACS) 
or stroke. The primary care-based interventions are targeted according to the following 
criteria:  
 
(i) Persons with greater than or equal to 15% five-year risk of CHD 
(hospitalised angina, myocardial infarction or death from CHD) or stroke 
event in the year 2003;  
 
(ii) Persons with greater than or equal to 10% and less than 15% five-year risk 
of a ACS or stroke event; and 
 
(iii) Persons with greater than or equal to 5% and less than 10% five-year risk of 
a ACS or stroke event. 
 
The absenteeism rates and workforce participation rates of male and female adults with 
self-reported cardiovascular disease, compared to the Australian average are presented 
in the 4 charts in Figure 3. Above the age of 35 these persons tend to have more days 
off while males participate at slightly lower levels than average and females participate 
at slightly higher levels than average (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2004 - 05). This 
would lead us to expect some production gains to be generated by programs aimed at 
prevention of cardiovascular disease through modification of risk factors. A number of 
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different strategies have been evaluated including reduction of cholesterol and blood 
pressure, improved diet and community based education programs.  
 
Figure 3: Workforce participation and absenteeism rates of people with 
cardiovascular disease compared to average Australians by age and sex, National 
Health Survey 2004/5 
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Cholesterol lowering strategies 
 
Several cholesterol lowering strategies for the prevention of cardiovascular disease 
exist. In Australia, dietary counselling is generally considered first-line therapy in the 
management of hypercholesterolemia (National Heart Foundation of Australia and The 
Cardiac Society of Australia and New Zealand 2001). HMG-CoA reductase inhibitors 
(statins) are widely used. Plant sterols (phytosterols or phytostanols) that inhibit 
absorption of cholesterol in the intestine and can be incorporated into dietary fats such 
as margarine are commercially available ((Lichtenstein and Deckelbaum 2001)). 
Ezetimibe, a cholesterol lowering drug with a similar mechanism of action to plant 
sterols, is now available on the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme for use as combination 
therapy with statins (Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme 2004). Finally, Community 
Heart Health Programs (CHHPs) use education, health promotion and environmental 
change to reduce cholesterol and other cardiovascular risk factors across the entire 
population.  
 
On the basis of a systematic review conducted by Lim (PHD thesis) there is substantial 
variation amongst the interventions in terms of the magnitude of the reduction in 
cholesterol and CVD. Statins are 3 times as effective as the next most effective 
individual intervention and in combination with ezetimibe could reduce CHD and 
ischemic stroke risk by around 40%. Lifestyle interventions such as CHHPs and dietary 
counselling, along with phytosterol or phytostanol supplementation are modestly 
effective. There is considerably more evidence for statin drugs than there is for other 
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interventions. While there is uncertainty about the true effect of lifestyle oriented 
interventions, these interventions have the potential for positive “ripple effects” that are 
not easily measured using trial methodology.  
4 ACE inhibitors targeted at 10% risk group for coronary event 
 
a. Description of intervention and its costs and benefits from a health 
sector perspective 
 
The intervention consists of drug therapy according to pharmaceutical guidelines to 
reduce blood pressure following GP testing. GP advice is provided in subsequent visits 
over a number of years. The comparator is the null scenario. The costs of the 
intervention are estimated at $1,183M ($1,012 – $1,355) and the cost offsets of reduced 
cardiovascular disease are more moderate at $169M ($103 – $257). Over 34,000 
DALYs are averted generating an incremental cost-effectiveness ratio of $29,000 per 
DALY averted. 
 
b. Intervention specific assumptions and caveats related to health 
 
The heart disease model which is used to calculate the health gain is currently under 
revision to eliminate some minor errors. The impact on this project is not expected to 
be significant. 
 
c. Second stage filters as appropriate 
 
Risk of side effects exists. 
 
d. Intervention specific assumptions and caveats related to production 
gains 
 
Nil. 
e. Mortality and morbidity benefits among workforce age group 
 
This intervention generates modest health gains in terms of 2,300 incident cases of 
cardiovascular disease averted and 120 deaths in older age groups. 
 
f. Production gains, taxation and welfare effects 
 
Using the HCA method (base case incorporating 3.5% discount rate and gender based 
wages) from the wider societal perspective, incorporating the production gains of 
prescribing ACE inhibitors to people at 10% risk of a coronary event of $21 million 
($10 – $33), the intervention remains a net societal cost of $994 million ($745 – 
$1,218). Using the FCA method, the intervention remains a net cost to society of 
$1,010 million ($752 – $1,243) after incorporating production gains of only $5 million 
($3 - $8). See Table 12.  The impact on the cost per DALY saved is a reduction from 
$29,400 to $28,800 using the HCA method or reduction from $29,400 to $29,200 using 
the FCA method. 
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Table 12: Summary base case. ACE inhibitors targeted at people in the 10% risk 
of cardiac events. 
ACE inhibitors to 10% risk
3 months , 3.5%, gender wages median LL 2.5% UL 97.5% median LL 2.5% UL 97.5%
$M $M $M $M $M $M
Cost of intervention Govt $1,183 $1,012 $1,355 $1,183 $1,012 $1,355
Cost of intervention patient $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Cost (offsets) $169 $257 $103 $169 $257 $103
Net cost to Health Sector $1,015 $755 $1,252 $1,015 $755 $1,252
Production gains $21 $10 $33 $5 $3 $8
Net cost to society $994 $745 $1,218 $1,010 $752 $1,243
DALYs saved 34556 23389 47463 34556 23389 47463
Net cost per DALY saved Health sector $29,364 $32,277 $26,372 $29,364 $32,277 $26,372
Net cost per DALY saved All sectors $28,754 $31,854 $25,670 $29,221 $32,154 $26,197
Impact on cost/DALY $609 $423 $701 $143 $123 $175
Human Capital Approach Friction Cost Approach
 
 
g. Most important contributor to the uncertainty of results 
 
The input variable that is most important to the variability in the estimates of 
production gains using HCA is the participation rate among risk exposed males aged 50 
- 59. HCA estimates are usually dominated by the long term absences which are 
prevented in older males by this intervention.  
 
The input variables that are most important to the variability in the estimates of 
production gains using FCA are: (a) the wage multiplier and (b) the absenteeism rate of 
risk exposed males aged 60 – 64.  Short term absences are relatively more important in 
the FCA than the HCA.  
 
The input variables that are most important to the taxation effects using HCA are: (a) 
the absenteeism rate of risk exposed males aged 55 – 59 and (b) the wage multiplier. 
The taxation effects are directly based on production gains and this age group is 
important. 
 
The input variables that are most important to the taxation effects using FCA are: (a) 
the wage multiplier and (b) the absenteeism rate among males risk exposed aged 55 – 
59. Short term absences are relatively more important in the FCA than the HCA. The 
taxation effects are directly based on production gains. The higher wage rates of the 
older age groups also affect the calculation of taxation effects. 
 
The input variable that is most important to the welfare effects using HCA or FCA is 
the participation rate of the males risk exposed aged 50 – 59, where most health 
benefits occur. 
 
h. Sensitivity analysis – effects of discount rates, friction period, wages 
rates 
 
None of the variables altered in sensitivity analysis change the conclusion. 
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i. Interpretation 
 
The inclusion of production gains generated very little difference to the cost-
effectiveness ratio of this intervention, because of its modest health benefits which can 
be expected at older ages. 
5 ACE inhibitors targeted at 5% risk group for coronary event 
 
a. Description of intervention and its costs and benefits from a health 
sector perspective 
 
This intervention is the same as the blood pressure reduction drug therapy intervention 
described above aimed to a lower risk larger sized target group. The intervention 
consists of drug therapy according to pharmaceutical guidelines to reduce blood 
pressure following GP testing. GP advice is provided in subsequent visits over a 
number of years. The comparator is the null scenario. The costs of the intervention are 
estimated at $3,565M ($3,000 – $4,000) and the cost offsets of reduced cardiovascular 
disease are more moderate at $487M ($291 – $764). Over 79,000 DALYs are averted 
generating an incremental cost-effectiveness ratio of $39,000 per DALY averted. 
 
b. Intervention specific assumptions and caveats related to health 
 
The main comparator is the “null scenario”. The heart disease model which is used to 
calculate the health gain is currently under revision to eliminate some minor errors. The 
impact on this project is not expected to be significant. 
 
c. Second stage filters as appropriate 
 
Risk of side effects exists. 
 
d. Intervention specific assumptions and caveats related to production 
gains 
 
Nil 
e. Mortality and morbidity benefits among workforce age group 
 
This intervention offered to the lower risk group has more generous health benefits of 
24,000 incident cases of cardiovascular disease averted and over 800 deaths. 
 
f. Production gains, taxation and welfare effects 
 
Using the HCA method (base case incorporating 3.5% discount rate and gender based 
wages) from the wider societal perspective, incorporating the production gains of ACE 
inhibitors to people at 5% risk of a coronary event of $400 million ($2003 – $600), the 
intervention remains a net societal cost of $2,679 million ($2,058 – $3,161). Using the 
FCA method, the intervention remains a higher net cost to society of $3,000 million 
($2,200 – $3,660) after incorporating production gains of only $63 million ($33 - 
$116). See Table 13. The impact on the cost per DALY saved is a reduction from 
$39,000 to $34,000 using the HCA method or reduction from $39,000 to $38,000 using 
the FCA method. 
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Table 13: Summary base case. ACE inhibitors targeted at people in the 5% risk of 
cardiac events. 
ACE inhibitors target 5% risk
3 months , 3.5%, gender wages median LL 2.5% UL 97.5% median LL 2.5% UL 97.5%
$M $M $M $M $M $M
Cost of intervention Govt $3,565 $3,020 $4,065 $3,565 $3,020 $4,065
Cost of intervention patient $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Cost (offsets) $487 $764 $291 $487 $764 $291
Net cost to Health Sector $3,079 $2,256 $3,774 $3,079 $2,256 $3,774
Production gains $400 $199 $613 $63 $33 $116
Net cost to society $2,679 $2,058 $3,161 $3,015 $2,224 $3,658
DALYs saved 79390 54438 110001 79390 54438 110001
Net cost per DALY saved Health sector $38,779 $41,448 $34,308 $38,779 $41,448 $34,308
Net cost per DALY saved All sectors $33,741 $37,798 $28,739 $37,980 $40,849 $33,253
Impact on cost/DALY $5,038 $3,650 $5,569 $799 $599 $1,055
Human Capital Approach Friction Cost Approach
 
 
g. Most important contributor to the uncertainty of results 
 
The input variable that is most important to the variability in the estimates of 
production gains using HCA is the participation rate among risk exposed males aged 45 
- 54. HCA estimates are usually dominated by the long term absences which are 
prevented in older males by this intervention.  
 
The input variables that are most important to the variability in the estimates of 
production gains using FCA are: (a) absenteeism rate of risk exposed males aged 55 – 
59 and (b) the wage multiplier.  Short term absences are relatively more important in 
the FCA than the HCA.  
 
The input variable that is most important to the taxation effects using HCA is the 
absenteeism rate of risk exposed males aged 50 – 59. The taxation effects are directly 
based on production gains and therefore it is unsurprising that this age group is 
important. 
 
The input variable that is most important to the taxation effects using FCA is also the 
absenteeism rate of risk exposed males aged 50 – 59. Short term absences are relatively 
more important in the FCA than the HCA. The taxation effects are directly based on 
production gains. The higher wage rates of the older age groups also affect the 
calculation of taxation effects. 
 
The input variable that is most important to the welfare effects using HCA or FCA is 
the participation rate of the males risk exposed aged 50 – 59 where most health benefits 
occur. 
 
h. Sensitivity analysis – effects of discount rates, friction period, wages 
rates 
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None of the variables altered in sensitivity analysis change the conclusion. 
 
i. Interpretation 
 
While it is more expensive to offer this intervention to persons at lower absolute risk 
(5%) of a coronary event, a greater number of people will benefit and the production 
gains are correspondingly larger. After inclusion of the production gains this 
intervention has a slightly higher cost-effectiveness ratio compared to the intervention 
being offered to persons at higher absolute risk (10%) of a coronary event, but it is still 
very cost-effective to undertake compared to the $50,000 /DALY threshold. 
Blood pressure lowering strategies 
 
A number of strategies exist including diet, exercise and drugs. We have analysed a 
number of drug therapies only.  
6 Beta blockers targeted at 15% risk group for coronary event 
 
a. Description of intervention and its costs and benefits from a health 
sector perspective 
 
This intervention is the same as the blood pressure reduction drug therapy intervention 
described above aimed to a higher risk smaller sized target group. The costs of the 
intervention are estimated at $536M ($461 – $614) and the cost offsets of reduced 
cardiovascular disease are more moderate at $81M ($18 – $161). The incremental cost-
effectiveness ratio is $18,000 per DALY averted. Over 25,000 DALYs are averted 
generating an incremental cost-effectiveness ratio of $18,000 per DALY averted. 
 
b. Mortality and morbidity benefits among workforce age group 
 
This intervention generates very small health gains of 120 incident cases of 
cardiovascular disease averted and 14 deaths.  
 
c. Production gains, taxation and welfare effects 
 
Using the HCA method (base case incorporating 3.5% discount rate and gender based 
wages) from the wider societal perspective, incorporating the production gains of beta 
blockers prescribed to people at 15% risk of a coronary event, of $2.2 million ($1.7 – 
$2.8), the intervention remains a net societal cost of $453 million ($299 – $593). Using 
the FCA method, the intervention remains a net cost to society of $455 million ($300 – 
$595) after incorporating production gains of only $0.4 million ($0.3 - $0.6). See Table 
14. The impact on the cost per DALY saved is a negligible reduction of $85 from 
$17,754 to $17,669 using the HCA method or reduction from $17,754 to $17,738 using 
the FCA method. 
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Table 14: Summary base case. Beta blockers targeted at people in the 15% risk of 
cardiac events. 
Beta blockers to 15% risk
3 months , 3.5%, gender wages median LL 2.5% UL 97.5% median LL 2.5% UL 97.5%
$M $M $M $M $M $M
Cost of intervention Govt $536 $461 $614 $536 $461 $614
Cost of intervention patient $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Cost (offsets) $81 $161 $18 $81 $161 $18
Net cost to Health Sector $455 $300 $595 $455 $300 $595
Production gains $2.2 $1.7 $2.8 $0.4 $0.3 $0.6
Net cost to society $453 $299 $593 $455 $300 $595
DALYs saved 25632 12486 40884 25632 12486 40884
Net cost per DALY saved Health sector $17,754 $24,053 $14,565 $17,754 $24,053 $14,565
Net cost per DALY saved All sectors $17,669 $23,919 $14,498 $17,738 $24,030 $14,550
Impact on cost/DALY $85 $134 $67 $17 $23 $15
Human Capital Approach Friction Cost Approach
 
 
d. Most important contributor to the uncertainty of results 
 
The input variables that are most important to the variability in the estimates of 
production gains using HCA are: participation rates among risk exposed males and 
females aged 50 - 54. HCA estimates are usually dominated by the long term absences 
which are prevented in older persons by this intervention.  
 
The input variables that are most important to the variability in the estimates of 
production gains using FCA are: (a) the wage multiplier and (b) training costs.  Short 
term absences are relatively more important in the FCA than the HCA. Small numbers 
of health benefits may be causing some volatility in results. 
 
The input variables that are most important to the taxation effects using HCA are: (a) 
the wage multiplier and (b) the absenteeism rate of risk exposed males aged 60 – 64. 
The taxation effects are directly based on production gains and this age group is 
important. 
 
The input variables that are most important to the taxation effects using FCA are: (a) 
the wage multiplier and (b) the absenteeism rate among males risk exposed aged 50 – 
59. Short term absences are relatively more important in the FCA than the HCA. The 
taxation effects are directly based on production gains. The higher wage rates of the 
older age groups also affect the calculation of taxation effects. 
 
The input variable that is most important to the welfare effects using HCA or FCA is 
the participation rate of the males risk exposed aged 50 – 59 where most health benefits 
occur. 
 
e. Sensitivity analysis – effects of discount rates, friction period, wages 
rates 
 
None of the variables altered in sensitivity analysis change the conclusion. 
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f. Interpretation 
 
This intervention is cost-effective when offered to persons at higher absolute risk of a 
coronary event, but the number of incident cases and deaths averted, mostly in older 
ages translates to a very small production gain and very little impact on the cost- 
effectiveness ratio from a societal perspective. 
 
7 Beta blockers targeted at 5% risk group for coronary event 
 
a. Description of intervention and its costs and benefits from a health 
sector perspective 
 
The intervention consists of drug therapy according to pharmaceutical guidelines to 
reduce blood pressure following GP testing. GP advice is provided in subsequent visits 
over a number of years. The comparator is the null scenario. The costs of the 
intervention are estimated at $1,790M ($1,526 – $2,044) and the cost offsets of reduced 
cardiovascular disease are more moderate at $224M ($20 – $483). Over 50,000 DALYs 
are averted generating an incremental cost-effectiveness ratio of $31,000 per DALY 
averted. 
 
b. Intervention specific assumptions and caveats related to health 
 
It is likely that the costs of the intervention are 85% borne by Government and 15% by 
the patient. The effectiveness of beta blockers in the prevention of coronary event is not 
statistically significant RR 0.93 (95% CI 0.8: 1.09), while it is in the prevention of a 
stroke RR 0.71 (95% CI 0.59 – 0.86). 
The heart disease model which is used to calculate the health gain is currently under 
revision to eliminate some minor errors. The impact on this project is not expected to 
be significant. 
 
c. Second stage filters as appropriate 
 
Some risk of side effects exist. 
 
d. Intervention specific assumptions and caveats related to production 
gains 
 
Nil. 
 
e. Mortality and morbidity benefits among workforce age group 
 
Prescribing beta-blockers to persons at 5% risk of coronary events in the next five years 
would avert 16,000 incident cases of cardiovascular disease and avert just over 600 
deaths. 
 
f. Production gains, taxation and welfare effects 
 
Using the HCA method (base case incorporating 3.5% discount rate and gender based 
wages) from the wider societal perspective, incorporating the production gains of beta 
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blockers to people at 5% risk of a coronary event of $283 million ($154 – $420), the 
intervention remains a net societal cost of $1,280 million ($890 – $1,600). Using the 
FCA method, the intervention remains a net cost to society of $1,520 million ($1,020 – 
$1,900) after incorporating production gains of only $44 million ($23 - $79). See Table 
15. The impact on the cost per DALY saved is a reduction from $31,000 to $25,000 
using the HCA method or reduction from $31,000 to $30,000 using the FCA method. 
 
Table 15: Summary base case. Beta blockers targeted at people in the 5% risk of 
cardiac events. 
Beta blockers targeted at 5% risk grou
3 months , 3.5%, gender wages median LL 2.5% UL 97.5% median LL 2.5% UL 97.5%
$M $M $M $M $M $M
Cost of intervention Govt $1,790 $1,526 $2,044 $1,790 $1,526 $2,044
Cost of intervention patient $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Cost (offsets) $224 $483 $20 $224 $483 $20
Net cost to Health Sector $1,566 $1,043 $2,024 $1,566 $1,043 $2,024
Production gains $283 $154 $420 $44 $23 $79
Net cost to society $1,282 $889 $1,604 $1,521 $1,020 $1,945
DALYs saved 50422 24747 79422 50422 24747 79422
Net cost per DALY saved Health sector $31,049 $42,161 $25,486 $31,049 $42,161 $25,486
Net cost per DALY saved All sectors $25,426 $35,935 $20,202 $30,168 $41,214 $24,496
Impact on cost/DALY $5,622 $6,226 $5,284 $881 $947 $990
Human Capital Approach Friction Cost Approach
 
 
g. Most important contributor to the uncertainty of results 
 
The input variable that is most important to the variability in the estimates of 
production gains using HCA is the participation rate among risk exposed males aged 45 
- 54. HCA estimates are usually dominated by the long term absences which are 
prevented in older males by this intervention.  
 
The input variables that are most important to the variability in the estimates of 
production gains using FCA are: (a) the wage multiplier and (b) absenteeism rate 
among males risk exposed aged 55 – 59.  Short term absences are relatively more 
important in the FCA than the HCA. 
 
The input variable that is most important to the taxation effects using HCA is the 
absenteeism rate of risk exposed males aged 50 – 59. The taxation effects are directly 
based on production gains and this age group is important. 
 
The input variable that is most important to the taxation effects using FCA is the 
absenteeism rate among males risk exposed aged 50 – 59. Short term absences are 
relatively more important in the FCA than the HCA. The taxation effects are directly 
based on production gains. The higher wage rates of the older age groups also affect the 
calculation of taxation effects. 
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The input variable that is most important to the welfare effects using HCA or FCA is 
the participation rate of the males risk exposed aged 50 – 59 where most health benefits 
occur. 
 
h. Sensitivity analysis – effects of discount rates, friction period, wages 
rates 
 
None of the variables altered in sensitivity analysis change the conclusion. 
 
i. Interpretation 
 
While it is more expensive to offer this intervention to persons at lower absolute risk 
(5%) of a coronary event, a greater number of people will benefit from it and the 
production gains are correspondingly larger. After inclusion of the production gains this 
intervention has a higher cost-effectiveness ratio compared to the intervention being 
offered to persons at higher absolute risk (15%) of a coronary event. 
 
8 Combination intervention targeted at 15% risk group for coronary event 
 
a. Description of intervention and its costs and benefits from a health 
sector perspective 
 
This is a multi- pronged intervention which comprises Community Heart Health 
Program as well as drug therapy (Diuretics, Beta Blockers, Ezetimibe and Aspirin), 
plus dietician advice and Phytosterol (modified margarine) targeted at people in the 
higher risk category for a cardiac event in the next five years. The comparator is the 
null scenario. The costs of the intervention are estimated at $6,200M ($5,300 – $7,200) 
and the cost offsets of reduced cardiovascular disease are more moderate at $688M 
($486 – $941). Over 143,000 DALYs are averted generating an incremental cost-
effectiveness ratio of $39,000 per DALY averted. 
 
b. Intervention specific assumptions and caveats related to health 
 
The heart disease model which is used to calculate the health gain is currently under 
revision to eliminate some minor errors. The impact on this project is not expected to 
be significant. 
 
c. Second stage filters as appropriate 
 
Risk of side effects exists. 
 
d. Intervention specific assumptions and caveats related to production 
gains 
 
Nil. 
 
e. Mortality and morbidity benefits among workforce age group 
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This intervention has reasonable health benefits in terms of 4,700 incident cases of 
cardiovascular disease averted and 250 deaths, mostly in older age groups. 
 
f. Production gains, taxation and welfare effects 
 
Using the HCA method (base case incorporating 3.5% discount rate and gender based 
wages) from the wider societal perspective, incorporating the production gains of a 
combination of many behavioural and drug interventions to people at 15% risk of a 
coronary event of $51 million ($25 – $80), the intervention remains a net societal cost 
of $5,500 million ($4,300 – $6,600). Using the FCA method, the intervention remains a 
net cost to society of $5,500 million ($4,300 – $6,700) after incorporating production 
gains of only $12 million ($7 - $20). (Refer to Table 16). The impact on the cost per 
DALY saved is a reduction from $38,500 to $38,200 using the HCA method or 
reduction of less than $100 from $38,500 to $38,400 using the FCA method. 
 
Table 16: Summary base case. Combination therapy targeted at people in the 15% 
risk of cardiac events. 
Combination to 15% risk
3 months , 3.5%, gender wages median LL 2.5% UL 97.5% median LL 2.5% UL 97.5%
$M $M $M $M $M $M
Cost of intervention Govt $6,204 $5,288 $7,193 $6,204 $5,288 $7,193
Cost of intervention patient $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Cost (offsets) $688 $941 $486 $688 $941 $486
Net cost to Health Sector $5,516 $4,347 $6,707 $5,516 $4,347 $6,707
Production gains $51 $25 $80 $12 $7 $20
Net cost to society $5,465 $4,322 $6,627 $5,504 $4,340 $6,687
DALYs saved 143179 118261 171793 143179 118261 171793
Net cost per DALY saved Health sector $38,526 $36,758 $39,042 $38,526 $36,758 $39,042
Net cost per DALY saved All sectors $38,167 $36,547 $38,575 $38,441 $36,700 $38,927
Impact on cost/DALY $359 $211 $467 $84 $58 $116
Human Capital Approach Friction Cost Approach
 
 
g. Most important contributor to the uncertainty of results 
 
The input variable that is most important to the variability in the estimates of 
production gains using HCA is the participation rate among risk exposed males aged 50 
- 59. HCA estimates are usually dominated by the long term absences which are 
prevented in older males by this intervention.  
 
The input variables that are most important to the variability in the estimates of 
production gains using FCA are: (a) absenteeism rate of risk exposed males aged 60 – 
64 and (b) the wage multiplier.  Short term absences are relatively more important in 
the FCA than the HCA.  
 
The input variable that is most important to the taxation effects using HCA is the 
absenteeism rate of risk exposed males aged 55 – 64. The taxation effects are directly 
based on production gains and this age group is important. 
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The input variable that is most important to the taxation effects using FCA is the 
absenteeism rate of risk exposed males aged 55 – 64. Short term absences are relatively 
more important in the FCA than the HCA. The taxation effects are directly based on 
production gains. The higher wage rates of the older age groups also affect the 
calculation of taxation effects. 
 
The input variable that is most important to the welfare effects using HCA or FCA is 
the participation rate of the males risk exposed aged 50 – 59 where most health benefits 
occur. 
 
h. Sensitivity analysis – effects of discount rates, friction period, wages 
rates 
 
None of the variables altered in sensitivity analysis change the conclusion. 
 
i. Interpretation 
 
The production gains generated by this intervention are very modest and make 
negligible difference to the cost-effectiveness ratio from a health sector perspective, 
because the beneficiaries are mostly at the latter years of their working lives. This is a 
cost-effective intervention compared to $50,000 but it is the most expensive of the 
cardiovascular disease prevention interventions analysed in this project. 
 
9 Community Heart Health Program  
 
a. Description of intervention and its costs and benefits from a health 
sector perspective 
 
The need for population-wide or public health approaches to the prevention of CVD 
arose from observations that the majority of cases of CVD arise among persons with 
medium or low levels of risk. Therefore, prevention efforts aimed only at high-risk 
individuals will not eradicate the burden of CVD at a population level. In recognition of 
this, the last 30 years have seen the development and evaluation of a number of 
Community Heart Health Programs (CHHPs) (such as the North Karelia Project 
((Puska, Salonen et al. 1983))and the Stanford Five City Project ((Farquhar, Fortmann 
et al. 1990))). The general aim of these programs is to positively shift population levels 
of CVD risk factors, on the basis that even relatively small population-wide changes in 
risk factors are likely to have a significant overall effect on the burden of CVD.  
The nature of the interventions used by these programs varies considerably, but 
generally include the following strategies: (i) lifestyle/behavioural change by health 
education through mass media, public events, competitions, self-help programs, and 
screening; (ii) community organisation by recruiting key community leaders to 
contribute to the overall goals of the program; and (iii) environmental changes such as 
supermarket shelf labelling and increasing the availability of health foods.  
 
The results of these community-wide programs have generally demonstrated small, 
reductions in smoking rates, cholesterol, blood pressure, and to a lesser extent body 
mass index (BMI). The main comparator is the null scenario. The cost of a CHHP is 
based on the Western Australia “2 Fruit and 5 vegetable” public health campaign that 
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included the costs for television, radio, print and transit advertising in addition to 
sport/arts sponsorship and point of sale promotion. Based on point estimates, a 
community heart health program (CHHP) is the most cost-effective cholesterol 
lowering strategy. This intervention, even with the modest effect size used in this 
analysis, was cost-saving. 
 
b. Intervention specific assumptions and caveats related to health 
 
As the effectiveness of CHHP is uncertain based on systematic review conducted by 
Lim (PHD thesis), it was assumed in this model that such a program would have only a 
modest effect on cholesterol levels, CHD and Stroke rates. A 2% reduction in CHD and 
Stroke rates is assumed with an uncertainty range from 4% to 0.5%. It is assumed that 
the treatment effect will be maintained with annual recurrent costs of the program. The 
heart disease model which is used to calculate the health gain is currently under 
revision to eliminate some minor errors. The impact on this project is not expected to 
be significant. 
 
c. Second stage filters as appropriate 
 
There are inconsistent treatment effects reported on cardiovascular risk factors. The 
majority of evidence is more than 20 years old. There are no equity, acceptability nor 
feasibility concerns with this intervention, while there is the possibility of flow on 
benefits. 
 
d. Intervention specific assumptions and caveats related to production 
gains 
 
Nil. 
 
e. Mortality and morbidity benefits among workforce age group 
 
A considerable number of incident cases of cardiovascular disease are averted by this 
intervention (>56,000) and many of them occur at relatively younger ages (<50). In 
excess of 2,000 deaths from cardiovascular disease are also averted but these tend to 
occur in the older ages (>50). 
 
f. Production gains, taxation and welfare effects 
 
Using the HCA method (base case incorporating 3.5% discount rate and gender based 
wages) from the wider societal perspective incorporating the production gains of 
$1,700 million ($956 – $2,500), the intervention becomes more cost saving while 
improving health. Using the FCA method, the intervention also becomes more cost 
saving while improving health, after incorporating production gains of $259 million 
($120 - $509). See Table 17. The cost per DALY with and without production gains 
under these circumstances (a dominant intervention) cannot be interpreted 
meaningfully and is not calculated. 
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Table 17: Summary base case. Community Heart Health Program untargeted. 
Community Heart Health Program
3 months , 3.5%, gender wages median LL 2.5% UL 97.5% median LL 2.5% UL 97.5%
$M $M $M $M $M $M
Cost of intervention Govt $45 $35 $54 $45 $35 $54
Cost of intervention patient $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Cost (offsets) $666 $328 $1,119 $666 $328 $1,119
Net cost to Health Sector ($621) ($292) ($1,065) ($621) ($292) ($1,065)
Production gains $1,715 $956 $2,549 $259 $120 $509
Net cost to society ($2,337) ($1,248) ($3,615) ($880) ($412) ($1,575)
DALYs saved 67922 37543 101257 67922 37543 101257
Net cost per DALY saved Health sector dominant
Net cost per DALY saved All sectors
Impact on cost/DALY
Human Capital Approach Friction Cost Approach
 
 
g. Most important contributor to the uncertainty of results 
 
The input variable that is most important to the variability in the estimates of 
production gains using HCA is the participation rate among risk exposed males aged 35 
- 44. HCA estimates are usually dominated by the long term absences but in this 
intervention the benefits are mostly reductions in morbidity in younger males.  
 
The input variables that are most important to the variability in the estimates of 
production gains using FCA are: (a) the wage multiplier and (b) absenteeism rates 
among males risk exposed aged 50 - 54. Short term absences are relatively more 
important in the FCA than the HCA. 
 
The input variables that are most important to the taxation effects using HCA are: (a) 
the wage multiplier and (b) participation rate among risk exposed males aged 35 - 39. 
The taxation effects are directly based on production gains. 
 
The input variables that are most important to the taxation effects using FCA are: (a) 
the wage multiplier and (b) the absenteeism rate among males risk exposed aged 55-59. 
Short term absences are relatively more important in the FCA than the HCA. The 
taxation effects are directly based on production gains. The higher wage rates of the 
older age groups also affect the calculation of taxation effects. 
 
The input variable that is most important to the welfare effects using HCA or FCA is 
the participation rate of the males risk exposed aged 35 – 44 where just less than 50% 
of the morbidity health benefits occur. 
 
h. Sensitivity analysis – effects of discount rates, friction period, wages 
rates 
 
Nothing changes the conclusion reached in the base case. 
 
i. Interpretation 
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This is a particularly dominant health intervention which becomes even more attractive 
with the inclusion of production gains. 
 
10 Dietician advice targeted at 10% risk group for coronary event 
 
a. Description of intervention and its costs and benefits from a health 
sector perspective 
 
Diet is generally considered first-line therapy in the management of 
hypercholesterolemia for the prevention of CVD. Systematic reviews have 
demonstrated reductions in total cholesterol with dietary advice ((Brunner, White et al. 
1997; Tang, Armitage et al. 1998; Yu-Poth, Zhao et al. 1999)). Dietary advice given by 
a dietician has been shown to be more efficacious in lowering cholesterol than advice 
given by a doctor. Studies that used a dietician demonstrate an overall weighted mean 
change of total cholesterol of -6.2% (95% CI -8.1% to -4.2%). The comparator is the 
“null scenario”. For primary care-based interventions, counselling by a dietician is the 
most cost-effective, followed by phytosterol supplementation, counselling by a GP, 
statin drugs and then a combination of ezetimibe and a statin. The cost of dietary 
counselling by a dietician is a long counselling session in the initial year with between 
one and two follow-up visits in subsequent years. It is assumed that the treatment effect 
will continue with, on average, one follow-up visit to a dietician per year. 
 
b. Intervention specific assumptions and caveats related to health 
 
By assuming that a 1% reduction in total cholesterol is equivalent to a 1.5% (1.0% to 
2.5%) reduction in the rate of CHD and ischemic stroke endpoints, dietary counselling 
by a dietician would reduce the risk of CHD and/or ischemic stroke by 10% (95% CI -
15% to -6%).  There is uncertainty over long-term adherence and sustainability of this 
type of intervention. It is likely that follow-up counselling sessions are necessary to 
maintain the treatment effect. Furthermore, there is also concern about a different level 
of adherence to dietary advice under routine health service conditions compared with 
randomised controlled trial conditions. Accordingly, an additional (from the intention-
to-treat effect) first-year discontinuation rate of 40% is assumed. 
 
The heart disease model which is used to calculate the health gain is currently under 
revision to eliminate some minor errors. The impact on this project is not expected to 
be significant. 
 
c. Second stage filters as appropriate 
 
There is evidence for cost-effectiveness, but uncertainty exists around the true 
effectiveness of the intervention under routine health service conditions. Cost to 
individuals may warrant Medicare reimbursement given potential for inequitable 
access. 
 
d. Intervention specific assumptions and caveats related to production 
gains 
Nil. 
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e. Mortality and morbidity benefits among workforce age group 
 
Just over 1,500 incident cases of CVD are averted in the older working ages and 70 
deaths in older ages are averted. 
 
f. Production gains, taxation and welfare effects 
 
Using the HCA method (base case incorporating 3.5% discount rate and gender based 
wages) from the wider societal perspective, incorporating the production gains of 
dietary advice to people at 10% risk of a coronary event of $14 million ($5 – $22), the 
intervention remains a net societal cost of $249 million ($104 – $394). Using the FCA 
method, the intervention remains a net cost to society of $259 million ($107 – $411) 
after incorporating production gains of only $3 million ($2 - $6). See Table 18. The 
impact on the cost per DALY saved is a reduction from $20,000 to $19,000 using the 
HCA method or reduction from $20,000 to $19,900 using the FCA method. 
 
Table 18: Summary base case. Dietician advice targeted at people in the 10% risk 
of cardiac events. 
Dietician targetted at 10% risk group
3 months , 3.5%, gender wages median LL 2.5% UL 97.5% median LL 2.5% UL 97.5%
$M $M $M $M $M $M
Cost of intervention Govt $338 $240 $459 $338 $240 $459
Cost of intervention patient $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Cost (offsets) $76 $131 $43 $76 $131 $43
Net cost to Health Sector $262 $109 $416 $262 $109 $416
Production gains $14 $5 $22 $3 $2 $6
Net cost to society $249 $104 $394 $259 $107 $411
DALYs saved 13001 7645 21044 13001 7645 21044
Net cost per DALY saved Health sector $20,171 $14,268 $19,777 $20,171 $14,268 $19,777
Net cost per DALY saved All sectors $19,128 $13,566 $18,738 $19,921 $14,027 $19,512
Impact on cost/DALY $1,043 $702 $1,039 $250 $241 $265
Human Capital Approach Friction Cost Approach
 
 
g. Most important contributor to the uncertainty of results 
 
The input variable that is most important to the variability in the estimates of 
production gains using HCA is the participation rate among risk exposed males aged 50 
- 59. HCA estimates are usually dominated by the long term absences which are 
prevented in older males by this intervention. 
 
The input variables that are most important to the variability in the estimates of 
production gains using FCA are: (a) absenteeism rate among males risk exposed aged 
55 – 59 and (b) the wage multiplier. Short term absences are relatively more important 
in the FCA than the HCA. 
 
The input variables that are most important to the taxation effects using HCA are: (a) 
the absenteeism rate of risk exposed males aged 55 – 59 and (b) the absenteeism rate of 
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all Australian males aged 55 – 59. The taxation effects are directly based on production 
gains and this age group is most important. 
 
The input variables that are most important to the taxation effects using FCA are: (a) 
absenteeism rate among males risk exposed aged 55 – 59 and (b) the wage multiplier. 
Short term absences are relatively more important in the FCA than the HCA. The 
taxation effects are directly based on production gains. The higher wage rates of the 
older age groups also affect the calculation of taxation effects. 
 
The input variable that is most important to the welfare effects using HCA or FCA is 
the participation rate of the males risk exposed aged 50 – 59 where most health benefits 
occur. 
 
h. Sensitivity analysis – effects of discount rates, friction period, wages 
rates 
 
Conclusions remain unaltered by varying any of the variables nominated. 
 
i. Interpretation 
 
This is a very cost-effective intervention which is only marginally improved by the 
inclusion of production gains. 
 
11 Dietician advice targeted at 5% risk group for coronary event 
 
a. Description of intervention and its costs and benefits from a health 
sector perspective 
 
This intervention is the same as the dietician intervention described above with a lower 
risk larger target group. 
 
b. Mortality and morbidity benefits among workforce age group 
 
Nearly 10,000 incident cases of cardiovascular disease and almost 300 deaths are 
averted by this intervention, mostly in the over 50 age groups. 
 
c. Production gains, taxation and welfare effects 
 
Using the HCA method (base case incorporating 3.5% discount rate and gender based 
wages) from the wider societal perspective, incorporating the production gains of 
dietary advice to people at 5% risk of a coronary event of $153 million ($73 – $244), 
the intervention remains a net societal cost of $638 million ($261 – $1,034). Using the 
FCA method, the intervention remains a net cost to society of $765 million ($322 – 
$1,229) after incorporating production gains of only $25 million ($12 - $49). See Table 
19. The impact on the cost per DALY saved is a reduction from $26,000 to $21,000 
using the HCA method or reduction from $26,000 to $25,500 using the FCA method. 
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Table 19: Summary base case. Dietician advice targeted at people in the 5% risk 
of cardiac events. 
Dietician targetted at 5% risk group
3 months , 3.5%, gender wages median LL 2.5% UL 97.5% median LL 2.5% UL 97.5%
$M $M $M $M $M $M
Cost of intervention Govt $1,013 $713 $1,399 $1,013 $713 $1,399
Cost of intervention patient $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Cost (offsets) $223 $379 $121 $223 $379 $121
Net cost to Health Sector $790 $334 $1,278 $790 $334 $1,278
Production gains $153 $73 $244 $25 $12 $49
Net cost to society $638 $261 $1,034 $765 $322 $1,229
DALYs saved 29956 17492 47686 29956 17492 47686
Net cost per DALY saved Health sector $26,384 $19,071 $26,795 $26,384 $19,071 $26,795
Net cost per DALY saved All sectors $21,293 $14,919 $21,680 $25,547 $18,393 $25,774
Impact on cost/DALY $5,091 $4,152 $5,115 $837 $678 $1,022
Human Capital Approach Friction Cost Approach
 
 
d. Most important contributor to the uncertainty of results 
 
The input variable that is most important to the variability in the estimates of 
production gains using HCA is the participation rate among risk exposed males aged 45 
- 54. HCA estimates are usually dominated by the long term absences which are 
prevented in older males by this intervention.  
 
The input variables that are most important to the variability in the estimates of 
production gains using FCA are: (a) the wage multiplier and (b) absenteeism rate 
among males risk exposed aged 55 – 59.  Short term absences are relatively more 
important in the FCA than the HCA. 
 
The input variable that is most important to the taxation effects using HCA is the 
absenteeism rate of risk exposed males aged 50 – 59. The taxation effects are directly 
based on production gains and this age group is important. 
 
The input variable that is most important to the taxation effects using FCA is the 
absenteeism rate among males risk exposed aged 55 – 64. Short term absences are 
relatively more important in the FCA than the HCA. The taxation effects are directly 
based on production gains. The higher wage rates of the older age groups also affect the 
calculation of taxation effects. 
 
The input variable that is most important to the welfare effects using HCA or FCA is 
the participation rate of the males risk exposed aged 50 – 59 where most health benefits 
occur. 
 
e. Sensitivity analysis – effects of discount rates, friction period, wages 
rates 
 
None of the variables altered in sensitivity analysis change the conclusion. 
 
f. Interpretation 
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While it is more expensive to offer this intervention to persons at lower absolute risk 
(5%) of a coronary event, a greater number of people will benefit from it and the 
production gains are correspondingly larger. After inclusion of the production gains this 
intervention has a slightly higher cost-effectiveness ratio compared to the intervention 
being offered to persons at higher absolute risk (10%) of a coronary event. 
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Primary and secondary prevention of major depression 
 
People who self report as having depression have both lower participation rates than 
average for Australia and experience greater absenteeism (refer to Figure 4). This 
would lead us to expect production gains to be generated by the prevention and 
treatment of this disorder, under the current simple production gains model. 
 
Figure 4: Workforce participation and absenteeism rates of people with 
depression compared to average Australians by age and sex, National Health 
Survey 2004/5 
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12 and 13 Maintenance CBT for depression over 5 years with either a private 
psychiatrist or a public psychologist 
 
a. Description of intervention and its costs and benefits from a health 
sector perspective 
 
The impact of Cognitive Behavioural Therapy with either a private psychiatrist or a 
public psychologist is modeled in all people seeking care for depression in the year 
2003 based on the ACE Mental Health model pertaining to the year 2000 (Vos T, Corry 
J et al. 2005).  Costs of the intervention include GP referral, psychiatrist and/or 
psychologist costs over a five year period. The costs of the intervention largely depend 
on the type of provider. Costs of a private psychiatrist are $590M (95% UI $454 - 
$718) to Government and $83M ($64 – $101) to patients. The costs of the intervention 
with a public psychologist are less at $235M (95%UI $159 – $344) to Government. 
There are no cost offsets, since to treat depression does not prevent incidence of other 
diseases and the treatment costs of those other diseases. Depression is not considered in 
this analysis to be a risk factor for other disease. Since there is no evidence for a 
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difference in effectiveness of the various providers, the same 119,000 DALYs are 
averted by this therapy, leading to an ICER from the health sector perspective, of 
$5,600 (private psychiatrist) or $2,000 (public psychologist) per DALY. 
 
b. Intervention specific assumptions and caveats related to health 
 
It is assumed that maintenance therapy is not part of current practice and there is no 
residual benefit beyond the five year period. This assumption generates conservative 
estimates of benefit. 
 
c. Second stage filters as appropriate 
 
There are moderate equity (funding differences), feasibility (workforce) and 
acceptability (to clinicians) concerns with this intervention. 
 
d. Intervention specific assumptions and caveats related to production 
gains 
 
As the intervention is assumed to prevent major depression over a five year timeframe 
the production gains are also modeled for a five year period – with the inherent 
assumption being that there is no residual benefit after this time. 
 
e. Mortality and morbidity benefits among workforce age group 
 
It is estimated that 15,000 persons benefit from this intervention averting depressive 
episodes and 250 suicides will be averted. The morbidity benefits are experienced 
mostly in females while suicides averted occur predominantly in males. Over 50% of 
the male suicides averted occur in males aged <40 years. 
 
f. Production gains, taxation and welfare effects 
 
Using the HCA method (base case incorporating 3.5% discount rate and gender based 
wages) from the wider societal perspective, incorporating the production gains of $323 
million ($289 – $359), the intervention (giving CBT from a private psychiatrist to 
people consulting a GP for depression) remains a net societal cost of $351 million 
($230 – $460). Using the FCA method, the intervention remains a higher net cost to 
society of $620 million ($480 – $750) after incorporating production gains of only $53 
million ($36 - $73). See Table 20. The impact on the cost per DALY saved is a 
reduction from $5,600 to $3,000 using the HCA method or reduction from $5,600 to 
$5,200 using the FCA method. 
 
Using the HCA method (base case incorporating 3.5% discount rate and gender based 
wages) from the wider societal perspective, incorporating the same production gains of 
$323 million ($289 – $359), the intervention (giving CBT from a public psychologist to 
people consulting a GP for depression) becomes cost saving of $88 million ($15 – 
$126). Using the FCA method, the intervention remains a net cost to society of $182 
million ($123 – $270) after incorporating production gains of only $53 million ($36 - 
$73). See Table 21. The impact on the cost per DALY saved is a reduction from $2,000 
to dominance using the HCA method or reduction from $2,000 to $1,500 using the 
FCA method. 
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Table 20: Summary base case. Maintenance CBT for major depression (private 
psychiatrist). 
Maint CBT 5 yrs with pri psychiatrist
3 months , 3.5%, gender wages median LL 2.5% UL 97.5% median LL 2.5% UL 97.5%
Cost of intervention (pub PsGovt $590 $454 $718 $590 $454 $718
Cost of intervention Patient $83 $64 $101 $83 $64 $101
Cost (offsets) $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Net cost to Health Sector $673 $518 $820 $673 $518 $820
Production gains $323 $289 $359 $53 $36 $73
Net cost to society $351 $230 $461 $620 $483 $746
DALYs saved 119477 87824 154131 119477 87824 154131
Net cost per DALY saved Health sector $5,634 $5,903 $5,317 $5,634 $5,903 $5,317
Net cost per DALY saved All sectors $2,934 $2,615 $2,990 $5,188 $5,494 $4,843
Impact on cost/DALY $2,700 $3,288 $2,327 $446 $409 $474
Human Capital Approach Friction Cost Approach
 
 
Table 21: Summary base case. Maintenance CBT for major depression (public 
psychologist). 
Maint CBT 5 yrs with pub psychol
3 months , 3.5%, gender wages median LL 2.5% UL 97.5% median LL 2.5% UL 97.5%
Cost of intervention (pub PsGovt $235 $159 $344 $235 $159 $344
Cost of intervention Patient $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Cost (offsets) $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Net cost to Health Sector $235 $159 $344 $235 $159 $344
Production gains $323 $287 $359 $53 $36 $74
Net cost to society ($88) ($128) ($15) $182 $123 $270
DALYs saved 119477 87824 154131 119477 87824 154131
Net cost per DALY saved Health sector $1,968 $1,815 $2,235 $1,968 $1,815 $2,235
Net cost per DALY saved All sectors dominant $1,523 $1,401 $1,754
Impact on cost/DALY $445 $414 $480
Human Capital Approach Friction Cost Approach
 
 
g. Most important contributor to the uncertainty of results 
 
The input variables that are most important to the variability in the estimates of 
production gains using HCA are: participation rates among risk exposed males aged 25 
– 29 and females aged 45 - 49. HCA estimates are usually dominated by the long term 
absences which in this intervention are spread equally in males over reductions in 
morbidity and mortality and in females are dominated by morbidity reductions.  
 
The input variables that are most important to the variability in the estimates of 
production gains using FCA are: (a) the wage multiplier and (b) training costs in the 
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35-39 age group. Morbidity based absences are more important in this intervention 
which are dominated by the persons retained in the workforce at higher participation 
rates, thus avoiding the staff training costs. 
 
The input variables that are most important to the taxation effects using HCA are: (a) 
participation rate among risk exposed males aged 25 – 29 and (b) the wage multiplier. 
The taxation effects are directly based on production gains. 
 
The input variables that are most important to the taxation effects using FCA are: (a) 
the wage multiplier and (b) absenteeism rate among males risk exposed aged 30 – 35. 
Short term absences are relatively more important in the FCA than the HCA. The 
taxation effects are directly based on production gains.  
 
The input variables that are most important to the welfare effects using HCA or FCA 
are the participation rate of the females risk exposed aged 30 – 34 and 45 – 49 where 
the largest morbidity health benefits occur.  
 
h. Sensitivity analysis – effects of discount rates, friction period, wages 
rates 
 
This intervention is particularly sensitive to HCA and FCA method and the higher 
discount rate. None of the other variables altered in sensitivity analysis alter the main 
conclusion. 
 
i. Interpretation 
 
The choice of provider used to deliver this intervention is central to the cost-
effectiveness ratio applying in the health sector, but to provide the intervention with 
either provider is cost effective. The production gains are identical since the 
intervention regardless of type of provider is equally effective in treating depression. 
Only when using the less expensive provider and the HCA does the intervention appear 
both cost saving and health improving (i.e. dominant). 
 
14 Maintenance SSRIs for depression over 5 years 
 
a. Description of intervention and its costs and benefits from a health 
sector perspective 
 
The impact of maintenance drug therapy with Selective Serotonin Re-uptake Inhibitors 
(SSRIs) is modeled in all people seeking care for depression in the year 2003 based on 
the ACE Mental Health model pertaining to the year 2000 (Vos T, Corry J et al. 2005).  
Costs of the intervention include GP visits and drug costs over a five year period. The 
costs of the intervention are $1,950M (95% UI $1,585 - $2,319) to Government and 
$466M ($378 – $554) to patients. There are no cost offsets, since treating depression 
does not prevent the treatment costs of other diseases. Depression is not considered in 
this analysis to be a risk factor for other disease. Nearly 106,000 DALYs are averted by 
this therapy, leading to an ICER from the health sector perspective, of $23,000 per 
DALY. 
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b. Intervention specific assumptions and caveats related to health 
 
It is assumed that maintenance therapy is not part of current practice. There is no 
residual benefit beyond the five year period. 
 
c. Second stage filters as appropriate 
 
There were some concerns of policy makers to endorse long-term drug treatment 
strategies, considering existing pressures on the PBS. Consumers were concerned of 
side-effects of the drug therapy. There were no equity, evidence or feasibility issues. 
 
d. Intervention specific assumptions and caveats related to production 
gains 
 
As the intervention is assumed to prevent recurrent episodes of major depression over a 
five year timeframe the production gains are also modeled for a five year period – with 
the inherent assumption being that there is no residual benefit after this time. 
 
e. Mortality and morbidity benefits among workforce age group 
 
It is estimated that 23,000 persons benefit from this intervention averting depressive 
episodes and 240 suicides will be averted. The morbidity benefits are experienced 
mostly in females while suicides averted occur predominantly in males. Over 50% of 
the male suicides averted occur in males aged <40 years. 
 
f. Production gains, taxation and welfare effects 
 
Using the HCA method (base case incorporating 3.5% discount rate and gender based 
wages) from the wider societal perspective, incorporating the production gains of $388 
million ($336 – $443), the intervention (giving antidepressant SSRIs to people 
consulting a GP for depression) remains a net societal cost of $2,028 million ($1,628 – 
$2,430). Using the FCA method, the intervention remains a higher net cost to society of 
$2,340 million ($1,912 – $2,767) after incorporating production gains of only $76 
million ($52 - $106). See Table 22. The impact on the cost per DALY saved is a 
reduction from $23,000 to $19,000 using the HCA method or reduction from $23,000 
to $22,000 using the FCA method. 
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Table 22: Summary base case. Maintenance drug therapy for major depression. 
Maintenance SSRIs
3 months , 3.5%, gender wages median LL 2.5% UL 97.5% median LL 2.5% UL 97.5%
Cost of intervention Govt $1,950 $1,585 $2,319 $1,950 $1,585 $2,319
Cost of intervention Patient $466 $378 $554 $466 $378 $554
Cost (offsets) $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Net cost to Health Sector $2,416 $1,964 $2,873 $2,416 $1,964 $2,873
Production gains $388 $336 $443 $76 $52 $106
Net cost to society $2,028 $1,628 $2,430 $2,340 $1,912 $2,767
DALYs saved 105836 83008 130965 105836 83008 130965
Net cost per DALY saved Health sector $22,828 $23,660 $21,938 $22,828 $23,660 $21,938
Net cost per DALY saved All sectors $19,158 $19,614 $18,556 $22,113 $23,033 $21,130
Impact on cost/DALY $3,670 $4,046 $3,382 $715 $626 $807
Human Capital Approach Friction Cost Approach
 
 
g. Most important contributor to the uncertainty of results 
 
The input variables that are most important to the variability in the estimates of 
production gains using HCA are: participation rates among risk exposed males aged 25 
– 29 and females aged 45 - 49. HCA estimates are usually dominated by the long term 
absences which in this intervention are spread equally in males over reductions in 
morbidity and mortality and in females are dominated by morbidity reductions.  
 
The input variables that are most important to the variability in the estimates of 
production gains using FCA are: (a) the wage multiplier and (b) training costs in the 
35-39 age group. Morbidity based absences are more important in this intervention 
which are dominated by the persons retained in the workforce at higher participation 
rates, thus avoiding the staff training costs. 
 
The input variables that are most important to the taxation effects using HCA are: (a) 
participation rate among risk exposed males aged 25 – 29 and (b) the wage multiplier. 
The taxation effects are directly based on production gains. 
 
The input variables that are most important to the taxation effects using FCA are: (a) 
the wage multiplier and (b) absenteeism rate among males risk exposed aged 30 – 35. 
Short term absences are relatively more important in the FCA than the HCA. The 
taxation effects are directly based on production gains.  
 
The input variable that is most important to the welfare effects using HCA or FCA is 
the participation rate of the males and females risk exposed aged 45 – 49 where the 
largest morbidity health benefits occur.  
 
h. Sensitivity analysis – effects of discount rates, friction period, wages 
rates 
 
None of the variables altered in sensitivity analysis alter the main conclusion. 
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i. Interpretation 
 
This intervention is very cost-effective from a health sector perspective. The inclusion 
of production gains leads it to become more cost-effective under either the HCA or 
FCA. 
 
15 Screening and treatment of sub-syndromal depression for the prevention of 
major depressive disorder. 
 
a. Description of intervention and its costs and benefits from a health 
sector perspective 
 
This evaluation is of a nation wide screening program to detect people who have ‘sub-
syndromal’ depressive symptoms (that is some symptoms of depression but not 
sufficient to meet a full DSM-IV or ICD-10 diagnosis) and the provision of 
psychological therapy to those who screen positive for sub-syndromal depression. The 
intervention involves screening the general adult population aged 18+ when they go to 
a GP using a depression rating scale (the Beck depression Inventory). Those who 
indicate elevated depressive symptoms (but not severe scores) are then eligible for a 
course of cognitive behavioral therapy (average of 8 sessions –derived from published 
literature). The proportions of the population who are assumed to have sub-syndromal 
depression (approximately 20%) are sourced from published studies and the National 
Survey of Mental Health and Wellbeing (NSMHWB). The proportions of these people 
participating in the intervention (about 74%), is also sourced from the published 
literature. The intervention has the potential to reduce about 22% of incident cases of 
depression, though this effect reduces over time. The benefits of the intervention are 
therefore only modeled for 3 years with a 25% decay rate every year. This means that 
the intervention delays, rather than prevents, the onset of depression. The comparator in 
this study is current practice, which is assumed to be ‘do nothing’, as screening and 
treatment for sub-syndromal depression is currently not offered in Australia. 
 
The costs of the intervention includes the cost of the GP for screening and the costs of 
private psychologists delivering the psychological therapy (even though the Medicare 
Benefits Schedule currently covers psychologists for the treatment of depression, this is 
only for people who have fully diagnosed episodes of depression according to DSM-IV 
or ICD-10 criteria). A 3% discount rate is used. Cost offsets include the costs 
associated with the numbers of depressive episodes prevented by the intervention over 
the 3 year benefit horizon. The health sector cost of the intervention is $322 million 
(95%UI $105M-$614M). The cost per DALY averted is $56,000 ($11,000-$277,000).  
 
b. Intervention specific assumptions and caveats related to health 
 
The most important assumption associated with this intervention is that the lifetime 
benefits to participants occur over a very limited time horizon of 3 years. This is based 
on the longest trial for which evidence of benefit is evident and the finding from a 
recent meta-analysis suggesting that the benefits decay over a short period of time.  
This assumption means that the results are conservative. A second important caveat is 
that the cost-effectiveness analysis has not yet been subjected to technical peer review 
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or full second stage filter consideration and must be considered preliminary or 
indicative at this stage. 
 
c. Second stage filters as appropriate 
 
The most important second stage filter for consideration is associated with the evidence 
of effectiveness. We use an estimate from a very recent meta-analysis undertaken by 
Pim Cuijpers and associates (in the Netherlands) (RR=0.78 [0.65-0.93]). This meta-
analysis is based on all psychological interventions aimed at sub-syndromal depression 
(including children and adults); properly measuring reduced cases of depression at 
follow-up. The meta-analysis reported little heterogeneity and sub-group analyses 
revealed no differences between the studies. However if studies focusing on general 
adult populations are considered separately the measure of effect becomes non 
significant (this may be due to insufficient sample size to detect true differences). 
Further research is required in general adult populations to ensure the intervention is 
effective within an Australian context.    
 
d. Intervention specific assumptions and caveats related to production 
gains 
 
As the intervention is assumed to prevent major depression over a three year timeframe 
the production gains are also modeled for a three year period – with the inherent 
assumption being that there is no residual benefit after this time. 
 
e. Mortality and morbidity benefits among workforce age group 
 
The main benefit of the intervention is associated with morbidity over three years for 
7,700 persons many in young age groups, and the delay of mortality (from suicide) in 
the equivalent of 13 people in the year 2003. 
 
f. Production gains, taxation and welfare effects 
 
Using the HCA method (base case incorporating 3.5% discount rate and gender based 
wages) from the wider societal perspective, incorporating the production gains of 
opportunistic screening for early depression and CBT to these people of $49 million 
($40 – $59), the intervention remains a net societal cost of $271 million ($65 – $560). 
Using the FCA method, the intervention remains a net cost to society of $301 million 
($92 – $589) after incorporating production gains of only $19 million ($13 - $26). See 
Table 23. The impact on the cost per DALY saved is a reduction from $56,000 to 
$48,000 using the HCA method or reduction from $56,000 to $53,000 using the FCA 
method. 
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Table 23: Summary base case. Opportunistic screening and CBT for sub clinical 
depression. 
Opp screening+CBT
3 months , 3.5%, gender wages median LL 2.5% UL 97.5% median LL 2.5% UL 97.5%
Cost of intervention Govt $43 $33 $53 $43 $33 $53
Cost of intervention Patient $323 $113 $631 $323 $113 $631
Cost (offsets) $46 $9 $129 $46 $9 $129
Net cost to Health Sector $320 $105 $615 $320 $105 $615
Production gains $49 $40 $59 $19 $13 $26
Net cost to society $271 $65 $556 $301 $92 $589
DALYs saved 5673 1168 14939 5673 1168 14939
Net cost per DALY saved Health sector $56,431 $89,867 $41,138 $56,431 $89,867 $41,138
Net cost per DALY saved All sectors $47,781 $55,794 $37,217 $53,129 $78,868 $39,424
Impact on cost/DALY $8,650 $34,073 $3,921 $3,302 $10,999 $1,714
Human Capital Approach Friction Cost Approach
 
 
g. Most important contributor to the uncertainty of results 
 
The input variables that are most important to the variability in the estimates of 
production gains using HCA are: participation rate among risk exposed males and 
females aged 25 - 29. HCA estimates are usually dominated by the long term absences 
but in this intervention the benefits are mostly reductions in morbidity in younger males 
and females.  
 
The input variables that are most important to the variability in the estimates of 
production gains using FCA are: (a) the wage multiplier and (b) training costs in the 
35-39 age group. Morbidity based absences are more important in this intervention 
which are dominated by the persons retained in the workforce at higher participation 
rates, thus avoiding the staff training costs. 
 
The input variables that are most important to the taxation effects using HCA are: (a) 
the wage multiplier and (b) participation rate among risk exposed males aged 25 - 29. 
The taxation effects are directly based on production gains. 
 
The input variables that are most important to the taxation effects using FCA are: (a) 
the wage multiplier and (b) absenteeism rate among males risk exposed aged 35 – 39. 
Short term absences are relatively more important in the FCA than the HCA. The 
taxation effects are directly based on production gains.  
 
The input variables that are most important to the welfare effects using HCA or FCA 
are the participation rate of the males risk exposed aged 15 – 19 and 30 - 34 where 
many health benefits occur and survey estimates are volatile due to relatively small 
numbers. 
 
h. Sensitivity analysis – effects of discount rates, friction period, wages 
rates 
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None of the variables altered in sensitivity analysis alter the main conclusion. 
 
i. Interpretation 
 
Production gains are small compared to the cost of this intervention, which is 
borderline cost-effective at just over $50,000 per DALY saved. The health outcome 
analysis is preliminary and not yet finalized. 
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Physical activity interventions 
 
The absenteeism rates and workforce participation rates of male and female physically 
inactive adults compared to the Australian average are presented in the 4 charts in 
Figure 5. These physically inactive persons tend to have more days off at most ages but 
participate at similar levels to the average (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2004 - 05). 
This would lead us to expect some modest production gains to be generated by physical 
activity programs. 
 
Figure 5: Workforce participation and absenteeism rates of physically inactive 
people compared to average Australians by age and sex, National Health Survey 
2004/5 
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16 Active Scripts from a GP 
 
a. Description of intervention and its costs and benefits from a health 
sector perspective 
 
The intervention is based on New Zealand’s Green Prescription program. The 
evaluation of the GP prescription is based on an RCT by Elley et al (Elley CR, Kerse N 
et al. 2003). In this program insufficiently active adults 40 to 79 years of age are 
screened opportunistically when they present for an appointment with a GP or practice 
nurse (PN). Inactive patients are provided with a written prescription of goals usually 
home-based physical activity, by the GP or PN, and a copy of the patient information is 
faxed to an exercise physiologist who provides follow-up support by phone (up to 3 
calls of 10-20 minutes) and mail-out for the first three months. Patients are also 
opportunistically followed up by the GP or PN. Health outcomes were estimated in 
DALYs due to reduced risk of each of ischaemic heart disease, ischaemic stroke, Type 
2 Diabetes, breast cancer and colon cancer, following an increase in leisure-time energy 
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expenditure. The number of people participating in the intervention is estimated at 
1.3million. 
The key costs of this intervention from a health sector perspective include: grants to 
regional organisations for intervention delivery and follow-up, co-ordination and GP 
training, training and salary for exercise physiologist and support staff, GP or PN 
intervention delivery telephone calls of exercise physiologist. Total costs of the 
intervention have been calculated on the basis of 1.3million inactive adults aged 40-79 
participating. 
 
b. Intervention specific assumptions and caveats related to health 
 
A decay factor of 50% per year after the first year was assumed. 
 
c. Second stage filters as appropriate 
 
Not yet evaluated within ACE-Prevention 
 
d. Intervention specific assumptions and caveats related to production 
gains 
 
People self-reporting on the National Health Survey of 2004/5 as being less physical 
activity than recommended in national guidelines, are compared to the Australian 
average on their workforce participation and absenteeism experience. 
 
e. Mortality and morbidity benefits among workforce age group 
 
This intervention averts approximately 1,700 incident cases of disease, related to 
physical inactivity and 115 deaths largely in males and the older age groups  
 
f. Production gains, taxation and welfare effects 
 
In 2003 if 1.3million physically inactive older adults participated in the Green 
Prescription program, it would have a net cost of $147 million ($140 - $167) from a 
health sector perspective (refer to Table 24). Using the HCA method to incorporate the 
production gains of $22 million ($16 - $30), (base case of 3.5% discount and gender 
based wages), from the wider societal perspective, the Green prescription generates a 
net cost to society of $125 million ($110 - $151). Using the FCA method, the 
intervention generates a net cost to society of $144 million ($135 - $165) after 
incorporating only $3 million ($2 - $5) of production gains. The net cost per DALY 
changes from $22,000 to $19,000 using the HCA method and only marginally from 
$22,000 to $21,900 per DALY using the FCA method. The net cost from a societal 
perspective is not greatly changed by production gains generated by this intervention. 
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Table 24: Summary base case. Active scripts from a GP 
Active Script by GP
3 months , 3.5%, gender wages median LL 2.5% UL 97.5% median LL 2.5% UL 97.5%
$M $M $M $M $M $M
Cost of intervention Govt $170 $145 $221 $170 $145 $221
Cost of intervention Patient $30 $26 $39 $30 $26 $39
Cost (offsets) $53 $3 $120 $53 $3 $120
Net cost to Health Sector $147 $167 $140 $147 $167 $140
Production gains $22 $16 $30 $3 $2 $5
Net cost to society $125 $151 $110 $144 $165 $135
DALYs saved 6570 344 12894 6570 344 12894
Net cost per DALY saved Health sector $22,374 $485,465 $10,858 $22,374 $485,465 $10,858
Net cost per DALY saved All sectors $18,976 $440,385 $8,553 $21,887 $479,374 $10,487
Impact on cost/DALY $3,398 $45,080 $2,305 $487 $6,091 $371
Human Capital Approach Friction Cost Approach
 
 
g. Most important contributor to the uncertainty of results 
 
The input variable that is most important to the variability in the estimates of 
production gains using HCA is the participation rate among risk exposed males aged 45 
- 54. HCA estimates are dominated by the long term absences and mortality in 
particular in this intervention.  
 
The input variables that are most important to the variability in the estimates of 
production gains using FCA are: (a) the absenteeism rate among males risk exposed 
aged 50 – 54 and (b) the wage multiplier. Short term absences are relatively more 
important in the FCA than the HCA. 
 
The input variable that is most important to the taxation effects using HCA and FCA is 
the absenteeism rate among risk exposed males aged 50 - 59. The taxation effects are 
directly based on production gains. Short term absences are relatively more important 
in the FCA than the HCA. The taxation effects are directly based on production gains. 
 
The input variable that is most important to the welfare effects using HCA or FCA is 
also the participation rate of the males risk exposed aged 50 – 59 where a large portion 
of health benefits occur. 
 
h. Sensitivity analysis – effects of discount rates, friction period, wages 
rates 
 
None of the scenarios tested:-length of friction period, choice of wage rates, or discount 
rates valuing production gains altered the conclusion  
 
i. Interpretation 
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This intervention while being cost effective from a health sector perspective is largely 
unaltered by the incorporation of production gains, due to the higher age groups 
targeted and the modest gains in health.  
 
17 Referral to an exercise physiologist 
 
a. Description of intervention and its costs and benefits from a health 
sector perspective 
 
The intervention involves a GP inviting (by letter) patients who are physically inactive 
to attend a one-on-one consultation with an exercise physiologist at a local leisure 
centre. An exercise physiologist is someone with specialised skills in prescribing 
exercise. In counselling a new patient an exercise physiologist would typically 
undertake a health assessment, review the patient’s current level of physical activity, 
health needs and physical activity aspirations, discuss options to be more physically 
active and strategies for overcoming barriers to success and develop a plan of activities 
to be undertaken. The evaluation of the program is based on a UK intervention trial by 
Stevens et al (Stevens W, Hillsdon M et al. 1998) where a significant effect was not 
observed. In this trial, after ten weeks the intervention participants were invited to a 
follow-up session with the exercise development officer to discuss their progress, and 
at 8 months were followed up by mail questionnaire. Health outcomes were estimated 
in DALYs due to reduced risk of each of ischaemic heart disease, ischaemic stroke, 
Type 2 Diabetes, breast cancer and colon cancer, following an increase in energy 
expenditure. The number of people aged 45 to 75 participating in the intervention is 
estimated at 500,000. The key costs of this intervention included: program coordination 
by Divisions of GP, screening and recruitment of participants, intervention delivery and 
follow-up by the exercise physiologist to the patient. Total costs of the intervention 
have been calculated on the basis of 500,000 inactive adults 45-75 participating. 
 
b. Intervention specific assumptions and caveats related to health 
 
The non-significant health benefit is considered largely due to the underpowered size of 
the original study. There is a small chance of no health benefits from this intervention. 
A decay factor of 50% per year after the first year was assumed. 
 
c. Second stage filters as appropriate 
 
Not yet evaluated within ACE-Prevention. 
 
d. Intervention specific assumptions and caveats related to production 
gains 
 
People self-reporting on the National Health Survey of 2004/5 as being less physical 
activity than recommended in national guidelines, are compared to the Australian 
average on their workforce participation and absenteeism experience. 
 
e. Mortality and morbidity benefits among workforce age group 
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There are very modest reductions is incident cases of disease (<500) and only 34 deaths 
averted by this intervention. 
 
f. Production gains, taxation and welfare effects 
 
In 2003 if 500,000 physically inactive older adults participated in the exercise 
physiologist program, it would have a net cost of $38 million ($36 - $38) from a health 
sector perspective. See Table 25. Using the HCA method to incorporate the production 
gains of $9 million ($7 - $12), (base case of 3.5% discount and gender based wages), 
from the wider societal perspective, the exercise physiologist program generates a net 
cost to society of $29 million ($26 - $29). Using the FCA method, the intervention 
generates a net cost to society of $37 million ($35 - $36) after incorporating only $1 
million ($1 - $2) of production gains. The net cost per DALY from a health sector 
perspective changes from $49,300 to $37,600, taken from a societal perspective using 
the HCA and only marginally from $49,300 to $48,000 per DALY using the FCA 
method.  
 
Table 25: Summary base case. Referral to exercise physiologist 
Referral to Exercise physiologist
3 months , 3.5%, gender wages median LL 2.5% UL 97.5% median LL 2.5% UL 97.5%
$M $M $M $M $M $M
Cost of intervention Govt $13 $11 $14 $13 $11 $14
Cost of intervention patient $33 $28 $37 $33 $28 $37
Cost (offsets) $8 $3 $13 $8 $3 $13
Net cost to Health Sector $38 $36 $38 $38 $36 $38
Production gains $9 $7 $12 $1 $1 $2
Net cost to society $29 $29 $26 $37 $35 $36
DALYs saved 777 348 1430 777 348 1430
Net cost per DALY saved Health sector $49,292 $103,448 $26,573 $49,292 $103,448 $26,573
Net cost per DALY saved All sectors $37,599 $84,244 $18,337 $47,940 $101,376 $25,517
Impact on cost/DALY $11,694 $19,205 $8,237 $1,352 $2,072 $1,057
Human Capital Approach Friction Cost Approach
 
 
g. Most important contributor to the uncertainty of results 
 
The input variables that are most important to the variability in the estimates of 
production gains using HCA are: participation rate among risk exposed males and 
average Australian males aged 40 - 44. HCA estimates are dominated by the long term 
absences particularly mortality.  
 
The input variables that are most important to the variability in the estimates of 
production gains using FCA are: participation rates among risk exposed males and 
average Australian males aged 50 – 54. This age group has the highest gross annual 
wage. 
 
The input variable that is most important to the taxation effects using HCA and FCA is 
the absenteeism among risk exposed males aged 50 - 59. The taxation effects are 
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directly based on production gains. The higher wage rates of the older age groups also 
affect the calculation of taxation effects. 
 
The input variable that is most important to the welfare effects using HCA or FCA is 
the participation rate of the males risk exposed and Australian average males aged 40 – 
44 where least production gains occur.  
 
The unusual results obtained in this uncertainty analysis may be explained by the 
volatility of small numbers of beneficiaries from this intervention. 
 
h. Sensitivity analysis – effects of discount rates, friction period, wages 
rates 
 
None of the scenarios tested:-length of friction period, choice of wage rates, or discount 
rates valuing production gains, altered the conclusion. 
 
i. Interpretation 
 
This is a marginally cost-effective intervention from a health sector perspective which 
is improved very little by the incorporation of production gains from a societal 
perspective. 
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Other mental disorders 
18 Vocational Rehabilitation for schizophrenia 
 
This particular intervention was analysed in ACE Mental Health for the year 2000 
(Chalamat, Mihalopoulos et al. 2005) and has been updated to the year 2003 to be 
consistent with the other interventions in the current study. A different approach to the 
measurement of the production gains is used as the workforce absenteeism and 
participation rates for people with schizophrenia is not surveyed within the National 
Health Survey. The previous ACE analysis established that there was no evidence of 
health gain arising from the individual placement and support vocational rehabilitation 
program, nor any future health cost offsets. Thus there are no incremental cost 
effectiveness ratios that can be presented. However this ACE analysis used a 
productivity gains framework to assess the impact of the intervention. 
 
The intervention provides support services to an eligible 8,200 people with 
schizophrenia, assisting 1,100 of them to find and retain paid employment. The costs of 
such a program ($12M) exceed the production gains that can be expected ($5.4M), 
hence the program remains a net cost to society ($6.6M) each year after consideration 
of the production gains. Welfare payments are reduced by $1.3M and taxation increases 
by $0.3M annually (refer to Table 26). Since there is no health gain (no deaths or 
disability averted) we do not apply the HCA and FCA model as in previous 
interventions, but instead measure the total costs and benefits of such a scheme 
(benefits have been defined as personal income accruing to the individual, welfare 
payments averted and taxes accruing to the government) using the same procedure as in 
Chalamat et al, (2005).. It is not possible to apply gendered wages as we do not have 
source data by gender. Much of the sensitivity analysis performed in the other 
interventions is superfluous. The second stage filter analysis of ACE Mental Health 
identified structural disincentives in the Australian economy which prevent a person on 
the Disability Support Pension seeking full time work if it meant losing the right to the 
pension. 
 
Table 26: Summary: vocational rehabilitation for people with schizophrenia  
Summary: Vocational Rehabilitation
Median LL UL
Cost to Government ($M) $12.0 $8.8 $15.9
Cost to Individuals ($M) $0.0 $0.0 $0.0
Production Gains $5.4 $3.3 $8.3
Net cost to society $6.6 $5.4 $7.7
Welfare payments $1.3 $0.8 $2.1 
Taxation receipts $0.3 $0.2 $0.5  
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Smoking cessation programs 
 
The workforce participation rates and absenteeism experience of male and female 
smokers compared to the Australian average is presented in the 4 charts of Figure 6. 
Overall smokers tend to have more days off work and participate less in the workforce 
than average (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2004 - 05). This would lead us to expect 
production gains to be gained by smoking cessation programs. 
 
Figure 6 Workforce participation and absenteeism rates of smokers and average 
Australians, by age and sex, National Health Survey 2004/5. 
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19 Bupropion 
 
a. Description of intervention and its costs and benefits from a health 
sector perspective 
 
Treatment with prescription medication Bupropion (Zyban) was modelled for a period 
of 7 weeks as per treatment guidelines(Bertram M, Lim S et al. 2007). The target 
population for the analysis comprised current smokers who were motivated to quit, 
aged 20-79 years in Australia in the year 2000.  The comparator was ‘do nothing’, 
which included the effects of mass-media campaigns and taxation on cigarettes, since 
they were widespread in Australia at the time. The costing procedure followed is the 
same as described for nicotine replacement therapy (NRT – refer to intervention 21). 
The costs of the intervention included: prescription medication and GP visits by 
persons motivated to quit. Costs of the intervention have been estimated on the basis of 
11% of smokers being motivated to quit using Bupropion. In 2003 if 11% of smokers 
were motivated to quit, Bupropion would cost $8,600 for each DALY averted from a 
health sector perspective (refer to Table 27). 
 
b. Intervention specific assumptions and caveats related to health 
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For the purpose of this production gains/losses project, the number of smokers in 2003 
was assumed to be approximately the same as the year 2000 (2.28 million), allowing 
for a larger total population and a declining percentage of smokers. The number of 
smokers motivated to quit, taking up Bupropion, was estimated at 11% of all smokers 
in 2003 (250,911) (Doran C, Shakeshaft A et al. 2002). 
 
c. Second stage filters as appropriate 
 
The drug has a number of unpleasant side-effects which influence its acceptability to 
smokers. 
 
d. Intervention specific assumptions and caveats related to production 
gains 
 
The production gains model calculates the value of lost production that would be 
averted if people were to quit smoking and avoid the negative health effects of tobacco-
related illness. People who quit smoking may avoid premature mortality and permanent 
early departure from the workforce (i.e. reduced participation in the workforce due to 
long term ill health) as well as experiencing fewer short term absences (days off in a 
year) due to ill health. All calculations in the model use age and sex specific data. 
Production effects are valued in real prices for the reference year (2003) after 
incorporating a wage rate increase of 0.016 per annum. 
 
e. Mortality and morbidity benefits among workforce age group 
 
The risk of tobacco-related mortality is reduced in former smokers (quitters) compared 
to current smokers, as excess risk is reversed over time because of smoking cessation. 
To account for disability (morbidity) attributable to tobacco-related causes a ratio of 
prevalent years lived with disability to death for each smoking-related cause in the year 
2000 was used as an average population estimate. This provides smoking-related 
disability proportionate to each smoking-related death. Data on the number of people 
likely to take up the intervention, the number of beneficiaries of the intervention and 
the number of deaths averted due to the intervention, are sourced from a disease model 
used in the ACE: Prevention studies (Bertram M, Lim S et al. 2007). The number of 
lifetime quitters in the first year of the intervention was 67 per 1000 motivated to quit 
(16,811 quitters). 
 
f. Production gains, taxation and welfare effects 
 
Using the HCA method (base case incorporating 3.5% discount rate and gender based 
wages) from the wider societal perspective incorporating the production gains of 
quitting of $52 million ($44 – $61), the intervention remains a net societal cost of $29 
million ($24 – $33). Using the FCA method, the intervention remains a net cost to 
society of $75 million ($74 – $75) after incorporating production gains of only $7 
million ($4 - $10). See Table 27. The impact on the cost per DALY saved is a reduction 
from $8,641 to $3,092 using the HCA method or reduction from $8,641 to $7,949 using 
the FCA method. 
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Table 27: Summary base case. Bupropion 
Bupropion
3 months , 3.5%, gender wages median LL 2.5% UL 97.5% median LL 2.5% UL 97.5%
$M $M $M $M $M $M
Cost of intervention Govt $78 $72 $84 $78 $72 $84
Cost of intervention Patient $18 $17 $20 $18 $17 $20
Cost (offsets) $15 $11 $19 $15 $11 $19
Net cost to Health Sector $81 $78 $85 $81 $78 $85
Production gains $52 $44 $61 $7 $4 $10
Net cost to society $29 $33 $24 $75 $74 $75
DALYs saved 9400 7007 11972 9400 7007 11972
Net cost per DALY saved Health sector $8,641 $11,068 $7,065 $8,641 $11,068 $7,065
Net cost per DALY saved All sectors $3,092 $4,756 $1,998 $7,949 $10,492 $6,223
Impact on cost/DALY $5,549 $6,312 $5,067 $693 $576 $842
Human Capital Approach Friction Cost Approach
 
 
g. Most important contributor to the uncertainty of results 
 
The input variable that is most important to the variability in the estimates of 
production gains using HCA is the participation rate among the male smokers aged 55 
to 64. HCA estimates are dominated by the long term absences and most health gains 
occur at older ages especially among males.  
 
The input variables that are most important to the variability in the estimates of 
production gains using FCA are: (a) the wage multiplier; and (b) participation rate 
among the male smokers aged 60 to 64. FCA estimates are dominated by the long term 
absences and most health gains occur at older ages especially among males. The actual 
value of lost production may be higher or lower than the wages paid reflecting the 
nature of the employee’s contribution at work. 
 
The input variables that are most important to the taxation effects using HCA are: (a) 
the wage multiplier and (b) participation rates among the male smokers aged 60-64. 
HCA estimates are dominated by the long term absences and most health gains occur at 
older ages especially among males. The actual value of lost production may be higher 
or lower than the wages paid reflecting the nature of the employee’s contribution at 
work. The taxation effects are directly based on the size of production gains. 
 
The input variables that are most important to the taxation effects using FCA are: (a) 
the absenteeism rate among 55 - 59 year old male smokers and (b) the wage multiplier. 
Short term absences are relatively more important in the FCA than the HCA. The 
taxation effects are directly based on production gains. 
 
The input variable that is most important to the welfare effects using HCA is the 
participation rate of the older smokers of both genders. The FCA estimates of welfare 
effects are influenced most by uncertainty in the participation rates of older male 
smokers. 
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h. Sensitivity analysis – effects of discount rates, friction period, wages 
rates 
 
Changing the length of the friction period or the discount rates in scenario analysis does 
not alter the main conclusion. 
 
i. Interpretation of results 
 
An intervention that is very cost effective from a health sector perspective (well below 
the arbitrary threshold of $50,000 per DALY) appears even more effective using HCA, 
but appears only marginally improved using the FCA. 
 
20 Call back counselling 
 
a. Description of intervention and its costs and benefits from a health 
sector perspective 
 
The version of call back counselling intervention analysed is similar to that used in the 
Borland trial (Borland R, Segan C et al. 2001). Call back counselling as part of the Quit 
line service, involves strategic calls back by a counsellor in the days and weeks before 
and after quitting smoking (usually two before and four after). The counselling is 
grounded in cognitive behavioural therapy. The average duration of sessions is 20 
minutes. A ‘Quit Pack’ comprising self-help materials is also mailed to participants. 
The target population for the analysis comprised current smokers who were motivated 
to quit, aged 35-79 years in Queensland, WA and NT in the year 2003.  The program is 
already in use in Victoria, SA, NSW and Tasmania, therefore an expansion of the 
intervention was modelled. The comparator was current practice, which included some 
counselling if requested and the receipt of self-help materials. The number of lifetime 
quitters in the first year of the intervention was 127 per 1000 motivated to quit (355 
quitters). The same costing procedure as NRT was followed in this intervention (refer 
to intervention 21). The key costs of this intervention included: counsellors at Quit, GP 
referral and telephone calls by individuals and counsellors. In 2003 if 0.5% of smokers 
were motivated to quit, call back counselling would be a dominant intervention (saving 
both health outcomes and health dollars) from a health sector perspective (refer to 
Table 28). 
 
b. Intervention specific assumptions and caveats related to health 
 
Total costs of the intervention have been calculated on the basis of 0.5% of smokers 
being motivated to quit using call back counseling. 
 
c. Second stage filters as appropriate 
 
There are no equity, strength of evidence, acceptability nor feasibility concerns with 
this intervention. 
 
d. Intervention specific assumptions and caveats related to production 
gains 
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The production gains model calculates the value of lost production that would be 
averted if people were to quit smoking and avoid the negative health effects of tobacco-
related illness. People who quit smoking may avoid premature mortality and permanent 
early departure from the workforce (i.e. reduced participation in the workforce due to 
long term ill health) as well as experiencing fewer short term absences (days off in a 
year) due to ill health. All calculations in the model use age and sex specific data. 
Production effects are valued in real prices for the reference year (2003) after 
incorporating a wage rate increase of 0.016 per annum. 
 
e. Mortality and morbidity benefits among workforce age group 
 
The risk of tobacco-related mortality is reduced in former smokers (quitters) compared 
to current smokers, as excess risk is reversed over time because of smoking cessation. 
To account for disability (morbidity) attributable to tobacco-related causes a ratio of 
prevalent years lived with disability to death for each smoking-related cause in the year 
2000 was used as an average population estimate. This provides smoking-related 
disability proportionate to each smoking-related death. The number of smokers 
motivated to quit, taking up call back counselling, was estimated at 2800 (0.5% of all 
smokers in Queensland, WA and NT aged over 35 in 2003 (517825) (Anita Lal 
research project in Health Economics, Master of Public Health). 
 
f. Production gains, taxation and welfare effects 
 
Using the HCA method to incorporate the production gains of quitting $0.265 million 
($0.197 - $0.336), (base case of 3.5% discount and gender based wages), from the 
wider societal perspective, call back counselling becomes more dominant through 
generating net cost savings to society of $0.743 million ($0.537 - $0.969) and providing 
health gains. Using the FCA method, the intervention also becomes more dominant, 
generating a net cost saving to society of $0.518 million ($0.353 - $0.706) after 
incorporating only $0.04 million ($0.013 - $0.073) of production gains. See Table 28. 
The cost per DALY with and without production gains under these circumstances (a 
dominant intervention) cannot be interpreted meaningfully and is not calculated. 
 
Table 28: Summary base case. Call back counselling 
Call back counselling
3 months , 3.5%, gender wages median LL 2.5% UL 97.5% median LL 2.5% UL 97.5%
$M $M $M $M $M $M
Cost of intervention ngos $0.197 $0.144 $0.256 $0.197 $0.144 $0.256
Cost of intervention health sector $0.006 $0.005 $0.008 $0.006 $0.005 $0.008
Cost of intervention individuals $0.002 $0.002 $0.003 $0.002 $0.002 $0.003
Cost (offsets) $0.683 $0.490 $0.900 $0.683 $0.490 $0.900
Net cost to Health Sector ($0.478) ($0.340) ($0.633) ($0.478) ($0.340) ($0.633)
Production gains $0.265 $0.197 $0.336 $0.040 $0.013 $0.073
Net cost to society ($0.743) ($0.537) ($0.969) ($0.518) ($0.353) ($0.706)
DALYs saved 940              720            1,170           940          720          1,170           
Net cost per DALY saved Health sectordominant intervention saving DALYs and dollars
Net cost per DALY saved All sectors
Impact on cost/DALY
Human Capital Approach Friction Cost Approach
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g. Most important contributor to the uncertainty of results 
 
The input variable that is most important to the variability in the estimates of 
production gains using HCA is the participation rate among the male smokers aged 55 
to 64. HCA estimates are usually dominated by the long term absences and most health 
gains occur at older ages usually among males.  
 
The input variables that are most important to the variability in the estimates of 
production gains using FCA are: (a) the wage multiplier; and (b) participation rates 
among the female smokers aged 60 to 64. FCA estimates are dominated by the long 
term absences and most health gains for this intervention occur at older ages among 
females. The actual value of lost production may be higher or lower than the wages 
paid reflecting the nature of the employee’s contribution at work. 
 
The input variables that are most important to the taxation effects using HCA are: (a) 
the absenteeism rate among the male smokers aged 60- 64 and (b) the wage multiplier. 
HCA estimates are usually dominated by the long term absences and most health gains 
occur at older ages among males. The actual value of lost production and may be higher 
or lower than the wages paid reflecting the nature of the employee’s contribution at 
work. The taxation effects are directly based on the size of production gains. 
 
The input variable that is most important to the taxation effects using FCA is the 
absenteeism rate among 55 - 64 year old male smokers. Short term absences are 
relatively more important in the FCA than the HCA. The taxation effects are directly 
based on production gains. 
 
The input variable that is most important to the welfare effects using HCA or FCA is 
the participation rate of the older smokers of both genders. 
 
h. Sensitivity analysis – effects of discount rates, friction period, wages 
rates 
 
None of the scenarios tested:-length of friction period, choice of wage rates, nor 
discount rates, altered the conclusion.  
 
i. Interpretation of results 
 
This dominant intervention which costs very little and saves relatively a lot, becomes 
even more attractive after the consideration of modest production gains. 
 
21 Nicotine Replacement Therapy 
 
a. Description of intervention, costs and benefits from health sector 
perspective  
 
Treatment with Nicotine Replacement Therapy (NRT) transdermal patches was 
modelled for a period of 6-12 weeks (Bertram M, Lim S et al. 2007). The target 
population for the analysis comprised current smokers who were motivated to quit, 
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aged 20-79 years in Australia in the year 2003.  The comparator was current practice, 
which included the effects of mass-media campaigns and taxation on cigarettes, since 
they were widespread in Australia at the time.  The cost of the NRT intervention 
includes purchase of Nicotine Replacement Transdermal patches by people motivated 
to quit. Life time costs and cost offsets were modelled until death or age 100 years with 
a discount rate of 3%. A ratio of total health system costs to the number of deaths for 
each tobacco-related disease was applied at the time of death. Costs of the intervention 
have been estimated on the basis of 20% of smokers being motivated to quit using 
NRT. In 2003 if 20% of smokers were motivated to quit, NRT patches would have a 
net cost from a health sector perspective of $19100 for each DALY averted (refer to 
Table 29). 
 
b. Intervention specific assumptions and caveats related to health sector 
perspective 
 
For the purpose of this production gains/losses project, the number of smokers in 2003 
was assumed to be approximately the same as the year 2000 (2.28 million), allowing 
for a larger total population and a declining percentage of smokers. The number of 
smokers motivated to quit, taking up NRT, was estimated at 20% of all smokers in 
2003 (456,201) (Bertram personal communication 10/8/07)  
 
c. Second stage filters as appropriate 
 
NRT is not provided to Australians on the Pharmaceutical Benefit scheme, and despite 
studies of its cost-effectiveness, it has not been added. 
 
d. Intervention specific assumptions and caveats related to production 
gains 
 
The production gains model calculates the value of lost production that would be 
averted if people were to quit smoking and avoid the negative health effects of tobacco-
related illness. People who quit smoking may avoid premature mortality and permanent 
early departure from the workforce (i.e. reduced participation in the workforce due to 
long term ill health) as well as experiencing fewer short term absences (days off in a 
year) due to ill health. All calculations in the model use age and sex specific data. 
Production effects are valued in real prices for the reference year (2003) after 
incorporating a wage rate increase of 0.016 per annum. 
 
e. Mortality and morbidity benefits among workforce age group 
 
The risk of tobacco-related mortality is reduced in former smokers (quitters) compared 
to current smokers, as excess risk is reversed over time because of smoking cessation. 
To account for disability (morbidity) attributable to tobacco-related causes a ratio of 
prevalent years lived with disability to death for each smoking-related cause in the year 
2003 was used as an average population estimate. This provides smoking-related 
disability proportionate to each smoking-related death. Data on the number of people 
likely to take up the intervention, the number of beneficiaries of the intervention and 
the number of deaths averted due to the intervention, are sourced from a disease model 
used in the ACE: Prevention studies (Bertram M, Lim S et al. 2007). The number of 
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lifetime quitters in the first year of the intervention was 51 per 1000 motivated to quit 
(i.e. 23,266 quitters). 
 
f. Production gains, taxation and welfare effects 
 
Using the HCA method from the wider societal perspective after incorporating effects 
on the workforce of the health gains of quitting of $72 million ($61 – $85), the 
intervention has a net societal cost of $176 million ($83 – $281). Using the FCA 
method, the intervention remains a net cost to society of $240 million ($138 – $352) 
after incorporating only $9 million ($5 - $14) production gains. See Table 29. The 
impact on the cost per DALY saved is a reduction from $19,107 to $13,556 using the 
HCA method or reduction from $19,107 to $18,432 using the FCA method.   
 
Table 29: Summary base case. Nicotine replacement therapy 
Nicotine Replacement Therapy
3 months , 3.5%, gender wages median LL 2.5% UL 97.5% median LL 2.5% UL 97.5%
$M $M $M $M $M $M
Cost of intervention $269 $159 $391 $269 $159 $391
Cost (offsets) $21 $16 $26 $21 $16 $26
Net cost to Health Sector $249 $143 $365 $249 $143 $365
Production gains $72 $61 $85 $9 $5 $14
Net cost to society $176 $83 $281 $240 $138 $352
DALYs saved 13010 9991 16223 13010 9991 16223
Net cost per DALY saved Health sector $19,107 $14,343 $22,521 $19,107 $14,343 $22,521
Net cost per DALY saved All sectors $13,556 $8,271 $17,296 $18,432 $13,808 $21,667
Impact on cost/DALY $5,550 $6,072 $5,225 $675 $535 $854
Human Capital Approach Friction Cost Approach
 
 
g. Most important contributor to the uncertainty of results 
 
The input variable that is most important to the variability in the estimates of 
production gains using HCA is the participation rate among the male smokers aged 55 
to 64. HCA estimates are dominated by the long term absences and most health gains 
occur at older ages especially among males.  
 
The input variables that are most important to the variability in the estimates of 
production gains using FCA are: (a) the wage multiplier; and (b) participation rates 
among the male smokers aged 60 to 64. FCA estimates are dominated by the long term 
absences and most health gains occur at older ages especially among males. The actual 
value of lost production may be higher or lower than the wages paid reflecting the 
nature of the employee’s contribution at work. 
 
The input variables that are most important to the taxation effects using HCA are: (a) 
the wage multiplier and (b) participation rate among the male smokers aged 60-64. 
HCA estimates are dominated by the long term absences and most health gains occur at 
older ages especially among males. The actual value of lost production and may be 
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higher or lower than the wages paid reflecting the nature of the employee’s contribution 
at work. The taxation effects are directly based on the size of production gains. 
 
The input variables that are most important to the taxation effects using FCA are: (a) 
the absenteeism rate among 60-64 year old male smokers and (b) the wage multiplier. 
Short term absences are relatively more important in the FCA than the HCA. The 
taxation effects are directly based on production gains. 
 
The input variable that is most important to the welfare effects using HCA or FCA is 
the participation rate of the older smokers of both genders. 
 
h. Sensitivity analysis – effects of discount rates, friction period, wages 
rates 
 
In scenario analysis, changing the length of the friction period from 3 to 6 months or 
the discount rates (0, 3.5, 5, and 7%) applied to the valuation of production gains, or the 
use of gender based or gender free wages does not alter the main conclusion.  
 
i. Interpretation of results 
 
An intervention that is very cost effective from a health sector perspective (well below 
the arbitrary threshold of $50,000 per DALY) appears even more effective using HCA, 
but appears only marginally improved using the FCA. 
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Skin cancer prevention 
22 SunSmart program 
 
a. Description of intervention and its costs and benefits from a health 
sector perspective 
 
Public health programs on skin protection such as SunSmart have been the focus of 
controlling skin cancer in Australia for the past 20 years. The SunSmart program 
originates from the “Slip, Slop, Slap” campaign in Victoria (1980) and has been 
adopted by each State’s Cancer Council to promote sun protection and prevent skin 
cancer. SunSmart is a broad-based, multi-faceted skin cancer control program which 
aims to lead, coordinate, implement and evaluate action to minimise the cost of skin 
cancer (CCV 2002). The SunSmart program is implemented through comprehensive 
public and professional education activities working with local governments, schools, 
workplaces and sporting groups to encourage people to change their sun protection 
behaviour and environments. The cost of a national SunSmart program is estimated by 
the national average per capita level of expenditure over the time period from late 
1980s to 2006, which is multiplied by the Australian population of 2003 to 2022 to 
estimate the probable expenditures of a future national program. Cost offsets are 
estimated as the published life time treatment costs (AIHW, 2002) multiplied by the 
incidence prevented (obtained from the SunSmart disease model). A 20-years national 
SunSmart program would prevent 9,378 melanoma and 23,260 non-melanoma skin 
cancer (NMSC) cases. The present value cost in 2003 of 20-years national SunSmart 
program would be $52 million. The cost offset (skin cancer treatment) would be $59 
million. A 20-year national SunSmart program would generate a net cost saving to the 
health sector of $6.7 million (refer to Table 30). 
b. Intervention specific assumptions and caveats related to health 
 
To assess the cost-effectiveness of a future national SunSmart program, a model was 
developed to estimate future health benefits and cost outcomes using the observed skin 
cancer incidence and the level of actual expenditures which occurred in the past 20 
years at the State/Territory level. A reduction of 50% in melanoma incidence is 
assumed attributable to the SunSmart program. Discounting at 5% has been applied to 
costs and benefits as this intervention was prepared outside the scope of the ACE-
Prevention study. The difference is not expected to be significant to the conclusions. 
 
c. Second stage filters as appropriate 
 
Not yet evaluated within ACE-Prevention. 
 
d. Intervention specific assumptions and caveats related to production 
gains 
 
There are no uncertainty intervals around intervention cost, cost offsets, net cost to the 
health sector, or life years saved since observed data over 20 years was the basis of the 
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predictive model for the next 20 years. People who self reported as having skin cancer 
in the National Health Survey were used to identify the participation rate and 
absenteeism behaviour of the exposed group to compare with the average Australian 
group. In several ages the people with skin cancer have higher participation rates than 
average. This has greatly contributed to the width of the uncertainty intervals around 
the production gains and losses. See the 4 charts in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7: Workforce participation and absenteeism rates of people with skin 
cancer compared to average Australians by age and sex, National Health Survey 
2004/5 
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e. Mortality and morbidity benefits among workforce age group 
 
The main health outcomes measured are skin cancer incidence prevented, death averted 
and life years saved (LYS) for melanoma and NMSC. Melanoma and NMSC are 
analysed separately due to data availability and disease outcomes. The health outcomes 
of melanoma are modelled using empirical incidence rates reported by three latitude 
zone representative states’ Cancer Registries (Vic, NSW, Qld), while the health 
outcomes of NMSC are modelled using the predicted reduction of NMSC incidence 
reported by the NMSC survey study (Staple 1998). There would be 967 deaths deferred 
and 16,887 LYS from a 20-years SunSmart program, (discounted at 5%).  
 
f. Production gains, taxation and welfare effects 
 
Using the HCA method (base case incorporating 3.5% discount rate and gender based 
wages) from the wider societal perspective incorporating the production gains of $420 
million ((-$197) – $1,100), the intervention becomes more cost saving while improving 
health. There is a 10 % chance of a production loss in the base case scenario. Using the 
FCA method, the intervention also becomes more cost saving while improving health, 
after incorporating production gains of $135 million ($32 - $340). See Table 30. The 
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cost per DALY with and without production gains under these circumstances (a 
dominant intervention) cannot be interpreted meaningfully and is not calculated. 
 
Table 30: Summary: base case. SunSmart 
SunSmart program:
3 months , 3.5%, gender wages median LL 2.5% UL 97.5% median LL 2.5% UL 97.5%
Cost of intervention $52 $52
Cost (offsets) $59 $59
Net cost to Health Sector ($7) ($7)
Production gains $422 ($197) $1,100 $135 $32 $344
Net cost to society ($429) ($142)
Life Years saved 16887 16887
Net cost per LY saved Health sectordominant dominant
Net cost per LY saved All sectors  
Impact on cost/LY   
Human Capital Approach Friction Cost Approach
 
 
g. Most important contributor to the uncertainty of results 
 
The participation rate of people with skin cancer is higher than the Australian average 
at some ages particularly among females.  
 
The input variable that is most important to the variability in the estimates of 
production gains using HCA is the participation rate among risk exposed males aged 25 
– 29 and 35 - 39. HCA estimates are usually dominated by the long term absences but 
in this intervention the benefits are mostly reductions in morbidity in these age groups.  
 
The input variables that are most important to the variability in the estimates of 
production gains using FCA are: (a) the wage multiplier and (b) the absenteeism rate 
among males risk exposed aged 25 - 29. Short term absences are relatively more 
important in the FCA than the HCA. 
 
The input variable that is most important to the taxation effects using HCA is the 
participation rate among risk exposed males aged 25 – 29 and 35 - 39. The taxation 
effects are directly based on production gains. 
 
The input variables that are most important to the taxation effects using FCA are: (a) 
the wage multiplier and (b) the absenteeism rate among males risk exposed aged 25 - 
29. Short term absences are relatively more important in the FCA than the HCA. The 
taxation effects are directly based on production gains. 
 
The input variable that is most important to the welfare effects using HCA and FCA is 
the participation rate of the females risk exposed aged 30 – 39 where most health 
benefits occur. 
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h. Sensitivity analysis – effects of discount rates, friction period, wages 
rates 
 
None of the scenarios tested:-length of friction period, choice of gendered or gender-
free wage rates, nor discount rates, altered the conclusion.  
 
i. Interpretation 
 
Production gains due to this long running program are large. The intervention was 
dominant (saving money and providing health gains) prior to any consideration of these 
gains, which make the intervention more attractive. 
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Part E: Application of Production Gains Model to 
Threshold Analysis for Diabetes 
1 Theory, methods, assumptions and usefulness within the 
decision making context 
 
Threshold analysis is a useful decision aid that can be undertaken in various ways to 
assist policy-makers with key decisions, including resource allocation and research 
priority decisions. It can be used in a very general way, for example, to scope out the 
likely size or distribution of a key parameter; or in a more direct way, to assist with 
specific decisions (such as to invest or disinvest). Threshold analysis is usually 
employed in decision contexts when some information is available, but other key pieces 
of information are missing.  
 
The basic approach in the invest/disinvest context, is to use the information you do 
have, plus sensible judgements about credible values for the missing data, to inform the 
decisions that need to be made. Usually the critical value(s) of a parameter or 
parameters central to a decision to invest or disinvest are identified. For example, the 
decision-maker might specify an acceptable level of investment or an acceptable cost-
effectiveness ratio (i.e. return on investment). The analyst then uses available 
information to assess which combinations of parameter estimates could cause the 
threshold to be exceeded or achieved. Alternatively, the threshold values that cause the 
program to be regarded as too costly or not cost-effective could be defined (Drummond 
et al. 2001). In this context, threshold analysis could be thought of as a form of 
sensitivity analysis. The analysis set out below for diabetes, constitutes initial steps in 
the direction of using threshold analysis to inform resource allocation decisions. 
 
From the work presented in this report, threshold analysis could also be used in the 
scoping role; to tease out the potential size and distribution of production gains 
available from the diseases and risk factors considered. Scoping the potential size and 
distribution of production and taxation/welfare impacts can be useful for policy 
discussions, even where detailed cost-effectiveness information relating to specific 
interventions is not yet available. The scoping task could be done in a series of steps 
where the disease burden is first assessed; then the ‘preventable fraction’ is assessed 
based on best available information; then the ‘achievable preventable fraction’ is 
assessed with known interventions (considered as a group). If applied to a number of 
key disease areas or risk factors, threshold analysis done in this fashion could allow 
decision-makers to assess the potential contribution of the different diseases/risk factors 
assessed; consider their effectiveness and equity impacts; and thereby help set priorities 
for research work; for applied cost-effectiveness work; etc. 
 
Disease – diabetes 
In the absence of evaluated health interventions for diabetes available to the current 
project, we felt it might be useful to at least identify the potential for gain on the basis 
of what is known about diabetes and the workplace behaviour of those who have the 
disease. The reason diabetes has been chosen as a demonstration disease for threshold 
analysis is that it is recognized as an important priority area for the Government. We 
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know the mortality, prevalence and incidence of diabetes from Burden of Disease 
studies for Australia (2003) and the participation rates and absenteeism experience of 
people with diabetes from the National Health Survey 2004/05. Unfortunately, we do 
not yet have available to us the cost-effectiveness of preventive health interventions 
using ACE methods. 
 
Using the threshold analysis approach, the potential production gains can be estimated 
if some arbitrary proportion of the incident cases of diabetes is assumed to be 
preventable. The value of threshold analysis in the current context is that decision-
makers may gain an idea of what proportion of diabetes needs to be prevented before 
sizable gains in production effects can be anticipated. As empirically-based diabetes 
prevention intervention effects become available in the future - both in terms of costs 
and benefits - these can then be compared to results from the earlier preliminary 
estimates from the threshold analysis. We are also able to compare the size of the 
production gains in this disease area with interventions in other diseases previously 
analysed. 
 
Threshold analysis can be undertaken within the current project because we can 
estimate the number of people (age/sex adjusted) who will benefit from, for example a 
1% or 10% fall in diabetes incidence (due to available epidemiological modeling of the 
diabetes burden of disease). We can then use the methods developed in this study to: 
firstly, determine the absenteeism and participation of people with diabetes; and 
secondly, model the impact on the work force due to the postulated fall in disease 
incidence (of 1% or 10% etc) and generate the likely production gains. Effective 
interventions that cost less than this level of production gain would then constitute a net 
benefit to society.  
 
 
2 Detail of threshold analysis applied to a disease, risk 
factor 
People with diabetes or high blood sugar tend to have lower work force participation 
rates than the average for Australians as a whole over most age groups and sex. They 
also have higher rates of absenteeism from the work force (refer Figure 8). 
 
a. Potential mortality and morbidity benefits among workforce age group 
 
If a 1% fall in diabetes incidence was achieved by an intervention, 516 people would 
benefit and 62 DALYs would be averted. If a 10% fall in diabetes incidence was 
achieved by an intervention 5,158 people would benefit and 618 DALYs would be 
averted (refer Table 31 -Table 32).  
 
b. Production gains, taxation and welfare effects 
 
We estimate using the HCA that $24 million in production gains would occur with a 
small 1% fall in the incidence of diabetes. This rises to $240 million if a 10% fall in 
diabetes incidence was to occur as a result of some (unspecified) health intervention. 
Using the FCA, a 1% fall in diabetes incidence leads to $5 million in production gains 
and a 10% fall leads to $49 million. 
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Figure 8: Workforce participation and absenteeism rates of people with diabetes 
or high blood sugar compared to average Australians by age and sex, National 
Health Survey 2004/5 
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Table 31 Summary base case 1% drop in incidence of Diabetes 
Type 2 Diabetes  1 % drop
3 months , 3.5%, gender wages median LL 2.5% UL 97.5% median LL 2.5% UL 97.5%
$M $M $M $M $M $M
Cost of intervention Govt $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Cost of intervention patient $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Cost (offsets) $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Net cost to Health Sector $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Production gains $24 $14 $35 $5 $2 $10
Net cost to society
DALYs saved estimated YLD 62 36 88 62 36 88
Net cost per DALY saved Health sector $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Net cost per DALY saved All sectors $0 $0 $0
Impact on cost/DALY $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Human Capital Approach Friction Cost Approach
 
 
Table 32 Summary base case 10% drop in incidence of Diabetes 
Type 2 Diabetes  10 % incidence drop
3 months , 3.5%, gender wages median LL 2.5% UL 97.5% median LL 2.5% UL 97.5%
$M $M $M $M $M $M
Cost of intervention Govt $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Cost of intervention patient $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Cost (offsets) $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Net cost to Health Sector $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Production gains $240 $147 $339 $49 $22 $101
Net cost to society
DALYs saved estimated YLD 618 361 875 618 361 875
Net cost per DALY saved Health sector $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Net cost per DALY saved All sectors $0 $0 $0
Impact on cost/DALY $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Human Capital Approach Friction Cost Approach
 
 
c. Interpretation of results 
Effective interventions that can achieve the targeted level of reduction in diabetes 
incidence, and whose net health sector cost was less than this level of production gain, 
would clearly constitute a net benefit to society (i.e. they would be dominant, having a 
cost saving plus a health gain). 
 
Threshold analysis can thus be used to set a useful target for the evaluation of 
alternative diabetes prevention programs. Interventions whose net health sector cost 
was more than the modeled production gains could still be ‘cost-effective’, but the 
decision-maker would then need to specify the ICER threshold value (e.g. < $50,000 
per DALY). 
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3 Conclusion of Threshold Analysis 
 
a. Recommendation 
In any further work exploring the production gains topic, there is a role for threshold 
analysis in supplementing and supporting the more detailed cost-ffectiveness work 
reported in Part D.  
 
b. Usefulness of the analysis 
Threshold analysis enables the potential size of the production gains to be compared 
with other known health interventions in other diseases. This can facilitate policy 
consideration of potential interventions and their pattern of benefits (age and sex). 
 
c. Limitations of the diabetes analysis 
What we cannot model easily is the impact of a reduction in diabetes mortality, because 
the costs associated with diabetes occur during a lifetime rather than at the point of 
death. It is much simpler to model the prevention of incident cases. 
 
 
  129
Part F: Discussion and Future Directions 
 
1 Overview of results 
 
This study has been an initial exploratory attempt to include production gains within a 
priority-setting framework which uses techniques of economic evaluation to assess the 
cost-effectiveness of a broad range of health interventions. By way of overview, the 
key findings were that: 
• the inclusion of production gains/losses in cost-effectiveness evaluations can be 
justified in normative economic theory, where the aim is to maximise social 
welfare with available resources; 
• of the two established methods to calculate production gains, the Friction Cost 
Approach (FCA) is our preferred method as it is based on more realistic 
assumptions regarding compensation effects and the replacement of workers 
who leave the workforce; 
• the impact of production gains on comparative cost-effectiveness of the 
interventions examined was minor, but further interventions need to be assessed 
before definite conclusions are drawn; 
• the size of the potential production gains varied considerably across the 
interventions considered (range -$1.9M to +$840M) and are likely to be very 
relevant to decision-makers in their considerations of intervention affordability 
and fiscal impact; 
• the size and distribution of production gains (and taxation/welfare effects) 
varied by age/sex across the interventions and will raise important issues of 
social justice to be balanced against other policy objectives; and 
• whilst there are certainly limitations with current methods and data sources 
which need to be kept in mind, the pilot has illustrated that the task of 
incorporating production gains into economic analysis of health interventions is 
feasible in Australia and that useful information can be gained to aid policy 
decisions.  
 
2 Discussion 
 
Our finding on the comparative cost-effectiveness ranking of interventions, with and 
without production gains, is interesting but not unexpected. Production gains reflect 
health gains, which in turn rely on the effectiveness of the interventions. Interventions 
that were already cost-effective from a health sector perspective are therefore further 
enhanced by inclusion of production gains. Two interventions that had borderline cost-
effectiveness credentials from a health sector perspective (at just over $50,000/DALY), 
become cost-effective by inclusion of production gains. Overall the inclusion of 
production gains did not greatly change the final league table arising from a health 
sector perspective and did not greatly alter the cost-effectiveness ratios.  
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The ACE projects have used a threshold figure (sometimes called shadow price) of 
$50,000 per Disability Adjusted Life-Year (DALY) averted to represent cost-
effectiveness (or value-for-money) in the context of available health sector resources. It 
is worth pausing for moment to consider the use of league tables to guide policy 
decisions and the associated concept of shadow price. In recent years it has become 
common practice for the results of economic evaluations to be brought together to 
provide a league table in which the interventions are ranked in order of their ‘cost per 
life year’ or ‘cost per QALY’ results. There are two separate reasons evident in the 
literature behind the league table approach. First, analysts undertaking an appraisal of 
an individual intervention may wish to look for some indication of the relative value of 
their intervention through reference to the cost-effectiveness of other programs. 
Comparing the result of an individual appraisal against others can help analysts and 
decision-makers develop a sense of what constitutes reasonable value-for-money, by 
seeing how resources are currently being utilised. In this decision context, the shadow 
price is a judgement call based on best available information on current spending 
decisions. 
 
Second, some analysts also develop league tables in order to inform decisions about the 
allocation of health care resources between various options for change – that is, to 
guide priority setting involving multiple interventions from a fixed budget. Here the 
shadow price is set by what is affordable from the available budget, with choices 
guided by the ICERs. Economists have urged caution, however, in the simplistic use of 
league tables in this way. Three reasons are discussed in the literature, viz: 
 
• First, for the information in league tables to be of use to decision-makers, they need 
to be confident that the methodology of the source studies is sound and that it is 
relatively homogeneous across the various studies. The aim is to ensure that the 
economic merit of interventions evaluated is not confounded by differences in the 
evaluation approach and associated assumptions. This concern sits behind our focus 
in this pilot study on using ACE evaluations where the methods have been 
standardised as far as possible. 
• Second, those league tables compiled from a review of the literature often include 
studies from a range of settings and economic data may not be easily transferable 
from one setting to another. Again this concern is addressed by use of ACE 
methods. 
• Third, there are issues associated with the practical application of decision rules in 
the presence of intervention indivisibilities (or ‘lumpiness’) and a budget constraint, 
which warrant caution against simplistic interpretation19. 
 
Thus in sum, notions of ‘cost-effectiveness’ are inherently context specific and the 
appropriateness of any particular level of threshold with the inclusion of production 
                                                 
19 Such as moving from the top of the table down the list of possible interventions until the entire budget 
is exhausted. Selection on the basis of average CEA/CUA results ignores the importance of marginal 
analysis (variation with patient needs; population sub-group; program size and design; health service 
setting; etc); and non constant returns to scale and indivisibilities also means that selection is not 
independent of financial cost (i.e. share of the budget utilised and its opportunity cost). 
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gains is a policy judgment that warrants further consideration20. The continued use by 
analysts of ‘$50,000 per DALY’ as the ‘rule of thumb’ threshold of cost-effectiveness 
in the health sector may be questioned if an appraisal perspective broader than the 
health sector is adopted (i.e. if both the cost and outcome side of the ICER are 
broadened). The inclusion of production gains makes the current study framework 
“partially societal”21 as production gains mostly fall outside the health sector (though of 
course some gains would feed back into the health sector).  
 
While the impact of production gains/losses on pre-existing cost-effectiveness ratios 
may be relatively small (although it is too early to be definitive), the potential to 
identify factors relevant to the affordability and social justice impacts of interventions 
is enhanced by this type of analysis. The affordability and efficiency consequences will 
clearly have equity impacts, as the distribution of winners and losers changes. This 
suggests the importance of placing economic/financial analysis within a broader 
approach to priority setting for the health sector, which incorporates government 
objectives for social justice. One way forward is offered by the ACE approach, with its 
combination of technical rigour and due process (incorporating the 2nd stage filter 
analysis), particularly since it has been successfully trialed in a number of empirical 
applications. 
 
3 Methods, Limitations and Future Directions 
 
The current project examined production gains, taxation effects and welfare payment 
effects. The extent to which welfare sector changes can be attributed to specific health 
interventions has been one of the more challenging aspects of the study and is 
particularly limited by lack of empirical estimates of such changes. 
 
The current project more generally suffered from the lack of direct longitudinal 
evidence of the impact of health interventions on work place behaviours, thereby 
making the exercise more indicative than definitive in any conclusions drawn. Thus 
reliance on tractable cross-sectional national data sets has been essential to undertaking 
any plausible analysis. The limitations of such data sets must be appreciated in order to 
appropriately interpret and use the results of this study. Firstly, while cross-sectional 
data provide a snap shot of the production-related behaviour of different sections of the 
population (e.g. self-identified smokers versus the average Australian population), such 
data cannot definitively ascribe any production-related change as attributable to a 
health intervention. How true this is remains an empirical issue and cannot be verified 
without properly collected longitudinal data from people undergoing the health 
interventions compared to people who do not.  
                                                 
20 Issues that arise in considering the wisdom of specifying shadow prices (as NICE has done in the UK) 
focus on the inter-relationship between the shadow price and: i) the size of the available budget; ii) the 
financial cost of the interventions being considered (as opposed their ICER); iii) whether interventions 
are easily increased or decreased in size (i.e. nature of the production function); iv) whether the outcome 
term captures all sources of value held to be important; v) symmetry and relevance of the costs and 
outcomes included; and vi) the risk of game playing (i.e. costs raised to get just below the shadow price). 
21 The words “partially societal” are chosen because while the inclusion of production gains broadens the 
perspective beyond the health sector (unless only health sector production effects are included as per 
Richardson & Olsen), other important societal costs, such as the criminal justice system or the education 
sector are not captured within the current framework. 
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Therefore if the inclusion of production gains within economic based decision-making 
frameworks is identified as an important consideration by public sector decision-
makers, then future trials and evaluations of health interventions need to properly 
measure the impact on production as well as impacts on the welfare sector (that is 
whether people move from welfare payment reliance to personal income gained from 
employment within the open-marketplace and vice versa). The current project has used 
the available data sets to make some plausible estimations, but the results of the project 
can only be considered indicative. 
 
The project has used two different methods to assess production gains, the FCA and the 
HCA. While these two approaches have been discussed in detail within Part B of this 
report, it is important to note that overall conclusions may change depending on which 
method is utilized. Given the aim of the current project, which was to assess production 
gains within the Australian paid-work sector, the FCA is the methodology of choice 
with respect to assessing realistic production gains attributable to health interventions.  
 
It is also important to appreciate that we cannot make any definitive statements or 
predictions based on our analysis about the impact on broader economic indices such as 
GDP growth. The effects of health improvements on broader economic gains, such as 
‘GDP per capita’, are far from certain. There is no simple linear relationship between 
health improvements, work force participation and productivity at this macro level. 
Many factors are important, including industry mix, population density and capital 
penetration (or the extent to which economies absorb new and innovative technologies). 
Therefore it is important to appreciate that improving the health of the Australian work 
force will not necessarily translate into broader macro-economic effects in a simple 
linear way, based upon current evidence. In this study we are defining production gains 
and losses as the impact of health interventions on people’s ability to participate in the 
paid work force.  
 
The current project has identified the key production-related parameters which 
contribute most to the uncertainty of the results (these are distinct from the question of 
whether the intervention works with respect to actually getting people back to work). 
These parameters are important to estimating the size of the potential economic impact 
using the frictional cost and human capital approaches adopted within this study. The 
key parameters which require further empirical verification include the wage multiplier, 
participation rates and absenteeism rates at various ages. This would involve larger 
National Health Surveys and industry surveys to identify the extent of compensatory 
behaviour in the Australian workplace when an employee is absent. 
 
It also needs to be acknowledged that the current intervention list is not an exhaustive 
list of health interventions, but rather a purposefully selected subset which includes 
different types of interventions across different sectors (both in terms of the health 
sector and level of financing as well as risk factor and disease categories). Because of 
this breadth of coverage and the available epidemiological and empirical data sets 
available for analysis, there are some differences to note in the way the standardised 
ACE methods are applied across the interventions. One example is the difference in the 
way the ‘current practice’ comparator is defined. For some interventions, such as 
random breath testing which aims to reduce road traffic accidents, current practice is 
defined as a do nothing scenario. For other interventions current practice is defined in a 
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way that specifies current activities (for example expansion of the Quit line to reduce 
cigarette smoking).  
 
Another example is that target populations may vary across the interventions. For some 
interventions the target population is people with established disease who are compared 
against the Australian average to identify production benefits from returning them to 
work or having fewer days off sick. Examples of this include interventions which 
reduce the risk of cardiovascular disease (whereby production gains to people who 
actually have the disease are estimated). Other interventions are targeted to confer 
production benefits to people at risk, but not necessarily persons with existing medical 
complications associated with the risky behaviour. The intervention aimed at reducing 
alcohol intake to counter risky drinking is an example of this.  
 
Finally, the analysis has not included any childhood interventions. One issue associated 
with such interventions is that many years would need to elapse before sizeable 
production gains would be experienced and the assumptions required for such estimates 
to be made. Another is that estimates, however uncertain, would be strongly impacted 
by the standard application of discounting. 
 
The current project has also included an introduction to threshold analysis, which could 
be a valuable addition to policy considerations about production gains and losses. As 
described in Part E, threshold analysis can be used in a very general way to scope out 
the likely size or distribution of a key parameter; or in a more direct way, to assist with 
specific decisions (such as to invest or disinvest). This can be valuable with respect to 
intervention areas not yet formally evaluated for cost-effectiveness, but on the policy 
agenda. The different levels of production gains and taxation/welfare effects could be 
modeled from estimated health benefits based on credible assumptions about the 
preventability of the health burden. As stronger evidence-based information becomes 
available on specific interventions to achieve the preventable burden, estimates of the 
associated production gains could be reworked. 
 
In conclusion, this study provides useful exploratory insight into how production gains 
and losses can be incorporated within a broad economic priority-setting decision 
context where multiple health interventions need to be assessed concurrently using best 
available data sources. We have demonstrated, with some important caveats, that such 
an addition is viable and can provide important additional information useful to public 
sector decision-makers. Future work on the possible inclusion of ‘human capital’ issues 
in priority setting processes adopted in the health sector would benefit from: 
 
• extension of the pilot list of 22 interventions to a more comprehensive list of 
disease/intervention combinations, possibly including children and adolescents, 
to better tease out the efficiency and equity implications; 
• further work to develop the data bases that would facilitate more rigorous 
measurement of production gains/losses (particularly longitudinal studies of the 
impact of health interventions on workforce absenteeism, participation rates, 
compensation effects and welfare impacts); 
• further discussion in the policy community about an acceptable framework for 
priority setting in the health sector; and  
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• further work in the academic community to develop standardised methods for 
the identification and measurement of production gains/losses. 
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Part G: Appendices 
Appendix 1: Intervention list and evidence of effectiveness 
 
Table 33: Intervention list, evidence of effectiveness and cost-effectiveness ratio 
# Risk factor Intervention Source of 
effectiveness  
Level of 
evidence 
Preliminary 
cost 
effectiveness 
ratio before 
production 
gains. 
1 Alcohol use Brief GP 
intervention 
Meta analysis 
(unpublished by C 
Doran) 
fair $1,000 
2 Alcohol use Random Breath 
testing 
NSW data 
reporting fatal 
accidents 
(Henstridge et al 
1997) 
fair $21,000 
3 Cervical Cancer Cervical Cancer 
Screening 
(current 
practice) 
Meta analysis 
(unpublished by S. 
Shih) 
sufficient $22,000 
4 CVD  ACE inhibitors 
targeted at 10% 
risk group 
Meta analysis 
(Lim S 2005) 
sufficient $29,000 
5 CVD  ACE inhibitors 
targeted at 5% 
risk group 
Meta analysis 
(Lim S 2005) 
sufficient $39,000 
6 CVD  Beta blockers 
targeted at 15% 
risk group 
Meta analysis 
(Lim S 2005) 
sufficient $18,000 
7 CVD  Beta blockers 
targeted at 5% 
risk group 
Meta analysis 
(Lim S 2005) 
sufficient $31,000 
8 CVD  Combination  
targeted at 15% 
risk group 
Meta analysis 
(Lim S 2005) 
sufficient $39,000 
9 CVD  Community 
Heart Health 
Program 
Meta analysis 
(Lim S 2005) 
sufficient Both cost 
saving and 
health saving 
10 CVD  Dietary 
counselling 
targeted at 10% 
risk group 
Meta analysis 
(Lim S 2005) 
sufficient $20,000 
11 CVD  Dietary 
counselling 
targeted at 5% 
risk group 
Meta analysis 
(Lim S 2005) 
sufficient $26,000 
12 Depression Maintenance 
CBT for 5 years 
with private 
psychiatrist 
Meta analysis 
(Vos T, Corry J et 
al. 2005) 
sufficient $5,600 
13 Depression Maintenance 
CBT for 5 years 
Meta analysis 
(Vos T, Corry J et 
sufficient $2,000 
  136
# Risk factor Intervention Source of 
effectiveness  
Level of 
evidence 
Preliminary 
cost 
effectiveness 
ratio before 
production 
gains. 
with public 
psychologist 
al. 2005) 
14 Depression Maintenance 
SSRIs for 5 
years 
Meta analysis 
(Trindade E and 
Menon D 1997) 
sufficient $23,000 
15 Depression Opportunistic 
screening + 
CBT 
Meta analysis 
(Cuijpers P, van 
Straten A et al. 
2007) 
limited $56,000 
16 Physical 
inactivity 
Active GP script (Elley CR, Kerse 
N et al. 2003) 
Single RCT (in 
NZ) with 
significant 
effect. Effect 
does not reach 
significance for 
7 out of 10 
RCTs of PA 
prescription. 
$22,000 
17 Physical 
inactivity 
GP referral to 
Exercise 
physiologist 
(Borland R, Segan 
C et al. 2001) 
Single RCT in 
UK. Effect 
didn’t reach 
significance. 
Few RCTs of 
Exercise 
Physiologist 
referral. 
$49,000 
18 Schizophrenia Vocational 
Rehabilitation 
Systematic review 
(Crowther R, 
Marshall M et al. 
2001) 
Limited 
generalisability 
outside US. 
Insufficient 
evidence of 
clinical 
outcomes 
Not applicable 
( no health 
gain) 
19 Smoking Bupropion Meta analysis 
(Silagy C, 
Lancaster T et al. 
2002) 
sufficient $8,600 
20 Smoking Call back 
counselling 
(Borland R, Segan 
C et al. 2001) 
sufficient Both cost 
saving and 
health saving 
21 Smoking Nicotine 
Replacement 
Therapy 
Meta analysis 
(Woolacott NF, 
Jones L et al. 
2002) 
sufficient $19,000 
22 Sunlight 
exposure 
SunSmart 
program 
Based on 
empirical data 
from Australian 
Cancer registry 
limited by lack 
of trial based 
data 
Both cost 
saving and 
health saving 
Notes  
The Preliminary Cost effectiveness ratios are calculated as net cost of the intervention to the health sector divided by the health 
benefit measured in disability adjusted life years.. These preliminary results are subject to peer review and potential change. 
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Appendix 2: The Recommended Checklist for Priority Setting 
 
Based on the four rationales set out in the paper, ten criteria have been developed that 
specify the features of an ideal approach to priority setting in health care. For each 
criterion, the letters in square brackets indicate the relevant rationale, viz: theoretical 
rationale [T]; ethical rationale [E]; pragmatic rationale [P]; and user considerations [U]. 
 
Criterion One: Is There A Well-Defined Research Question? [T; P; U] 
• Does the model seek a well-defined research question in answerable form? 
- Are the objectives of the health care system and of the specific choice 
problem clear? 
- Is the perspective of the decision-maker clear? 
- Are comparators clearly identified? 
- Is the choice of evaluation technique(s) appropriate to the research 
question? 
• Is the model adaptable to variations in decision context and setting? If not, are 
the general settings and purposes for which the model is appropriate specified?  
• Is the model appropriate to the specific research question of the decision-
maker(s) and the context in which it occurs?  
 
Criterion Two: Is There A Clear Concept of Benefit? [T; E; U] 
• Does the model have a mechanism or process to clearly define the concept of 
benefit in a way that captures the perspective and objectives of the decision-
maker(s)?  
• Does the model establish a clear logical connection between the concept of 
benefit, the research question and the priority setting objectives? 
• Are the ethical values underlying the concept of benefit made explicit? 
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Criterion Three: Is There An Acceptable Process for Generating the Options 
for Change? [T; U; P] 
 
• Does the model have an explicit mechanism for generating options for change 
that embodies the principle of “opportunity cost” in a theoretically acceptable 
and tractable way? 
 
• Do the options generated pay specific regard to the choice problem of the 
decision-maker(s) and the legitimate interests of stakeholders? 
 
• Do the options for change meet the following criteria: 
 
• comprehensiveness (important alternatives are not omitted; inclusion of both 
increments and decrements)? 
• relevance (to choice problem and decision-maker needs)? 
• evidence-based (including a process for establishing and dealing with the 
evidence base of options for change)? 
• defined in concrete terms so that the pathway of activities can be clearly 
determined? and 
• manageable (the evaluation task is tractable in the time available)?   
 
Criterion Four: Is Marginal Analysis An Integral Component? [ T ] 
 
• Does the model utilise incremental analysis in comparing the options for 
change? 
 
• Does the model operationalise the measurement and analysis of the costs and 
benefits associated with the options for change through marginal analysis?  
 
• Does the marginal analysis cover (or is it able to cover) 
 
• the scale and scope of the interventions? 
• the target/user groups? 
• mode of service delivery? 
 
Criterion Five: Are The Decision Rules Clearly Specified? [ T, E ] 
 
• Does the model clearly articulate the decision rules by which the options for 
change are ranked (maximisation through equating MC and MB; maximisation 
with equity weights; maximisation subject to constraints; two stage decision 
process, etc)? 
 
• Does the model specify how any multiple dimensions of benefit are weighted 
and aggregated?  
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• If outcomes are weighted for equity, are the equity principles, data sources and 
methods clearly specified? 
 
Criterion Six: Is the Role of Judgement Recognised? [E; P; U] 
 
• Does the model check the need for judgment in the specification, application 
and interpretation of the technical analysis, particularly in relation to underlying 
assumptions and value judgments? 
 
• Does the model make explicit the basis on which judgement impacts on the 
technical results?  
 
Criterion Seven: Are the Data Needs Tractable? [P; U] 
 
• Does the model have a mechanism for making the data needs of the evaluation 
process tractable?  
 
Criterion Eight: Is the Need for Due Process Recognised? [E; P; U; T] 
• Does the model check the need to place the technical analysis within a process 
for decision-making that contributes to the legitimacy of the decisions taken and 
their acceptability to stakeholders?  
 
• Is this process characterised by: 
• Transparency and openness? 
• Accountability? 
• Fairness and reasonableness (unbiased; consideration given to all relevant 
factors; disregarding of irrelevant factors; accessing of relevant information)? 
• Involvement of key stakeholders? 
• Consistency in decision-making? 
• An appeal or review mechanism, where this is appropriate to the decision 
context? 
 
Criterion Nine: Do the Measurement Methods Demonstrate Appropriate 
Rigour? [T; P; U, E] 
 
• Does the model demonstrate a rigorous approach to the measurement of costs 
and benefits that strikes a reasonable balance between expense, difficulty and 
timeliness? Rigour, care and effort should be proportional to the size and 
importance of the costs and benefits under analysis. 
• Does the model involve: 
 
• A clearly specified evaluation protocol? 
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• Standardised evaluation methods appropriate to the research question? 
• Sensitivity analysis of key design parameters and evaluation assumptions? 
• Rigour in the implementation of both efficiency and equity objectives? 
• Recognition that the choice of outcome measures has important ethical 
implications? 
 
Criterion Ten: Reporting/Implementation [U; P; E] 
 
• Does the model produce and report results that address issues of likely concern 
to the decision-maker(s), including: 
 
• the ethical implications of decisions taken or proposed? 
• feasibility of implementation?  
• acceptability to stakeholders? 
• importance of the problem addressed? 
• financial implications? 
 
• Is the reporting format designed to assist with judgements on what weight might 
be placed on the results, including 
 
• the generalisability to other settings and contexts? 
• the consultation processes adopted? 
• the strengths and weaknesses of the technical analysis, including 
comparison with similar evaluation studies in the literature? 
• the levels of evidence for the efficacy assumptions? 
 
• Does the model clearly document the results, together with their rationale, to 
facilitate the development of a “case law” on priority setting? 
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How Do Different Approaches Perform Against The Checklist? 
Table 34: Summary of performance of needs-based models 
Criterion Performance 
Well-defined research 
question. Adaptable to 
decision context and setting. 
 
Clarity in research question varies between methods and from study to study. 
Some models take a broad-based societal perspective (such as the GBD and 
associated national DALY or “avoidable mortality/morbidity” studies) while 
others focus on specific diseases and particular health service sectors. Well-
designed research question is achievable within context of model objectives. 
Clear concept of benefit 
 
Few of the needs-based approaches explicitly consider priority setting 
objectives and what this means for the concept of benefit. Equity is a complex 
concept and few studies define it clearly. Needs-based models do not have an 
in-built mechanism to discuss and clarify concept of benefit with stakeholders. 
Most assume disease/health is the distribuendum. Broader objectives rarely 
canvassed, although their descriptive nature does allow equity issues to be 
explored. 
Process for generating 
options for change 
 
“Health needs” studies focus on a description of the size and distribution of 
disease problem, rather than health gain or interventions. “Health care needs” 
studies take into account whether efficacious interventions exist, but rarely 
provide advice on option generation/selection matched to specific decision 
contexts. 
Marginal Analysis Needs-based models are not based on economic principles and do not involve 
marginal analysis or opportunity cost principles 
Clear decision rules Fail to incorporate decision rules for priority setting in situation of resource 
scarcity. Needs-based models contain no mechanism to adjust health service 
mix towards the optimal (such as the MB = MC rule of economics). 
Role of judgement noted and 
clearly specified 
Performance would vary between models and studies. The better studies would 
make explicit the role of judgement in specification, application and 
interpretation of the technical analysis. 
Data needs made tractable 
 
Like most forms of technical priority setting, needs-based approaches can 
involve large requirements for data that often pose considerable problems. 
Existence of the requisite data on disease incidence/prevalence, duration, 
mortality and disease burden varies by disease and from country to country. 
Integration of quality of life weights involves further detailed data and ethical 
issues. Modelling and simplifying assumptions often employed. 
Due process Needs-based models, like most technical approaches, rarely give consideration 
to issues of procedural justice. Most studies endeavour to make their methods 
explicit. Involvement of stakeholders varies between models. 
Rigorous approach to 
measurement 
Performance varies from study to study. Rigorous and balanced approach to 
measurement is achievable. 
Reporting issues of concern 
to decision-makers 
Some issues of concern to decision-makers not covered by approach (i.e. 
financial cost; allocative and technical efficiency). Coverage of other issues 
(ethical values; feasibility; acceptability to stakeholders) would vary from 
study to study. 
Overall assessment 
 
Needs-based models have been useful to in distributing regional budgets 
(RAFs), in prioritising problems, and in estimating potential benefits. 
Failure to provide mechanism to address choice between different needs/ 
interventions, compromises ability to guide individual purchasing 
decisions. Best utilised to provide need/severity classification systems and 
as an input to decision-making where decision rules are introduced from 
efficiency-based models.  
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Table 35: Summary of performance of age-based models 
Criterion Performance 
Well-defined research 
question. Adaptable to 
decision context and setting. 
 
The age-based models put forward by philosophers all address the issue of 
choice in the face of resource scarcity, but do so at an in-principle level, 
rather than in the context of practical decision-making. Discussion 
focussed on the micro level and on intra-personal choice. Extrapolation to 
other levels of decision-making and to inter-personal comparisons may not 
be appropriate. 
Clear concept of benefit 
 
The age-based models give very careful consideration to the appropriate 
objective of health care and to the associated concept of benefit. They 
demonstrate subtle and complex arguments, with detailed philosophical 
underpinnings. 
Process for generating 
options for change 
There is no process for generating or selecting options for chance. The 
focus of these models is on the concept of benefit. 
Marginal Analysis Not utilised 
Clear decision rules Most models are based on the specification of an age cut-off as to what 
constitutes a “fair innings” and associated moral arguments that govern its 
application. One model is based on prudential reasoning over individual’s 
life span. These approaches are not consistent with QALY maximisation 
or distributive equity between individuals.  
Role of judgement Clearly specified in relation to concept of benefit. 
Data needs tractable Not considered, as these models have remained theoretical models argued 
at the conceptual level. Is likely to require much less data than other 
technical approaches. 
Due process Offer explicit reasoning for objective and concept of benefit. Other aspects 
of due process not addressed. 
Rigorous approach to 
measurement 
 
This issue has not arisen, as models have not been applied or moved 
beyond conceptual level. May need to be combined with measurement 
techniques from other disciplines to be operationalised. 
Reporting issues of concern 
to decision-makers 
Models not applied in practical context. Treatment of cost and practical 
feasibility/acceptability issues remains to be demonstrated. 
 
Overall assessment 
 
 
These models are well thought out in relation to the concept of benefit, 
but have not proven popular in practice. Applied priority setting has 
focused on interventions that should be given priority, rather than 
individuals who should be given priority. The age-based rationing 
models assessed have not been developed into full models of priority 
setting for practical application. 
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Table 36: Summary of performance of the “three-stage consensus model” 
Criterion 
 
Performance 
Well-defined research 
question. Adaptable to 
decision context and setting 
Applications illustrate this is achievable with the “three-stage model”. 
Note, however, that potential of this model to apply to purchasing 
decisions (as opposed to selecting targets or work programs) not yet 
demonstrated. 
Clear concept of benefit 
 
Approach to date has focused more on prioritising the problem, rather than 
prioritising interventions. There is a lack of precision at present in 
defining criteria and their relative weight in the voting process. 
Process for generating 
options for change 
 
Selected by research team in response to problems/targets prioritised by 
the Working Party. Mechanism and criteria for selection of options not 
specified. While “opportunity cost” implicit in voting process, 
compromised in option selection process. 
Marginal Analysis Not utilised. 
Clear decision rules 
 
Rules of nominal group and voting process are clearly specified. 
Relationship between selection criteria and vote not made explicit. Links 
between vote and purchasing implications not clear (i.e. no budget 
information provided; no cost data provided; no apparent decision rule to 
guide purchasing decisions). 
Role of judgement 
 
Clearly specified in relation to voting process and nominal group 
approach. Model well positioned to achieve consensus for opinion-based 
judgements, although clarity in use of decision criteria could be improved. 
Data needs made tractable 
 
Working Party assisted by research team. Data process places reliance on 
readily available epidemiological data and key informant judgements. 
Efficacy and efficiency data based on literature review. Only community 
survey involves substantial data collection issue. 
Due process 
 
Major strength of this model. Demonstrated effective capacity to satisfy 
concerns of “due process”. Stakeholder participation and effective 
involvement encouraged by nominal group approach. 
Rigorous approach to 
measurement 
Acceptable in some aspects, but very questionable on others (such as 
efficacy data on interventions; economic evidence on interventions; lack 
of precision in decision rules). 
Reporting issues of concern 
to decision-makers 
Achievable within research question adopted. Reflects strength in 
achieving consensus. Note weaknesses in efficacy and efficiency may 
impact here. 
Overall assessment 
 
Offers important strengths in achieving consensus and effective 
stakeholder participation. Role in assisting purchasing not 
substantiated at this time. Best utilised in combination with an 
economic approach, if intended as a model of priority setting to aid 
purchasing decisions (as opposed to selecting targets or prioritising 
problems).  
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Table 37: Summary of performance of League Tables  
Criterion Performance 
Well-defined research 
question. Adaptable to 
decision context and setting. 
 
Clarity in research question, together with scope, perspective and context 
varies from table to table. League tables are adaptable to problem setting and 
context, and are sometimes incorporated into other broad-based approaches 
to priority setting (such as PBMA). Well-designed research question is 
potentially achievable with league table approach to priority setting. 
Clear concept of benefit 
 
Few league tables explicitly consider priority setting objectives and what 
this means for the concept of benefit. Most league tables simply assume a 
“health gain” definition of benefit, with no attention to broader issues such 
as distributive equity or procedural justice. 
Process for generating 
options for change 
 
There is no in-built mechanism in league tables for option generation and 
selection. Selection process varies from analyst discretion (literature review 
based league table) to dictates of problem context (PBAC league table). 
Rationale for option selection is rarely well documented. 
Marginal Analysis 
 
Most league tables report average CEA/CUA results, rather than marginal 
analysis. Decisions based on averages, especially when condition/treatment 
pairs involve disparate patient groups, are unlikely to maximise community 
benefit. This is more a criticism of current practice than intrinsic to method. 
Clear decision rules 
 
Incorporates decision rules for priority setting in situation of resource 
scarcity. Not decisive in absence of budget constraint, without pre-defined 
shadow price. Opinion varies about appropriateness and practicality of using 
shadow price of societal willingness-to-pay for health gains. 
Role of judgement noted and 
clearly specified 
 
Performance varies between tables. The better studies would make explicit 
the role of judgement in specification, application and interpretation of the 
technical analysis. Many league tables have substantive implicit elements, as 
evidenced by PBAC and Oregon. Ethical issues rarely made explicit 
Data needs made tractable 
 
Many league tables simply rely on reviewing the economic literature as the 
source of studies. There is no other mechanism to make data needs tractable, 
unless league table is incorporated into broader approach where such 
mechanisms exist (such as MEEM). 
Due process 
 
There is no consideration of “due process” or discussion mechanism 
inherent in the league table approach, unless it is combined with a broader 
approach to priority setting. 
Rigorous approach to 
measurement 
Performance varies from table to table. League tables based on a literature 
review would be susceptible to confounding due to variation in methods and 
setting of source studies. Rigorous and balanced approach to measurement is 
potentially achievable, however, particularly if appraisal is part of the 
priority setting approach. This in turn raises issue of data tractability. 
Reporting issues of concern 
to decision-makers 
 
Some issues of concern to decision-makers not covered by basic league table 
approach, unless part of broader approach (i.e. financial cost; distributive 
equity; feasibility; acceptability to stakeholders). 
Overall assessment 
 
League tables need to be handled with caution, both in terms of their 
technical validity and the weight placed on ratios based on a narrow 
interpretation of benefit and implicit value judgements. League tables 
are more likely to make a positive contribution if utilised within a 
broader approach to priority setting that involves distributive equity, 
procedural justice and a macro economic evaluation protocol 
specifically designed for a multiple intervention decision context. 
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Table 38: Summary of performance of PBMA 
Criterion Performance 
 
Well-defined research 
question. Adaptable to 
decision context and setting. 
 
 
Most PBMA studies have been undertaken at a regional or organisational 
level, but studies at the national level are also feasible. The horizontal/ 
vertical design options for PBMA provide flexibility for adaptation to 
various decision contexts and settings; although horizontal (or macro) 
studies have proven difficult to achieve in practice. PBMA can be 
undertaken as once-off study or institutionalised as ongoing planning 
process. Study perspective will vary between applications in accordance 
with context and setting. 
Clear concept of benefit 
 
Achieving a clear concept of benefit is a major strength of the PBMA 
approach, with clarification of objectives a basic step in the PBMA 
process. The Working Party provides the vehicle for discussion and 
clarification of the concept of benefit and underlying values with 
stakeholders. Broader objectives can be canvassed, and integrated using 
decision theory; options appraisal; or a two-stage approach. 
Process for generating 
options for change 
 
Discussion of option generation/selection is an important matter for the 
Working Party to discuss and decide. A more formalised process, 
involving a research team assisting the Working Party, is an important 
way of improving the comprehensiveness and rigour of the option 
selection process and controlling “gaming” or domination of Working 
Party discussion. PBMA can be undertaken as an iterative and ongoing 
process to increase coverage of current activities and options for change. 
Marginal Analysis 
 
PBMA is based on the fundamental economic principles of marginal 
analysis; opportunity cost; and clear concept of benefit. The level to which 
marginal analysis is achieved will vary from study to study. Simplifying 
assumptions (eg that equate average and marginal changes for sub-groups) 
are not uncommon, but this is true for most applied economic evaluation 
work. PBMA can embody the full range of economic evaluation 
techniques. 
Clear decision rules 
 
PBMA applies standard optimisation rules of economics, although they 
maybe subject to adjustment to reflect broader objectives. Particular rules 
will depend on evaluation technique utilised (i.e. CEA; CUA; CBA; 
options appraisal). Any modification of standard decision rules should be 
clearly specified. 
Role of judgement noted and 
clearly specified 
 
Performance on this criterion would vary between studies. The better 
studies would make explicit the role of judgement in specification, 
application and interpretation of the technical analysis and any broader 
issues taken into consideration. Scope exists for the clarification of ethical 
values in Working Party discussion, but such discussion would not be 
commonplace at present. 
Data needs made tractable 
 
Data needs are made tractable at present through undue reliance on 
opinions of Working Party, but this practice may compromise validity of 
conclusions and confidence in PBMA approach (Peacock S and Edwards 
D 1997; Segal L and Chen Y 2000). Undertaking an evidence-based 
approach will require research support for Working Party and may require 
linking PBMA with other approaches (such as MEEM) that incorporate a 
macro evaluation protocol and in-built mechanism for resolving data 
needs. Institutionalising PBMA at organisational level will require linkage 
with existing financial and statistical collections. 
Due process PBMA provides a mechanism, through the Working Party, to give 
consideration to issues of procedural justice. Most studies endeavour to 
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Criterion Performance 
 make their methods explicit. Nature and degree of involvement of 
stakeholders (including community representation) varies between studies. 
 
Rigorous approach to 
measurement 
 
Performance varies from study to study. Has been a point of major 
criticism of early PBMA studies, which relied on judgement rather than 
evidence for assessing intervention performance (Peacock S and Edwards 
D 1997; Segal L and Chen Y 2000). Rigorous and balanced approach to 
measurement is potentially achievable, however, with PBMA approach.  
Reporting issues of concern 
to decision-makers 
 
All issues of concern to decision-makers are potentially covered by 
PBMA approach, although performance would inevitably vary from study 
to study. Evidence to date suggests addressing organisational and 
managerial issues will be central to successful implementation (Mitton C 
and Donaldson C 2000). 
 
Overall assessment 
 
 
The PBMA technique is capable of providing both a valid and 
practical approach to priority setting in many contexts. The criticisms 
of PBMA reflect more the “growing pains” of an evolving technique, 
than fatal flaws in its underlying structure or rationale. Criticisms 
such as lack of measurement rigour, inadequacies in option selection, 
narrow perspective and poorly developed marginal analysis; are all 
resolvable within the PBMA approach, as evidenced by recent 
developments (Peacock S, Richardson J et al. 1997; Carter R, Stone C 
et al. 2000). Data tractability, however, will be a problem once the 
current reliance on expert opinion is removed to achieve a more 
rigorous methodology. A solution is possible by combining PBMA 
with another approach to priority setting that does provide an 
effective means of resolving the data tractability issue (such as 
MEEM). Evidence to date suggests addressing organisational and 
managerial issues will be central to successful implementation. 
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Table 39: Summary of performance of HBG/HRG Model  
Criterion 
 
Performance 
Clear concept of benefit 
 
There is no in-built mechanism in the HBG/HRG approach to discuss and 
clarify concept of benefit with stakeholders. Current applications assume 
health gain as the primary benefit (NT project using the DALY). Broader 
objectives not canvassed, although the HBGs potentially allow distributive 
equity to be explored through targeting population sub-groups. 
Process for generating 
options for change 
 
Current models do not operate at the level of individual interventions, 
which compromises their credentials to guide specific purchasing 
decisions. This, together with data tractability, is an important reservation. 
Rationale for scenario development should also be documented with 
assumptions made explicit.  
Marginal Analysis 
 
The model adopts incremental analysis (in that scenarios are compared to 
the status quo) and the health needs of the population can be compared in 
terms of the stages of the disease pathway. The HBGs and HRGs assume 
homogeneity, however, and thus they need to be operationalised at a level 
where this is a meaningful assumption (as for DRGs). It is difficult for the 
approach at present to address technical efficiency, when it is not even 
operating at an intervention specific level. This is a key weakness at 
present. 
Clear decision rules 
 
Model would utilise the standard optimisation rules to the extent this was 
feasible. Model offers choice of what to optimise (i.e. health gains; cost 
savings; cost per DALY). The assumptions behind the cost and outcome 
estimates, however, may compromise their meaning. 
Role of judgement noted and 
clearly specified 
Judgement plays a major role in the specification, application and 
interpretation of the technical analysis. It is important that this is clearly 
specified. This has not yet been achieved. 
Data needs made tractable 
 
The HBG/HRG approach has large requirements for data that poses 
considerable problems. Data needs solved at present through broadly-
based HRGs, reliance on provider judgement, modelling and simplifying 
assumptions. There is no in-built mechanism to make data needs tractable. 
As rigour in specification of the model improves this will prove to be an 
important problem. 
Due process Like most purely technical approaches, no consideration is given to issues 
of procedural justice. Nature of involvement of key stakeholders needs to 
be made explicit. Provider opinion seems to dominate current approaches. 
Rigorous approach to 
measurement 
Rigorous and balanced approach to measurement is achievable, but 
closely linked to the data tractability and marginal analysis issues. 
Reporting issues of concern 
to decision-makers 
 
Some issues of concern to decision-makers not covered by approach (i.e. 
particularly allocative and technical efficiency at the level of specific 
interventions). Coverage of broader issues (ethical values; feasibility; 
procedural justice; acceptability to stakeholders) not part of technical 
analysis. 
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Table 40: Summary of performance of Disease-Based Framework  
Criterion  Performance 
 
Well-defined research 
question. Adaptable to 
decision context and setting. 
 
 
The DBF has a well-defined (albeit very ambitious) research question. The 
model is designed for implementation at the national/state levels and takes 
a societal perspective. The model is not intended for use at an 
organisational level and consciously avoids adhering to institutional 
budgets or study viewpoints other than a societal perspective. Within the 
confines of its intended use, the model is adaptable to context and setting. 
Clear criteria exist for selection of disease sequence and staging of 
analysis. 
Clear concept of benefit 
 
The model focuses on health gain (QALY), but recognises the importance 
of equity and community values. There is no in-built mechanism for 
discussion with stakeholders on the objectives and concept of benefit. 
Theoretical foundation of model is not clear and vacillates between 
welfarist and extra-welfarist statements re arguments in social welfare 
function. If community values not available recommends research be 
undertaken. Specific process proposed for combining elements of benefit 
not clear. 
Process for generating 
options for change 
 
Comprehensive and well-developed process for option generation and 
selection. While this is undoubtedly a real strength of this model, aspects 
of the quick CEAs undertaken to select the most marginal interventions 
are questionable (such as scope for methodological confounding due to 
reliance on the literature; possible neglect of options for change 
considered important by decision-makers). 
Marginal Analysis 
 
Strongly based on economic principles with heavy focus on marginal 
analysis and opportunity cost. Strength of marginal analysis may be 
constrained in practice by reliance on the literature and lack of in-built 
mechanism to make data needs tractable. 
Clear decision rules 
 
Clear decision rules for priority setting based on marginal analysis. 
Mechanism for inclusion of equity in decision rules not clarified (whether 
by QALY weights or some other mechanism).  
Role of judgement noted and 
clearly specified 
 
Intention is clearly to make explicit the role of judgement in specification, 
application and interpretation of the technical analysis. No mechanism for 
exploration with stakeholders of ethical values or broader aspects of 
benefit. 
Data needs made tractable 
 
DBF approach has huge requirements for data because of its 
comprehensive scope and technical approach. Apart from comprehensive 
and well-developed framework for staging the huge research task 
involved, there is no in-built mechanism to make the data needs tractable. 
This is an important reservation with the model as currently developed. 
Due process 
 
Like most purely technical approaches there is no consideration given to 
issues of due process. Nonetheless care is taken to make methods as 
explicit as possible and recognition is given to importance of community 
values. There is no in-built mechanism for stakeholder involvement. 
Rigorous approach to 
measurement 
Rigorous and balanced approach to measurement is potentially achievable 
with the DBF. Emphasis is given to evidence-based approach and minimal 
reliance on expert opinion. Selection of evaluation techniques is 
appropriate. However, heavy reliance on literature, lack of mechanism to 
make data needs tractable, no apparent macro evaluation protocol 
specified, and size of the task, may compromise rigor in practice. 
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Criterion  Performance 
Reporting issues of concern 
to decision-makers 
 
DBF as currently formulated is a heavily researcher-oriented model. 
Weight given to decision-maker needs is not clear. This may create 
problems for the DBF in achieving relevance to decision-makers and 
impacting upon policy.  
Some issues of concern to decision-makers not covered by approach at 
present (i.e. budget implications for affected organisations; procedural 
justice; ethical values; feasibility; acceptability to stakeholders). Specific 
process for integrating equity and community values warrants 
clarification. 
 
Overall assessment 
 
 
The DBF represents a significant contribution to the economic toolkit 
as a technical approach to priority setting, with important innovative 
aspects worthy of careful consideration. Clarification of the 
theoretical foundation would be a useful refinement. The DBF 
performs well against those criteria that relate to technical validity, 
with the exception of providing a means to make its data needs 
tractable. Further empirical experience with the model will help to 
clarify the importance of this data reservation, and possibly, of the 
scope for collaboration with other approaches.  
On those criteria that broaden the ideal features of a priority setting 
model beyond a purely technical approach, the DBF performs poorly. 
There is no surprise here, as these criteria were not taken into account 
in the model’s development. The DBF as currently formulated is a 
heavily researcher-oriented model with little apparent weight given to 
decision-maker needs. This may create problems for the DBF in 
achieving relevance to decision-makers and impacting upon policy. 
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Table 41: Overview of performance of major economic approaches to priority 
setting 
Criterion League 
Tables 
PBMA HBG/HRG 
Approach 
Disease-Based 
Framework 
Well-defined research 
question. 
 
X XX X XX 
Clear concept of benefit 
 
X XXX X X 
Process for generating 
options for change 
 
- X (usually) 
XX 
(sometimes) 
- 
(not intervention 
based) 
XXX 
Marginal Analysis 
 
- X - XXX 
Clear decision rules 
 
X XX XX XX 
Role of judgement noted and 
clearly specified 
 
- X - - 
Data needs made tractable 
 
X X X - 
(not counting the 
staging 
framework) 
Due process 
 
- X - - 
Rigorous approach to 
measurement 
 
X - (usually) 
X (sometimes) 
- XX 
Reporting issues of concern 
to decision-makers 
 
X XXX X X 
Overall assessment 
 
X 
Handle with 
caution. 
X 
Has potential. 
Requires 
development. 
- 
Not suitable for 
priority setting. 
OK for planning 
X 
Strong on most 
technical aspects. 
Weak on other 
criteria. 
 
Key: 
• Blank: performs poorly with respect to criterion  
• X: partially meets this criterion 
• XX: fully meets this criterion 
• XXX: key strength of this approach 
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Appendix 3: Detailed production gains and transfers for each 
intervention by age and sex. 
 
This report answers the questions: 
1. What is the distribution of production gains, taxation and welfare across age 
groups and gender in the base case? The distribution depends on the pattern of 
health benefits by age and gender. Males are paid higher wage rates than 
females and younger men and women are paid lower rates than the more 
mature counterparts. 
2. What is the comparative contribution of mortality and morbidity to total 
production gains for each intervention? The impact of mortality on production 
gains appears in the initial columns, followed by morbidity in the next two 
columns. 
3. How do these distributions and contributions vary by HCA and FCA? HCA 
estimates are presented in the first section of rows and FCA in the second. The 
FCA estimates are a mere fraction of the HCA estimates.  
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1 
:Discount at 3.5%, Friction 3 month, gender based wage rates
Male Female Male Female Male Female Persons Male Female Male Female
15-19 $112,367 $14,516 ($1,393,573) ($310,975) ($1,281,206) ($296,459) ($1,577,664) ($330,196) ($51,372) ($161,837) ($64,813)
20-24 $447,565 $44,656 ($474,583) ($467,539) ($27,017) ($422,883) ($449,901) ($2,805) ($61,698) ($61,410) ($90,560)
25-29 $495,794 $64,795 ($483,777) ($869,869) $12,017 ($805,074) ($793,056) $10,427 ($97,102) ($55,954) ($168,775)
30-34 $493,008 $83,487 ($263,025) ($479,324) $229,984 ($395,837) ($165,853) $32,623 ($38,909) ($26,546) ($97,995)
35-39 $363,299 $91,586 $11,057 ($151,666) $374,356 ($60,080) $314,276 $40,994 ($5,741) $2,226 ($31,943)
40-44 $294,161 $75,929 $53,795 ($42,885) $347,956 $33,044 $381,000 $29,854 $1,081 $5,781 ($7,476)
45-49 $256,162 $70,924 ($23,662) ($18,768) $232,500 $52,156 $284,656 $16,597 $1,699 ($2,167) ($3,464)
50-54 $186,419 $55,196 $52,387 ($113,742) $238,806 ($58,546) $180,260 $13,373 ($2,824) $6,508 ($29,048)
55-59 $104,104 $28,425 ($25,336) ($43,772) $78,769 ($15,347) $63,421 $2,623 ($599) ($3,735) ($15,268)
60-64 $31,794 $8,048 ($14,171) ($5,144) $17,624 $2,904 $20,528 $401 ($4) ($2,944) ($2,580)
65+ $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
total $2,784,674 $537,560 ($2,560,886) ($2,503,682) $223,787 ($1,966,122) ($1,742,334) ($186,110) ($255,469) ($300,078) ($511,921)
Male Female Male Female Male Female Persons Male Female Male Female
15-19 $361 $65 $27,266 ($205) $27,627 ($140) $27,487 $6,460 $69 ($161,837) ($64,813)
20-24 $3,612 $552 $117,256 ($5,002) $120,868 ($4,450) $116,418 $28,812 ($521) ($61,410) ($90,560)
25-29 $6,946 $1,216 $70,771 ($21,691) $77,717 ($20,475) $57,242 $22,134 ($2,225) ($55,954) ($168,775)
30-34 $7,656 $1,749 ($4,682) ($13,704) $2,974 ($11,955) ($8,981) ($582) ($1,480) ($26,546) ($97,995)
35-39 $12,710 $3,700 ($9,405) ($10,712) $3,305 ($7,012) ($3,707) ($3,726) ($1,481) $2,226 ($31,943)
40-44 $12,481 $3,803 ($5,847) ($5,680) $6,633 ($1,877) $4,757 ($3,384) ($1,172) $5,781 ($7,476)
45-49 $14,494 $4,815 ($3,736) ($3,723) $10,758 $1,092 $11,850 ($570) ($839) ($2,167) ($3,464)
50-54 $15,591 $5,726 $2,813 ($13,716) $18,403 ($7,990) $10,413 $138 ($1,004) $6,508 ($29,048)
55-59 $14,662 $5,416 ($4,554) ($8,946) $10,108 ($3,530) $6,577 ($318) ($319) ($3,735) ($15,268)
60-64 $11,084 $4,476 ($5,020) ($2,929) $6,065 $1,547 $7,612 $63 ($35) ($2,944) ($2,580)
65+ $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
total $99,596 $31,517 $184,863 ($86,308) $284,459 ($54,790) $229,668 $49,026 ($9,008) ($300,078) ($511,921)
FCA/HCA 4% 6% -7% 3% 127% 3% -13.2% -26% 4% 100% 100%
Morbidity Welfare effects
Taxation effects
Taxation effects
Welfare effects
Brief GP alcohol 
intervention
Total Production gains in 2003 
Friction Cost
Mortality
Friction cost
Morbidity Total Production Gains in 2003 
Human Capital
Mortality
Human Capital
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2  
:Discount at 3.5%, Friction 3 month, gender based wage rates
Male Female Male Female Male Female Persons Male Female Male Female
15-19 $6,749,512 $359,994 $80,556 $8,278 $6,830,069 $368,272 $7,198,341 $1,751,167 $63,646 $9,838 $1,750
20-24 $22,289,522 $1,299,443 $456,282 $34,081 $22,745,804 $1,333,525 $24,079,329 $4,832,601 $193,347 $49,057 $6,676
25-29 $16,189,764 $688,364 $683,216 $22,295 $16,872,980 $710,659 $17,583,639 $2,984,679 $85,035 $69,418 $4,409
30-34 $14,764,684 $686,968 $614,638 $10,514 $15,379,322 $697,482 $16,076,804 $2,236,051 $67,333 $62,902 $2,197
35-39 $11,438,398 $791,583 $431,700 $15,599 $11,870,097 $807,183 $12,677,280 $1,404,768 $63,052 $45,727 $3,414
40-44 $8,205,697 $517,570 $276,294 $13,491 $8,481,991 $531,061 $9,013,051 $812,073 $33,360 $25,820 $2,589
45-49 $4,705,773 $335,052 $176,160 $9,017 $4,881,933 $344,069 $5,226,002 $373,009 $16,664 $18,155 $1,943
50-54 $730,141 $7,959 $33,214 $761 $763,355 $8,720 $772,075 $45,583 $306 $4,013 $199
55-59 $317,637 $0 $8,355 $265 $325,992 $265 $326,257 $14,064 $6 $1,295 $94
60-64 $80,947 $0 $2,102 $73 $83,049 $73 $83,122 $2,210 $1 $442 $38
65+ $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
total $85,472,074 $4,686,934 $2,762,519 $114,375 $88,234,593 $4,801,309 $93,035,901 $14,456,205 $522,750 $286,666 $23,310
Male Female Male Female Male Female Persons Male Female Male Female
15-19 $21,701 $1,606 ($5,815) ($114) $15,886 $1,492 $17,378 ($1,562) ($27) $9,838 $1,750
20-24 $179,867 $16,064 ($16,505) ($16) $163,362 $16,049 $179,411 $4,567 $726 $49,057 $6,676
25-29 $226,820 $12,919 ($4,763) $138 $222,057 $13,058 $235,115 $17,647 $677 $69,418 $4,409
30-34 $229,273 $14,389 $2,495 $73 $231,768 $14,462 $246,230 $20,432 $738 $62,902 $2,197
35-39 $400,166 $31,978 $11,374 $533 $411,541 $32,511 $444,051 $23,761 $871 $45,727 $3,414
40-44 $348,152 $25,924 $9,898 $606 $358,050 $26,530 $384,581 $20,974 $812 $25,820 $2,589
45-49 $266,254 $22,748 $9,185 $578 $275,439 $23,326 $298,765 $16,373 $719 $18,155 $1,943
50-54 $61,064 $826 $2,647 $76 $63,711 $901 $64,612 $3,568 $25 $4,013 $199
55-59 $44,735 $0 $1,149 $50 $45,884 $50 $45,934 $2,066 $1 $1,295 $94
60-64 $28,220 $0 $729 $40 $28,949 $40 $28,989 $628 $0 $442 $38
65+ $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
total $1,806,252 $126,455 $10,396 $1,964 $1,816,647 $128,419 $1,945,066 $108,454 $4,541 $286,666 $23,310
FCA/ 
HCA 2% 3% 0% 2% 2% 3% 2.1% 1% 1% 100% 100%
Total Production gains in 2003 
Friction Cost
Mortality
Friction cost
Morbidity Total Production Gains in 2003 
Human Capital
Mortality
Human Capital
Morbidity Welfare effects
Taxation effects
Taxation effects
Welfare effects
Random breath 
testing
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3 
Discount at 3.5%, Friction 3 month, gender based wage rates
Male Female Male Female Male Female Persons Male Female Male Female
15-19 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
20-24 $0 $31,575,596 $0 ($503,328) $0 $31,072,268 $31,072,268 $0 $4,513,961 $0 ($118,907)
25-29 $0 $125,905,341 $0 $1,115,319 $0 $127,020,660 $127,020,660 $0 $15,347,301 $0 ($12,246)
30-34 $0 $133,371,913 $0 ($9,782,490) $0 $123,589,423 $123,589,423 $0 $12,675,633 $0 ($2,885,227)
35-39 $0 $137,019,529 $0 ($43,319,533) $0 $93,699,995 $93,699,995 $0 $8,549,635 $0 ($10,576,703)
40-44 $0 $154,692,473 $0 $13,524,985 $0 $168,217,457 $168,217,457 $0 $11,983,420 $0 $1,643,695
45-49 $0 $123,596,725 $0 ($1,354,548) $0 $122,242,177 $122,242,177 $0 $6,913,026 $0 ($936,574)
50-54 $0 $88,879,191 $0 ($13,347,318) $0 $75,531,873 $75,531,873 $0 $3,204,302 $0 ($3,908,981)
55-59 $0 $48,361,637 $0 ($1,010,697) $0 $47,350,941 $47,350,941 $0 $1,340,437 $0 ($648,705)
60-64 $0 $53,379,801 $0 ($850,652) $0 $52,529,149 $52,529,149 $0 $659,909 $0 ($532,827)
65+ $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
total $0 $896,782,206 $0 ($55,528,263) $0 $841,253,943 $841,253,943 $0 $65,187,624 $0 ($17,976,474)
Male Female Male Female Male Female Persons Male Female Male Female
15-19 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
20-24 $0 $390,356 $0 $107,630 $0 $497,986 $497,986 $0 $43,709 $0 ($118,907)
25-29 $0 $2,362,989 $0 $1,177,277 $0 $3,540,266 $3,540,266 $0 $415,410 $0 ($12,246)
30-34 $0 $2,793,583 $0 $3,956,103 $0 $6,749,687 $6,749,687 $0 $1,285,873 $0 ($2,885,227)
35-39 $0 $5,535,267 $0 $3,274,173 $0 $8,809,440 $8,809,440 $0 $1,728,571 $0 ($10,576,703)
40-44 $0 $7,748,298 $0 $5,344,725 $0 $13,093,023 $13,093,023 $0 $1,975,958 $0 $1,643,695
45-49 $0 $8,391,603 $0 $2,722,022 $0 $11,113,626 $11,113,626 $0 $1,389,370 $0 ($936,574)
50-54 $0 $9,220,469 $0 $92,206 $0 $9,312,675 $9,312,675 $0 $817,907 $0 ($3,908,981)
55-59 $0 $9,214,157 $0 $437,086 $0 $9,651,243 $9,651,243 $0 $441,475 $0 ($648,705)
60-64 $0 $29,687,922 $0 ($517,886) $0 $29,170,036 $29,170,036 $0 $104,335 $0 ($532,827)
65+ $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
total $0 $75,344,644 $0 $16,593,336 $0 $91,937,980 $91,937,980 $0 $8,202,607 $0 ($17,976,474)
FCA/HCA #DIV/0! 8% #DIV/0! -30% #DIV/0! 11% 10.9% #DIV/0! 13% #DIV/0! 100%
Morbidity Welfare effects
Taxation effects
Taxation effects
Welfare effects
Intervention Cervical 
Screening Program:
Total Production gains in 2003 
Friction Cost
Mortality
Friction cost
Morbidity Total Production Gains in 2003 
Human Capital
Mortality
Human Capital
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4 
:Discount at 3.5%, Friction 3 month, gender based wage rates
Male Female Male Female Male Female Persons Male Female Male Female
15-19 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
20-24 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
25-29 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
30-34 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
35-39 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
40-44 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
45-49 $368,039 $395,453 $693,721 ($138,809) $1,061,760 $256,644 $1,318,404 $112,358 $28,427 $64,763 ($40,469)
50-54 $6,968,724 $1,654,336 $651,136 ($2,087,114) $7,619,861 ($432,778) $7,187,082 $947,866 $50,660 ($24,454) ($591,826)
55-59 $1,995,808 $818,134 $4,699,354 ($148,649) $6,695,162 $669,485 $7,364,647 $499,642 $31,406 $668,314 ($71,572)
60-64 $2,915,090 $476,868 $1,651,246 ($153,634) $4,566,337 $323,234 $4,889,571 $204,006 $7,750 $315,324 ($87,722)
65+ $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
total $12,247,662 $3,344,791 $7,695,457 ($2,528,206) $19,943,119 $816,585 $20,759,705 $1,763,872 $118,244 $1,023,946 ($791,589)
Male Female Male Female Male Female Persons Male Female Male Female
15-19 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
20-24 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
25-29 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
30-34 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
35-39 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
40-44 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
45-49 $20,824 $26,849 $98,080 $36,966 $118,904 $63,815 $182,719 $39,362 $18,841 $64,763 ($40,469)
50-54 $582,814 $171,623 $837,427 ($49,161) $1,420,241 $122,463 $1,542,704 $575,565 $70,646 ($24,454) ($591,826)
55-59 $281,084 $155,876 $980,690 $14,606 $1,261,774 $170,482 $1,432,256 $266,919 $19,569 $668,314 ($71,572)
60-64 $1,016,279 $265,217 $670,966 ($78,334) $1,687,245 $186,883 $1,874,127 $119,833 $4,614 $315,324 ($87,722)
65+ $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
total $1,901,001 $619,566 $2,587,164 ($75,923) $4,488,164 $543,642 $5,031,807 $1,001,679 $113,670 $1,023,946 ($791,589)
FCA/HCA 16% 19% 34% 3% 23% 67% 24.2% 57% 96% 100% 100%
Total Production gains in 2003 
Friction Cost
Mortality
Friction cost
Morbidity Total Production Gains in 2003 
Human Capital
Mortality
Human Capital
Morbidity Welfare effects
Taxation effects
Taxation effects
Welfare effects
ACE inhibitors to 
10% risk
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5 
:Discount at 3.5%, Friction 3 month, gender based wage rates
Male Female Male Female Male Female Persons Male Female Male Female
15-19 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
20-24 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
25-29 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
30-34 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
35-39 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
40-44 $3,523,679 $0 $4,010,861 $0 $7,534,540 $0 $7,534,540 $1,152,224 $0 $278,233 $0
45-49 $53,392,684 $9,083,306 $95,473,497 ($3,020,910) $148,866,181 $6,062,396 $154,928,577 $15,672,978 $641,791 $8,912,985 ($880,726)
50-54 $102,894,531 $9,365,039 $9,971,031 ($11,265,745) $112,865,562 ($1,900,706) $110,964,856 $14,286,422 $288,813 ($374,479) ($3,194,535)
55-59 $37,224,921 $5,984,628 $74,844,915 ($1,050,028) $112,069,836 $4,934,599 $117,004,436 $8,192,563 $226,570 $10,643,989 ($505,572)
60-64 $5,951,201 $877,139 $3,227,121 ($273,690) $9,178,322 $603,450 $9,781,772 $405,472 $14,130 $616,255 ($156,271)
65+ $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
total $202,987,017 $25,310,113 $187,527,425 ($15,610,373) $390,514,442 $9,699,740 $400,214,182 $39,709,659 $1,171,304 $20,076,984 ($4,737,104)
Male Female Male Female Male Female Persons Male Female Male Female
15-19 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
20-24 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
25-29 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
30-34 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
35-39 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
40-44 $149,503 $0 $1,140,247 $0 $1,289,750 $0 $1,289,750 $544,114 $0 $278,233 $0
45-49 $3,020,970 $616,711 $13,498,289 $804,493 $16,519,259 $1,421,204 $17,940,463 $5,426,639 $411,057 $8,912,985 ($880,726)
50-54 $8,605,363 $971,544 $12,823,755 ($265,359) $21,429,118 $706,186 $22,135,304 $8,795,457 $382,648 ($374,479) ($3,194,535)
55-59 $5,242,654 $1,140,228 $15,619,103 $103,174 $20,861,757 $1,243,403 $22,105,160 $4,285,950 $139,009 $10,643,989 ($505,572)
60-64 $2,074,748 $487,833 $1,311,305 ($139,547) $3,386,054 $348,286 $3,734,340 $236,129 $8,261 $616,255 ($156,271)
65+ $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
total $19,093,239 $3,216,317 $44,392,699 $502,762 $63,485,938 $3,719,079 $67,205,017 $19,288,288 $940,976 $20,076,984 ($4,737,104)
FCA/HCA 9% 13% 24% -3% 16% 38% 16.8% 49% 80% 100% 100%
Morbidity Welfare effects
Taxation effects
Taxation effects
Welfare effects
ACE inhibitors 
target 5% risk
Total Production gains in 2003 
Friction Cost
Mortality
Friction cost
Morbidity Total Production Gains in 2003 
Human Capital
Mortality
Human Capital
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6 
:Discount at 3.5%, Friction 3 month, gender based wage rates
Male Female Male Female Male Female Persons Male Female Male Female
15-19 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
20-24 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
25-29 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
30-34 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
35-39 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
40-44 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
45-49 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
50-54 $929,022 $239,635 $24,532 ($163,217) $953,555 $76,419 $1,029,973 $75,586 $7,853 ($921) ($46,282)
55-59 $333,773 $159,259 $166,809 ($15,301) $500,582 $143,958 $644,540 $29,095 $4,958 $23,723 ($7,367)
60-64 $380,208 $13,562 $115,126 ($2,695) $495,334 $10,867 $506,201 $18,940 $197 $21,985 ($1,539)
65+ $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
total $1,643,003 $412,455 $306,468 ($181,212) $1,949,471 $231,243 $2,180,714 $123,620 $13,008 $44,786 ($55,188)
Male Female Male Female Male Female Persons Male Female Male Female
15-19 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
20-24 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
25-29 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
30-34 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
35-39 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
40-44 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
45-49 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
50-54 $77,697 $24,860 $31,551 ($3,844) $109,248 $21,016 $130,264 $24,884 $5,858 ($921) ($46,282)
55-59 $47,008 $30,343 $34,811 $1,503 $81,818 $31,846 $113,665 $11,158 $2,299 $23,723 ($7,367)
60-64 $132,551 $7,543 $46,780 ($1,374) $179,331 $6,168 $185,499 $9,701 $89 $21,985 ($1,539)
65+ $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
total $257,255 $62,746 $113,142 ($3,715) $370,397 $59,030 $429,428 $45,743 $8,246 $44,786 ($55,188)
FCA/HCA 16% 15% 37% 2% 19% 26% 19.7% 37% 63% 100% 100%
Morbidity Welfare effects
Taxation effects
Taxation effects
Welfare effects
Beta blockers to 
15% risk
Total Production gains in 2003 
Friction Cost
Mortality
Friction cost
Morbidity Total Production Gains in 2003 
Human Capital
Mortality
Human Capital
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7  
:Discount at 3.5%, Friction 3 month, gender based wage rates
Male Female Male Female Male Female Persons Male Female Male Female
15-19 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
20-24 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
25-29 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
30-34 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
35-39 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
40-44 $2,708,933 $0 $2,593,138 $0 $5,302,071 $0 $5,302,071 $786,232 $0 $179,886 $0
45-49 $40,735,537 $8,302,290 $61,888,657 ($2,421,326) $102,624,194 $5,880,964 $108,505,158 $10,628,205 $563,938 $5,777,652 ($705,921)
50-54 $74,391,599 $7,902,081 $6,377,434 ($8,362,803) $80,769,034 ($460,723) $80,308,311 $9,650,916 $247,923 ($239,515) ($2,371,371)
55-59 $27,375,962 $4,655,616 $47,777,946 ($737,257) $75,153,908 $3,918,359 $79,072,267 $5,385,892 $169,511 $6,794,689 ($354,978)
60-64 $4,113,111 $650,498 $2,112,299 ($189,790) $6,225,410 $460,708 $6,686,118 $271,204 $10,294 $403,367 ($108,366)
65+ $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
total $149,325,142 $21,510,485 $120,749,474 ($11,711,176) $270,074,617 $9,799,309 $279,873,925 $26,722,448 $991,666 $12,916,080 ($3,540,636)
Male Female Male Female Male Female Persons Male Female Male Female
15-19 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
20-24 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
25-29 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
30-34 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
35-39 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
40-44 $114,935 $0 $737,203 $0 $852,137 $0 $852,137 $352,903 $0 $179,886 $0
45-49 $2,304,826 $563,684 $8,749,978 $644,819 $11,054,804 $1,208,503 $12,263,307 $3,538,874 $331,650 $5,777,652 ($705,921)
50-54 $6,221,581 $819,775 $8,202,026 ($196,981) $14,423,607 $622,793 $15,046,400 $5,666,723 $286,924 ($239,515) ($2,371,371)
55-59 $3,855,554 $887,017 $9,970,599 $72,442 $13,826,154 $959,458 $14,785,612 $2,759,109 $99,321 $6,794,689 ($354,978)
60-64 $1,433,941 $361,784 $858,310 ($96,769) $2,292,250 $265,015 $2,557,265 $156,214 $5,793 $403,367 ($108,366)
65+ $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
total $13,930,837 $2,632,259 $28,518,115 $423,511 $42,448,952 $3,055,770 $45,504,722 $12,473,823 $723,688 $12,916,080 ($3,540,636)
FCA/HCA 9% 12% 24% -4% 16% 31% 16.3% 47% 73% 100% 100%
Morbidity Welfare effects
Taxation effects
Taxation effects
Welfare effects
Beta blockers 
targeted at 5% risk 
Total Production gains in 2003 
Friction Cost
Mortality
Friction cost
Morbidity Total Production Gains in 2003 
Human Capital
Mortality
Human Capital
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8 
:Discount at 3.5%, Friction 3 month, gender based wage rates
Male Female Male Female Male Female Persons Male Female Male Female
15-19 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
20-24 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
25-29 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
30-34 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
35-39 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
40-44 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
45-49 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
50-54 $19,323,504 $1,727,518 $1,621,134 ($2,439,980) $20,944,637 ($712,462) $20,232,176 $2,477,974 $51,938 ($60,884) ($691,885)
55-59 $4,555,247 $1,720,995 $11,259,788 ($340,182) $15,815,035 $1,380,813 $17,195,848 $1,187,359 $68,393 $1,601,299 ($163,792)
60-64 $8,634,618 $185,244 $5,070,437 ($63,939) $13,705,055 $121,305 $13,826,360 $617,997 $3,071 $968,257 ($36,508)
65+ $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
total $32,513,369 $3,633,757 $17,951,359 ($2,844,100) $50,464,727 $789,657 $51,254,384 $4,283,330 $123,402 $2,508,671 ($892,185)
Male Female Male Female Male Female Persons Male Female Male Female
15-19 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
20-24 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
25-29 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
30-34 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
35-39 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
40-44 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
45-49 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
50-54 $1,616,080 $179,215 $2,084,942 ($57,472) $3,701,022 $121,743 $3,822,765 $1,442,456 $81,965 ($60,884) ($691,885)
55-59 $641,548 $327,894 $2,349,763 $33,426 $2,991,311 $361,320 $3,352,631 $638,095 $44,210 $1,601,299 ($163,792)
60-64 $3,010,259 $103,026 $2,060,317 ($32,601) $5,070,576 $70,425 $5,141,002 $365,560 $1,900 $968,257 ($36,508)
65+ $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
total $5,267,887 $610,136 $6,495,022 ($56,647) $11,762,909 $553,489 $12,316,398 $2,446,110 $128,075 $2,508,671 ($892,185)
FCA/HCA 16% 17% 36% 2% 23% 70% 24.0% 57% 104% 100% 100%
Taxation effects
Taxation effects
Welfare effectsMortality
Friction cost
Morbidity Total Production Gains in 2003 
Combination to 
15% risk
Total Production gains in 2003 
Friction Cost
Human Capital
Mortality
Human Capital
Morbidity Welfare effects
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9  
:Discount at 3.5%, Friction 3 month, gender based wage rates
Male Female Male Female Male Female Persons Male Female Male Female
15-19 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
20-24 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
25-29 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
30-34 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
35-39 $159,827,644 $28,104,590 $585,346,038 ($144,627,492) $745,173,682 ($116,522,902) $628,650,781 $117,516,375 ($7,660,195) $52,407,287 ($32,914,474)
40-44 $141,113,259 $25,581,936 $187,888,147 $24,057,191 $329,001,406 $49,639,127 $378,640,533 $51,680,096 $4,241,487 $13,033,782 $3,812,351
45-49 $114,087,166 $82,415,594 $236,144,230 ($8,484,407) $350,231,395 $73,931,187 $424,162,582 $37,390,583 $4,560,718 $22,045,385 ($2,473,571)
50-54 $73,487,351 $72,506,827 $8,279,435 ($18,059,509) $81,766,786 $54,447,319 $136,214,104 $11,147,695 $2,491,839 ($310,948) ($5,120,986)
55-59 $27,056,509 $33,524,035 $62,456,188 ($955,848) $89,512,697 $32,568,186 $122,080,883 $6,663,386 $851,764 $8,882,140 ($460,226)
60-64 $3,229,071 $2,362,428 $1,925,662 ($201,143) $5,154,733 $2,161,286 $7,316,019 $233,366 $30,510 $367,727 ($114,849)
65+ $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
total $518,800,999 $244,495,410 $1,082,039,700 ($148,271,207) $1,600,840,700 $96,224,203 $1,697,064,903 $224,631,500 $4,516,123 $96,425,372 ($37,271,755)
Male Female Male Female Male Female Persons Male Female Male Female
15-19 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
20-24 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
25-29 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
30-34 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
35-39 $5,591,485 $1,135,359 $103,618,754 $614,866 $109,210,240 $1,750,225 $110,960,464 $40,868,876 $1,833,409 $52,407,287 ($32,914,474)
40-44 $5,987,166 $1,281,358 $53,414,677 $5,085,715 $59,401,843 $6,367,074 $65,768,916 $25,426,822 $1,449,920 $13,033,782 $3,812,351
45-49 $6,455,078 $5,595,609 $33,386,679 $2,259,467 $39,841,757 $7,855,076 $47,696,833 $13,360,122 $1,275,784 $22,045,385 ($2,473,571)
50-54 $6,145,957 $7,521,974 $10,648,192 ($425,382) $16,794,148 $7,096,592 $23,890,740 $7,245,941 $787,440 ($310,948) ($5,120,986)
55-59 $3,810,563 $6,387,205 $13,033,746 $93,920 $16,844,310 $6,481,126 $23,325,435 $3,550,862 $232,939 $8,882,140 ($460,226)
60-64 $1,125,741 $1,313,898 $782,472 ($102,558) $1,908,213 $1,211,340 $3,119,553 $138,451 $8,661 $367,727 ($114,849)
65+ $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
total $29,115,989 $23,235,403 $214,884,520 $7,526,029 $244,000,509 $30,761,432 $274,761,942 $90,591,075 $5,588,153 $96,425,372 ($37,271,755)
FCA/H
CA 6% 10% 20% -5% 15% 32% 16.2% 40% 124% 100% 100%
Community Heart Health 
Program
Morbidity Welfare effects
Taxation effects
Taxation effects
Welfare effects
Total Production gains in 2003 
Friction Cost
Mortality
Friction cost
Morbidity Total Production Gains in 2003 
Human Capital
Mortality
Human Capital
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:Discount at 3.5%, Friction 3 month, gender based wage rates
Male Female Male Female Male Female Persons Male Female Male Female
15-19 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
20-24 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
25-29 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
30-34 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
35-39 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
40-44 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
45-49 $220,982 $199,017 $484,648 ($87,213) $705,630 $111,804 $817,434 $75,731 $15,464 $45,245 ($25,426)
50-54 $4,363,597 $925,063 $458,027 ($1,382,482) $4,821,624 ($457,419) $4,364,205 $634,543 $27,531 ($17,202) ($392,019)
55-59 $1,224,885 $498,537 $3,307,605 ($101,984) $4,532,490 $396,553 $4,929,043 $343,899 $20,104 $470,388 ($49,104)
60-64 $1,952,542 $302,701 $1,182,928 ($106,890) $3,135,471 $195,811 $3,331,282 $142,528 $5,052 $225,894 ($61,032)
65+ $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
total $7,762,007 $1,925,318 $5,433,209 ($1,678,570) $13,195,215 $246,748 $13,441,963 $1,196,702 $68,151 $724,324 ($527,581)
Male Female Male Female Male Female Persons Male Female Male Female
15-19 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
20-24 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
25-29 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
30-34 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
35-39 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
40-44 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
45-49 $12,503 $13,512 $68,521 $23,226 $81,024 $36,738 $117,762 $27,374 $11,732 $45,245 ($25,426)
50-54 $364,940 $95,968 $589,069 ($32,564) $954,009 $63,404 $1,017,413 $402,284 $46,278 ($17,202) ($392,019)
55-59 $172,509 $94,984 $690,252 $10,021 $862,761 $105,005 $967,766 $186,718 $13,188 $470,388 ($49,104)
60-64 $680,709 $168,351 $480,670 ($54,501) $1,161,379 $113,851 $1,275,230 $84,814 $3,166 $225,894 ($61,032)
65+ $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
total $1,230,661 $372,815 $1,828,512 ($53,818) $3,059,173 $318,998 $3,378,171 $701,190 $74,365 $724,324 ($527,581)
FCA/HCA 16% 19% 34% 3% 23% 129% 25.1% 59% 109% 100% 100%
Total Production gains in 2003 
Friction Cost
Mortality
Friction cost
Morbidity Total Production Gains in 2003 
Human Capital
Mortality
Human Capital
Morbidity Welfare effects
Taxation effects
Taxation effects
Welfare effects
Dietician targeted 
at 10% risk group
 
  162
11 
:Discount at 3.5%, Friction 3 month, gender based wage rates
Male Female Male Female Male Female Persons Male Female Male Female
15-19 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
20-24 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
25-29 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
30-34 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
35-39 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
40-44 $1,164,701 $0 $1,640,078 $0 $2,804,779 $0 $2,804,779 $444,687 $0 $113,772 $0
45-49 $17,766,899 $2,366,767 $38,979,460 ($1,037,332) $56,746,358 $1,329,435 $58,075,794 $6,090,453 $183,917 $3,638,951 ($302,427)
50-54 $36,931,377 $2,806,713 $4,151,175 ($4,195,207) $41,082,552 ($1,388,494) $39,694,058 $5,594,419 $83,529 ($155,904) ($1,189,600)
55-59 $13,186,742 $2,017,988 $31,158,764 ($412,827) $44,345,506 $1,605,161 $45,950,667 $3,310,840 $81,377 $4,431,210 ($198,770)
60-64 $2,252,927 $312,508 $1,338,782 ($109,396) $3,591,709 $203,112 $3,794,821 $162,456 $5,202 $255,655 ($62,463)
65+ $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
total $71,302,647 $7,503,976 $77,268,257 ($5,754,762) $148,570,904 $1,749,214 $150,320,119 $15,602,856 $354,025 $8,283,684 ($1,753,260)
Male Female Male Female Male Female Persons Male Female Male Female
15-19 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
20-24 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
25-29 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
30-34 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
35-39 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
40-44 $49,416 $0 $466,257 $0 $515,673 $0 $515,673 $221,777 $0 $113,772 $0
45-49 $1,005,255 $160,692 $5,511,016 $276,250 $6,516,272 $436,942 $6,953,213 $2,201,625 $139,547 $3,638,951 ($302,427)
50-54 $3,088,676 $291,173 $5,338,831 ($98,816) $8,427,507 $192,357 $8,619,864 $3,633,410 $140,432 ($155,904) ($1,189,600)
55-59 $1,857,184 $384,480 $6,502,405 $40,564 $8,359,589 $425,043 $8,784,632 $1,769,495 $53,383 $4,431,210 ($198,770)
60-64 $785,431 $173,806 $543,999 ($55,778) $1,329,430 $118,027 $1,447,458 $96,316 $3,245 $255,655 ($62,463)
65+ $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
total $6,785,963 $1,010,150 $18,362,508 $162,220 $25,148,471 $1,172,370 $26,320,841 $7,922,623 $336,607 $8,283,684 ($1,753,260)
FCA/HCA 10% 13% 24% -3% 17% 67% 17.5% 51% 95% 100% 100%
Morbidity Welfare effects
Taxation effects
Taxation effects
Welfare effects
Dietician targetted 
at 5% risk group
Total Production gains in 2003 
Friction Cost
Mortality
Friction cost
Morbidity Total Production Gains in 2003 
Human Capital
Mortality
Human Capital
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:Discount at 3.5%, Friction 3 month, gender based wage rates
Male Female Male Female Male Female Persons Male Female Male Female
15-19 $0 $0 $1,750,368 ($600,281) $1,750,368 ($600,281) $1,150,087 $198,992 ($47,362) $684,689 ($416,930)
20-24 $24,416,061 $4,203,642 $3,417,384 $2,101,248 $27,833,445 $6,304,891 $34,138,336 $5,820,166 $867,635 $717,101 $421,631
25-29 $33,080,465 $5,543,524 $13,986,004 ($2,278,201) $47,066,469 $3,265,323 $50,331,792 $8,916,882 $456,153 $2,410,357 ($579,748)
30-34 $30,074,931 $4,856,004 $10,230,353 $128,605 $40,305,284 $4,984,608 $45,289,892 $6,940,407 $653,673 $1,627,814 ($219,739)
35-39 $17,791,135 $3,536,625 $12,616,158 $14,751,756 $30,407,293 $18,288,380 $48,695,673 $5,179,681 $1,484,175 $2,499,482 $3,203,148
40-44 $14,642,971 $2,931,602 $5,797,431 $13,840,369 $20,440,402 $16,771,970 $37,212,373 $2,724,981 $1,253,810 $1,208,539 $2,323,805
45-49 $14,153,504 $2,590,913 $17,236,277 $20,692,133 $31,389,781 $23,283,046 $54,672,827 $4,850,366 $1,551,986 $4,396,166 $3,531,518
50-54 $9,428,990 $1,668,940 $9,330,036 $10,053,193 $18,759,027 $11,722,133 $30,481,160 $2,675,610 $705,782 $3,039,745 $1,941,302
55-59 $2,033,742 $512,229 $5,767,802 $7,082,309 $7,801,544 $7,594,538 $15,396,082 $1,361,314 $333,704 $2,944,324 $2,119,909
60-64 $611,649 $143,477 $1,489,305 $1,919,432 $2,100,954 $2,062,910 $4,163,864 $271,272 $8,539 $1,322,240 $1,025,123
65+ $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
total $146,233,448 $25,986,955 $81,621,118 $67,690,564 $227,854,566 $93,677,519 $321,532,085 $38,939,670 $7,268,095 $20,850,458 $13,350,020
Male Female Male Female Male Female Persons Male Female Male Female
15-19 $0 $0 $202,340 $142,733 $202,340 $142,733 $345,073 $7,077 $18,128 $684,689 ($416,930)
20-24 $197,027 $51,968 $369,353 $617,458 $566,381 $669,426 $1,235,806 $49,857 $78,415 $717,101 $421,631
25-29 $463,460 $104,041 $2,243,629 $170,105 $2,707,090 $274,146 $2,981,236 $408,827 $84,526 $2,410,357 ($579,748)
30-34 $467,017 $101,713 $3,044,450 $1,009,987 $3,511,467 $1,111,700 $4,623,167 $890,777 $270,551 $1,627,814 ($219,739)
35-39 $622,413 $142,871 $4,198,281 $3,016,774 $4,820,695 $3,159,646 $7,980,340 $662,616 $261,515 $2,499,482 $3,203,148
40-44 $621,273 $146,839 $1,920,642 $2,667,143 $2,541,915 $2,813,982 $5,355,897 $159,526 $275,922 $1,208,539 $2,323,805
45-49 $800,809 $175,910 $6,797,808 $4,103,910 $7,598,616 $4,279,820 $11,878,436 $299,638 $464,727 $4,396,166 $3,531,518
50-54 $788,573 $173,138 $5,053,066 $2,388,545 $5,841,639 $2,561,683 $8,403,322 $465,391 $323,702 $3,039,745 $1,941,302
55-59 $286,427 $97,593 $4,533,290 $2,039,081 $4,819,717 $2,136,674 $6,956,391 $496,170 $186,593 $2,944,324 $2,119,909
60-64 $213,237 $79,797 $2,347,348 $1,039,473 $2,560,585 $1,119,270 $3,679,855 $139,447 ($13,165) $1,322,240 $1,025,123
65+ $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
total $4,460,237 $1,073,871 $30,710,207 $17,195,210 $35,170,444 $18,269,080 $53,439,525 $3,579,326 $1,950,915 $20,850,458 $13,350,020
FCA/HCA 3% 4% 38% 25% 15% 20% 16.6% 9% 27% 100% 100%
Maint CBT 5 yrs with 
pri psychiatrist
Welfare effects
Taxation effects
Taxation effects
Welfare effects
Human Capital
Mortality
Human Capital
Morbidity Total Production gains in 2003 
Friction Cost
Mortality
Friction cost
Morbidity Total Production Gains in 2003 
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13 
 
:Discount at 3.5%, Friction 3 month, gender based wage rates
Male Female Male Female Male Female Persons Male Female Male Female
15-19 $0 $0 $1,750,368 ($600,281) $1,750,368 ($600,281) $1,150,087 $198,992 ($47,362) $684,689 ($416,930)
20-24 $24,416,061 $4,203,642 $3,417,384 $2,101,248 $27,833,445 $6,304,891 $34,138,336 $5,820,166 $867,635 $717,101 $421,631
25-29 $33,080,465 $5,543,524 $13,986,004 ($2,278,201) $47,066,469 $3,265,323 $50,331,792 $8,916,882 $456,153 $2,410,357 ($579,748)
30-34 $30,074,931 $4,856,004 $10,230,353 $128,605 $40,305,284 $4,984,608 $45,289,892 $6,940,407 $653,673 $1,627,814 ($219,739)
35-39 $17,791,135 $3,536,625 $12,616,158 $14,751,756 $30,407,293 $18,288,380 $48,695,673 $5,179,681 $1,484,175 $2,499,482 $3,203,148
40-44 $14,642,971 $2,931,602 $5,797,431 $13,840,369 $20,440,402 $16,771,970 $37,212,373 $2,724,981 $1,253,810 $1,208,539 $2,323,805
45-49 $14,153,504 $2,590,913 $17,236,277 $20,692,133 $31,389,781 $23,283,046 $54,672,827 $4,850,366 $1,551,986 $4,396,166 $3,531,518
50-54 $9,428,990 $1,668,940 $9,330,036 $10,053,193 $18,759,027 $11,722,133 $30,481,160 $2,675,610 $705,782 $3,039,745 $1,941,302
55-59 $2,033,742 $512,229 $5,767,802 $7,082,309 $7,801,544 $7,594,538 $15,396,082 $1,361,314 $333,704 $2,944,324 $2,119,909
60-64 $611,649 $143,477 $1,489,305 $1,919,432 $2,100,954 $2,062,910 $4,163,864 $271,272 $8,539 $1,322,240 $1,025,123
65+ $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
total $146,233,448 $25,986,955 $81,621,118 $67,690,564 $227,854,566 $93,677,519 $321,532,085 $38,939,670 $7,268,095 $20,850,458 $13,350,020
Male Female Male Female Male Female Persons Male Female Male Female
15-19 $0 $0 $202,340 $142,733 $202,340 $142,733 $345,073 $7,077 $18,128 $684,689 ($416,930)
20-24 $197,027 $51,968 $369,353 $617,458 $566,381 $669,426 $1,235,806 $49,857 $78,415 $717,101 $421,631
25-29 $463,460 $104,041 $2,243,629 $170,105 $2,707,090 $274,146 $2,981,236 $408,827 $84,526 $2,410,357 ($579,748)
30-34 $467,017 $101,713 $3,044,450 $1,009,987 $3,511,467 $1,111,700 $4,623,167 $890,777 $270,551 $1,627,814 ($219,739)
35-39 $622,413 $142,871 $4,198,281 $3,016,774 $4,820,695 $3,159,646 $7,980,340 $662,616 $261,515 $2,499,482 $3,203,148
40-44 $621,273 $146,839 $1,920,642 $2,667,143 $2,541,915 $2,813,982 $5,355,897 $159,526 $275,922 $1,208,539 $2,323,805
45-49 $800,809 $175,910 $6,797,808 $4,103,910 $7,598,616 $4,279,820 $11,878,436 $299,638 $464,727 $4,396,166 $3,531,518
50-54 $788,573 $173,138 $5,053,066 $2,388,545 $5,841,639 $2,561,683 $8,403,322 $465,391 $323,702 $3,039,745 $1,941,302
55-59 $286,427 $97,593 $4,533,290 $2,039,081 $4,819,717 $2,136,674 $6,956,391 $496,170 $186,593 $2,944,324 $2,119,909
60-64 $213,237 $79,797 $2,347,348 $1,039,473 $2,560,585 $1,119,270 $3,679,855 $139,447 ($13,165) $1,322,240 $1,025,123
65+ $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
total $4,460,237 $1,073,871 $30,710,207 $17,195,210 $35,170,444 $18,269,080 $53,439,525 $3,579,326 $1,950,915 $20,850,458 $13,350,020
FCA/HCA 3% 4% 38% 25% 15% 20% 16.6% 9% 27% 100% 100%
Maint CBT 5 yrs 
with pub psychol
Total Production gains in 2003 
Friction Cost
Mortality
Friction cost
Morbidity Total Production Gains in 2003 
Human Capital
Mortality
Human Capital
Morbidity Welfare effects
Taxation effects
Taxation effects
Welfare effects
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Maintenance SSRIs :Discount at 3.5%, Friction 3 month, gender based wage rates
Male Female Male Female Male Female Persons Male Female Male Female
15-19 $0 $0 $2,637,197 ($904,415) $2,637,197 ($904,415) $1,732,782 $299,811 ($71,358) $1,031,589 ($628,168)
20-24 $22,841,977 $3,932,637 $5,148,812 $3,165,852 $27,990,790 $7,098,489 $35,089,278 $5,805,156 $959,085 $1,080,422 $635,252
25-29 $30,947,795 $5,186,137 $21,072,056 ($3,432,458) $52,019,850 $1,753,679 $53,773,529 $10,089,835 $308,270 $3,631,572 ($873,480)
30-34 $28,136,025 $4,542,941 $15,413,592 $193,763 $43,549,616 $4,736,704 $48,286,320 $7,957,370 $717,018 $2,452,551 ($331,071)
35-39 $16,644,155 $3,308,621 $19,008,173 $22,225,778 $35,652,327 $25,534,399 $61,186,726 $6,600,330 $2,078,297 $3,765,853 $4,826,033
40-44 $13,698,950 $2,742,604 $8,734,717 $20,852,633 $22,433,668 $23,595,237 $46,028,905 $3,304,095 $1,783,810 $1,820,849 $3,501,168
45-49 $13,241,039 $2,423,879 $25,969,089 $31,175,864 $39,210,128 $33,599,743 $72,809,871 $6,689,469 $2,266,581 $6,623,497 $5,320,773
50-54 $8,821,111 $1,561,345 $14,057,127 $15,146,674 $22,878,238 $16,708,019 $39,586,257 $3,709,029 $1,029,733 $4,579,841 $2,924,869
55-59 $1,902,628 $479,206 $8,706,526 $10,670,583 $10,609,154 $11,149,789 $21,758,943 $2,009,363 $496,050 $4,436,074 $3,193,967
60-64 $572,217 $134,227 $2,243,866 $2,891,919 $2,816,083 $3,026,146 $5,842,228 $399,403 $11,905 $1,992,157 $1,544,505
65+ $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
total $136,805,897 $24,311,597 $122,991,154 $101,986,192 $259,797,051 $126,297,790 $386,094,840 $46,863,861 $9,579,391 $31,414,405 $20,113,847
Male Female Male Female Male Female Persons Male Female Male Female
15-19 $0 $0 $304,856 $215,049 $304,856 $215,049 $519,905 $10,663 $27,313 $1,031,589 ($628,168)
20-24 $184,325 $48,618 $556,487 $930,295 $740,812 $978,912 $1,719,725 $68,536 $116,671 $1,080,422 $635,252
25-29 $433,582 $97,333 $3,380,371 $256,289 $3,813,952 $353,623 $4,167,575 $590,527 $124,025 $3,631,572 ($873,480)
30-34 $436,909 $95,156 $4,586,930 $1,521,700 $5,023,839 $1,616,855 $6,640,694 $1,316,049 $404,527 $2,452,551 ($331,071)
35-39 $582,287 $133,661 $6,325,353 $4,545,232 $6,907,640 $4,678,893 $11,586,532 $976,450 $391,753 $3,765,853 $4,826,033
40-44 $581,220 $137,373 $2,893,741 $4,018,459 $3,474,961 $4,155,832 $7,630,793 $218,664 $413,074 $1,820,849 $3,501,168
45-49 $749,181 $164,569 $10,241,937 $6,183,168 $10,991,118 $6,347,737 $17,338,856 $423,508 $697,028 $6,623,497 $5,320,773
50-54 $737,735 $161,976 $7,613,217 $3,598,708 $8,350,951 $3,760,685 $12,111,636 $675,338 $484,821 $4,579,841 $2,924,869
55-59 $267,961 $91,301 $6,846,546 $3,072,188 $7,114,506 $3,163,489 $10,277,996 $748,636 $280,023 $4,436,074 $3,193,967
60-64 $199,490 $74,652 $3,536,639 $1,566,126 $3,736,129 $1,640,778 $5,376,907 $207,442 ($19,958) $1,992,157 $1,544,505
65+ $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
total $4,172,689 $1,004,639 $46,286,076 $25,907,215 $50,458,766 $26,911,854 $77,370,619 $5,235,811 $2,919,277 $31,414,405 $20,113,847
FCA/HCA 3% 4% 38% 25% 19% 21% 20.0% 11% 30% 100% 100%
Welfare effects
Taxation effects
Taxation effects
Welfare effects
Human Capital
Mortality
Human Capital
Morbidity Total Production gains in 2003 
Friction Cost
Mortality
Friction cost
Morbidity Total Production Gains in 2003 
 
 
  166
15 
:Discount at 3.5%, Friction 3 month, gender based wage rates
Male Female Male Female Male Female Persons Male Female Male Female
15-19 $0 $0 $823,340 ($296,492) $823,340 ($296,492) $526,848 $35,922 ($2,786) $552,394 ($344,971)
20-24 $1,719,091 $303,538 $839,445 $712,336 $2,558,536 $1,015,874 $3,574,410 $490,664 $125,664 $233,252 $140,651
25-29 $0 $0 $3,600,795 ($810,340) $3,600,795 ($810,340) $2,790,455 $769,854 ($89,878) $664,033 ($176,336)
30-34 $2,412,174 $424,534 $2,233,639 ($2,605) $4,645,814 $421,929 $5,067,742 $876,606 $83,505 $404,584 ($58,850)
35-39 $0 $0 $5,946,189 $4,824,613 $5,946,189 $4,824,613 $10,770,803 $1,487,342 $381,800 $1,146,533 $1,098,101
40-44 $2,022,070 $303,137 $2,513,042 $4,390,816 $4,535,113 $4,693,953 $9,229,065 $771,386 $338,400 $526,753 $759,820
45-49 $0 $0 $3,455,508 $4,328,798 $3,455,508 $4,328,798 $7,784,306 $764,165 $308,463 $873,095 $729,431
50-54 $596,699 $110,318 $1,987,353 $2,404,902 $2,584,052 $2,515,219 $5,099,271 $440,144 $154,630 $642,198 $430,377
55-59 $0 $0 $1,387,346 $1,415,607 $1,387,346 $1,415,607 $2,802,953 $332,354 $80,080 $600,164 $336,734
60-64 $44,039 $8,041 $650,847 $651,942 $694,886 $659,983 $1,354,869 $112,600 $2,424 $577,837 $348,187
65+ $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
total $6,794,074 $1,149,567 $23,437,504 $17,619,576 $30,231,578 $18,769,144 $49,000,722 $6,081,037 $1,382,303 $6,220,843 $3,263,143
Male Female Male Female Male Female Persons Male Female Male Female
15-19 $0 $0 $236,682 ($6,127) $236,682 ($6,127) $230,556 $5,508 $469 $552,394 ($344,971)
20-24 $13,872 $3,753 $164,612 $322,694 $178,484 $326,446 $504,930 $14,055 $39,629 $233,252 $140,651
25-29 $0 $0 $731,844 ($117,045) $731,844 ($117,045) $614,799 $82,393 ($5,746) $664,033 ($176,336)
30-34 $37,457 $8,892 $760,356 $223,002 $797,813 $231,894 $1,029,707 $165,169 $64,683 $404,584 ($58,850)
35-39 $0 $0 $3,068,828 $1,565,455 $3,068,828 $1,565,455 $4,634,283 $446,515 $111,033 $1,146,533 $1,098,101
40-44 $85,793 $15,184 $1,383,111 $1,242,187 $1,468,903 $1,257,370 $2,726,274 $109,604 $82,590 $526,753 $759,820
45-49 $0 $0 $2,227,196 $1,282,576 $2,227,196 $1,282,576 $3,509,771 $113,354 $118,109 $873,095 $729,431
50-54 $49,904 $11,445 $1,574,564 $741,194 $1,624,467 $752,639 $2,377,106 $45,836 $70,997 $642,198 $430,377
55-59 $0 $0 $1,443,245 $538,843 $1,443,245 $538,843 $1,982,089 $133,433 $51,154 $600,164 $336,734
60-64 $15,353 $4,472 $1,025,823 $353,061 $1,041,177 $357,533 $1,398,710 $59,242 ($4,533) $577,837 $348,187
65+ $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
total $202,379 $43,745 $12,616,261 $6,145,840 $12,818,639 $6,189,585 $19,008,225 $1,175,109 $528,384 $6,220,843 $3,263,143
FCA/HCA 3% 4% 54% 35% 42% 33% 38.8% 19% 38% 100% 100%
Opp 
screening+CBT
Total Production gains in 2003 
Friction Cost
Mortality
Friction cost
Morbidity Total Production Gains in 2003 
Human Capital
Mortality
Human Capital
Morbidity Welfare effects
Taxation effects
Taxation effects
Welfare effects
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Active Script by GP :Discount at 3.5%, Friction 3 month, gender based wage rates
Male Female Male Female Male Female Persons Male Female Male Female
15-19 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
20-24 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
25-29 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
30-34 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
35-39 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
40-44 $657,548 $200,486 $541,458 $244,860 $1,199,005 $445,346 $1,644,352 $157,963 $32,603 $40,618 $43,387
45-49 $3,685,035 $693,315 $1,144,024 $213,882 $4,829,059 $907,197 $5,736,256 $459,793 $48,422 $98,802 $42,552
50-54 $5,726,636 $874,327 $535,610 $211,550 $6,262,246 $1,085,877 $7,348,123 $480,091 $41,889 $42,695 $51,856
55-59 $5,257,046 $683,437 ($516,176) ($75,621) $4,740,871 $607,816 $5,348,687 $266,280 $17,305 ($95,347) ($30,569)
60-64 $2,482,951 $292,083 ($677,163) $56,751 $1,805,788 $348,834 $2,154,622 $64,521 $4,946 ($147,989) $27,547
65+ $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
total $17,809,217 $2,743,648 $1,027,752 $651,421 $18,836,969 $3,395,070 $22,232,039 $1,428,648 $145,166 ($61,221) $134,772
Male Female Male Female Male Female Persons Male Female Male Female
15-19 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
20-24 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
25-29 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
30-34 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
35-39 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
40-44 $27,899 $10,042 $122,392 $28,953 $150,291 $38,995 $189,286 $55,841 $6,388 $40,618 $43,387
45-49 $208,500 $47,073 $235,317 $29,061 $443,817 $76,133 $519,951 $120,286 $7,107 $98,802 $42,552
50-54 $478,935 $90,704 $210,362 $32,982 $689,297 $123,687 $812,984 $145,423 $7,255 $42,695 $51,856
55-59 $740,388 $130,213 $14,356 ($5,893) $754,744 $124,319 $879,063 $95,546 $5,836 ($95,347) ($30,569)
60-64 $865,623 $162,446 ($217,093) $33,105 $648,530 $195,551 $844,081 $30,688 $1,421 ($147,989) $27,547
65+ $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
total $2,321,345 $440,477 $365,335 $118,208 $2,686,679 $558,685 $3,245,365 $447,784 $28,006 ($61,221) $134,772
FCA/HCA 13% 16% 36% 18% 14% 16% 14.6% 31% 19% 100% 100%
Welfare effects
Taxation effects
Taxation effects
Welfare effects
Human Capital
Mortality
Human Capital
Morbidity Total Production gains in 2003 
Friction Cost
Mortality
Friction cost
Morbidity Total Production Gains in 2003 
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17 
:Discount at 3.5%, Friction 3 month, gender based wage rates
Male Female Male Female Male Female Persons Male Female Male Female
15-19 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
20-24 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
25-29 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
30-34 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
35-39 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
40-44 $657,548 $200,486 $541,458 $244,860 $1,199,005 $445,346 $1,644,352 $157,963 $32,603 $40,618 $43,387
45-49 $2,388,398 $491,874 $318,629 $62,303 $2,707,027 $554,177 $3,261,203 $232,252 $28,158 $27,518 $12,395
50-54 $1,944,217 $337,665 $65,513 $27,348 $2,009,730 $365,013 $2,374,743 $133,136 $13,342 $5,222 $6,704
55-59 $1,254,047 $187,050 ($79,284) ($11,830) $1,174,763 $175,220 $1,349,982 $60,193 $4,550 ($14,645) ($4,782)
60-64 $524,914 $68,802 ($107,182) $9,216 $417,731 $78,018 $495,750 $13,728 $1,054 ($23,424) $4,474
65+ $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
total $6,769,123 $1,285,877 $739,134 $331,896 $7,508,256 $1,617,774 $9,126,030 $597,273 $79,706 $35,289 $62,177
Male Female Male Female Male Female Persons Male Female Male Female
15-19 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
20-24 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
25-29 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
30-34 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
35-39 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
40-44 $27,899 $10,042 $122,392 $28,953 $150,291 $38,995 $189,286 $55,841 $6,388 $40,618 $43,387
45-49 $135,136 $33,396 $65,540 $8,465 $200,676 $41,861 $242,537 $38,210 $2,688 $27,518 $12,395
50-54 $162,600 $35,030 $25,731 $4,264 $188,331 $39,294 $227,625 $23,757 $1,618 $5,222 $6,704
55-59 $176,616 $35,638 $2,205 ($922) $178,822 $34,716 $213,538 $17,535 $1,217 ($14,645) ($4,782)
60-64 $182,999 $38,265 ($34,362) $5,376 $148,637 $43,641 $192,279 $5,861 $263 ($23,424) $4,474
65+ $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
total $685,250 $152,371 $181,506 $46,136 $866,756 $198,507 $1,065,263 $141,203 $12,174 $35,289 $62,177
FCA/HCA 10% 12% 25% 14% 12% 12% 11.7% 24% 15% 100% 100%
Morbidity Welfare effects
Taxation effects
Taxation effects
Welfare effects
Exercise 
physiologist
Total Production gains in 2003 
Friction Cost
Mortality
Friction cost
Morbidity Total Production Gains in 2003 
Human Capital
Mortality
Human Capital
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19 
Bupropion :Discount at 3.5%, Friction 3 month, gender based wage rates
Male Female Male Female Male Female Persons Male Female Male Female
15-19 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
20-24 $113,927 $68,415 ($8,183) $68,795 $105,744 $137,210 $242,954 $23,038 $20,421 ($1,615) $11,757
25-29 $876,567 $237,591 $285,633 $155,752 $1,162,200 $393,343 $1,555,543 $213,873 $50,219 $23,079 $25,602
30-34 $1,642,592 $330,084 $519,689 $101,053 $2,162,280 $431,137 $2,593,417 $335,237 $47,679 $43,457 $13,969
35-39 $1,572,288 $551,842 $653,457 $203,989 $2,225,745 $755,831 $2,981,576 $280,686 $70,235 $62,670 $34,314
40-44 $3,132,418 $932,744 $1,449,614 $762,180 $4,582,032 $1,694,924 $6,276,956 $460,007 $126,496 $128,982 $133,044
45-49 $4,420,776 $1,367,202 $3,693,890 $969,810 $8,114,666 $2,337,012 $10,451,678 $665,060 $143,923 $368,428 $189,936
50-54 $5,787,021 $1,478,353 $6,118,314 $1,002,425 $11,905,335 $2,480,778 $14,386,113 $835,527 $118,185 $708,608 $241,781
55-59 $6,417,197 $1,660,174 $2,175,622 ($311,160) $8,592,819 $1,349,014 $9,941,833 $565,144 $58,002 $285,898 ($127,218)
60-64 $3,751,473 $630,906 ($868,239) $91,725 $2,883,234 $722,631 $3,605,865 $197,240 $2,101 ($226,756) $60,732
65+ $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
total $27,714,259 $7,257,311 $14,019,797 $3,044,569 $41,734,056 $10,301,880 $52,035,937 $3,575,813 $637,261 $1,392,752 $583,917
Male Female Male Female Male Female Persons Male Female Male Female
15-19 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
20-24 $919 $846 $7,377 $8,744 $8,297 $9,590 $17,887 $2,204 $1,762 ($1,615) $11,757
25-29 $12,281 $4,459 $56,904 $27,090 $69,185 $31,549 $100,734 $19,109 $6,468 $23,079 $25,602
30-34 $25,507 $6,914 $96,773 $34,678 $122,280 $41,592 $163,871 $36,848 $9,698 $43,457 $13,969
35-39 $55,006 $22,293 $77,391 $52,572 $132,396 $74,865 $207,262 $28,391 $15,575 $62,670 $34,314
40-44 $132,903 $46,720 $118,872 $100,112 $251,775 $146,832 $398,607 $38,332 $26,626 $128,982 $133,044
45-49 $250,129 $92,826 $305,352 $144,829 $555,480 $237,655 $793,135 $79,826 $39,555 $368,428 $189,936
50-54 $483,985 $153,367 $720,241 $169,853 $1,204,226 $323,220 $1,527,446 $192,902 $40,523 $708,608 $241,781
55-59 $903,780 $316,307 $584,812 ($20,977) $1,488,593 $295,330 $1,783,922 $260,857 $33,007 $285,898 ($127,218)
60-64 $1,307,864 $350,887 ($163,298) $39,593 $1,144,566 $390,480 $1,535,046 $146,409 ($5,538) ($226,756) $60,732
65+ $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
total $3,172,373 $994,618 $1,804,424 $556,494 $4,976,797 $1,551,112 $6,527,910 $804,877 $167,676 $1,392,752 $583,917
FCA/HCA 11% 14% 13% 18% 12% 15% 12.5% 23% 26% 100% 100%
Total Production gains in 2003 
Friction Cost
Mortality
Friction cost
Morbidity Total Production Gains in 2003 
Human Capital
Mortality
Human Capital
Morbidity Welfare effects
Taxation effects
Taxation effects
Welfare effects
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20 
:Discount at 3.5%, Friction 3 month, gender based wage rates
Male Female Male Female Male Female Persons Male Female Male Female
15-19 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
20-24 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
25-29 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
30-34 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
35-39 $1,911 $1,149 $848 $443 $2,759 $1,592 $4,350 $349 $149 $81 $75
40-44 $12,383 $3,345 $6,223 $2,894 $18,605 $6,239 $24,845 $1,873 $468 $554 $505
45-49 $23,152 $6,015 $21,786 $4,782 $44,938 $10,798 $55,736 $3,699 $675 $2,173 $937
50-54 $31,551 $8,408 $40,633 $6,748 $72,184 $15,155 $87,340 $5,137 $741 $4,706 $1,628
55-59 $39,895 $10,442 $18,058 ($2,551) $57,954 $7,891 $65,845 $4,113 $403 $2,373 ($1,043)
60-64 $23,426 $6,525 ($7,969) $3,498 $15,458 $10,023 $25,481 $1,517 ($125) ($2,081) $2,316
65+ $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
total $132,318 $35,884 $79,579 $15,815 $211,897 $51,699 $263,596 $16,688 $2,309 $7,806 $4,417
Male Female Male Female Male Female Persons Male Female Male Female
15-19 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
20-24 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
25-29 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
30-34 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
35-39 $67 $46 $100 $114 $167 $161 $328 $37 $34 $81 $75
40-44 $525 $168 $510 $380 $1,036 $548 $1,583 $162 $101 $554 $505
45-49 $1,310 $408 $1,801 $714 $3,111 $1,123 $4,233 $461 $194 $2,173 $937
50-54 $2,639 $872 $4,783 $1,143 $7,422 $2,016 $9,438 $1,248 $268 $4,706 $1,628
55-59 $5,619 $1,989 $4,854 ($172) $10,473 $1,817 $12,290 $2,080 $259 $2,373 ($1,043)
60-64 $8,167 $3,629 ($1,499) $1,510 $6,668 $5,139 $11,807 $1,260 ($238) ($2,081) $2,316
65+ $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
total $18,327 $7,113 $10,550 $3,690 $28,877 $10,803 $39,680 $5,247 $617 $7,806 $4,417
FCA/HCA 14% 20% 13% 23% 14% 21% 15.1% 31% 27% 100% 100%
Morbidity Welfare effects
Taxation effects
Taxation effects
Welfare effects
Call back counselling
Total Production gains in 2003 
Friction Cost
Mortality
Friction cost
Morbidity Total Production Gains in 2003 
Human Capital
Mortality
Human Capital
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 Nicotine Replacement Therapy: Discount at 3.5%, Friction 3 month, gender based wage rates
Male Female Male Female Male Female Persons Male Female Male Female
15-19 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
20-24 $157,715 $94,711 ($11,328) $95,237 $146,387 $189,947 $336,335 $31,893 $28,269 ($2,235) $16,276
25-29 $1,213,480 $328,910 $395,418 $215,616 $1,608,898 $544,526 $2,153,424 $296,077 $69,520 $31,949 $35,442
30-34 $2,273,930 $456,953 $719,434 $139,893 $2,993,363 $596,846 $3,590,209 $464,087 $66,004 $60,160 $19,339
35-39 $2,176,605 $763,946 $904,616 $282,393 $3,081,221 $1,046,339 $4,127,559 $388,568 $97,231 $86,758 $47,502
40-44 $4,336,379 $1,291,249 $2,006,780 $1,055,127 $6,343,159 $2,346,376 $8,689,535 $636,813 $175,116 $178,556 $184,180
45-49 $6,119,923 $1,892,693 $5,113,655 $1,342,561 $11,233,578 $3,235,254 $14,468,832 $920,679 $199,241 $510,036 $262,939
50-54 $8,011,290 $2,046,565 $8,469,918 $1,387,712 $16,481,208 $3,434,278 $19,915,486 $1,156,666 $163,610 $980,965 $334,710
55-59 $8,882,846 $2,298,234 $3,011,186 ($430,700) $11,894,032 $1,867,534 $13,761,566 $782,238 $80,291 $395,700 ($176,092)
60-64 $5,193,070 $873,369 ($1,202,099) $126,946 $3,990,972 $1,000,316 $4,991,287 $273,059 $2,910 ($313,950) $84,053
65+ $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
total $38,365,237 $10,046,630 $19,407,579 $4,214,786 $57,772,817 $14,261,416 $72,034,233 $4,950,081 $882,193 $1,927,939 $808,349
Male Female Male Female Male Female Persons Male Female Male Female
15-19 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
20-24 $1,273 $1,171 $10,213 $12,105 $11,486 $13,276 $24,762 $3,052 $2,439 ($2,235) $16,276
25-29 $17,001 $6,173 $78,775 $37,502 $95,776 $43,675 $139,452 $26,453 $8,955 $31,949 $35,442
30-34 $35,311 $9,571 $133,968 $48,006 $169,279 $57,577 $226,856 $51,011 $13,425 $60,160 $19,339
35-39 $76,147 $30,862 $107,136 $72,778 $183,284 $103,640 $286,924 $39,304 $21,562 $86,758 $47,502
40-44 $183,984 $64,677 $164,562 $138,591 $348,546 $203,267 $551,813 $53,065 $36,860 $178,556 $184,180
45-49 $346,267 $128,504 $422,715 $200,494 $768,982 $328,999 $1,097,980 $110,507 $54,758 $510,036 $262,939
50-54 $670,007 $212,314 $997,069 $235,137 $1,667,076 $447,451 $2,114,527 $267,044 $56,099 $980,965 $334,710
55-59 $1,251,035 $437,874 $809,414 ($29,036) $2,060,449 $408,838 $2,469,287 $361,048 $45,688 $395,700 ($176,092)
60-64 $1,810,444 $485,737 ($226,091) $54,796 $1,584,353 $540,532 $2,124,885 $202,700 ($7,665) ($313,950) $84,053
65+ $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
total $4,391,468 $1,376,882 $2,497,762 $770,374 $6,889,230 $2,147,256 $9,036,487 $1,114,182 $232,121 $1,927,939 $808,349
FCA/HCA 11% 14% 13% 18% 12% 15% 12.5% 23% 26% 100% 100%
Total Production gains in 2003 
Friction Cost
Mortality
Friction cost
Morbidity Total Production Gains in 2003 
Human Capital
Mortality
Human Capital
Morbidity Welfare effects
Taxation effects
Taxation effects
Welfare effects
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 SunSmart: Discount at 3.5%, Friction 3 month, gender based wage rates
Male Female Male Female Male Female Persons Male Female Male Female
15-19 $2,720,787 ($3,023,613) ($23,391,692) $26,053,882 ($20,670,905) $23,030,268 $2,359,363 ($5,342,173) $4,012,904 ($2,834,130) $5,777,202
20-24 $23,223,380 $3,315,252 ($151,157,037) ($47,918,098) ($127,933,657) ($44,602,845) ($172,536,503) ($25,426,497) ($6,184,712) ($18,775,129) ($10,181,051)
25-29 $22,376,464 $3,057,937 $402,598,845 $83,688,585 $424,975,309 $86,746,522 $511,721,831 $77,419,510 $11,802,088 $38,456,326 $13,854,556
30-34 $55,875,613 $16,766,753 ($87,482,574) ($128,215,377) ($31,606,960) ($111,448,623) ($143,055,584) ($4,186,348) ($8,154,806) ($8,876,718) ($29,662,882)
35-39 $48,948,688 $14,443,534 $202,643,979 ($210,446,866) $251,592,667 ($196,003,332) $55,589,334 $32,328,576 ($11,362,419) $20,621,103 ($49,616,936)
40-44 $51,832,670 $3,427,826 $17,225,472 $56,716,134 $69,058,142 $60,143,960 $129,202,102 $10,776,100 $6,872,100 $752,795 $8,734,282
45-49 $39,589,299 $2,573,831 $59,220,024 ($75,061,833) $98,809,324 ($72,488,002) $26,321,322 $10,607,970 ($1,660,188) $5,500,356 ($17,335,767)
50-54 $27,117,382 $7,186,759 $732,044 ($6,216,322) $27,849,426 $970,438 $28,819,864 $1,895,551 $194,042 $43,752 ($1,750,989)
55-59 $14,108,332 $3,520,024 $1,307,798 ($4,745,274) $15,416,130 ($1,225,250) $14,190,880 $645,363 $36,064 $198,898 ($1,777,037)
60-64 $7,024,824 $1,131,921 $376,929 ($814,868) $7,401,753 $317,053 $7,718,806 $236,851 $23,533 $64,230 ($462,759)
65+ $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
total $292,817,439 $52,400,226 $422,073,788 ($306,960,036) $714,891,227 ($254,559,811) $460,331,416 $98,954,904 ($4,421,394) $35,151,485 ($82,421,381)
Male Female Male Female Male Female Persons Male Female Male Female
15-19 $8,748 ($13,486) $1,490,391 ($1,647,037) $1,499,139 ($1,660,523) ($161,384) $360,357 ($273,419) ($2,834,130) $5,777,202
20-24 $187,403 $40,985 $29,788,935 $4,081,872 $29,976,338 $4,122,857 $34,099,195 $8,334,019 $939,204 ($18,775,129) ($10,181,051)
25-29 $313,496 $57,391 $21,468,897 $14,062,636 $21,782,393 $14,120,027 $35,902,420 $5,574,483 $3,019,705 $38,456,326 $13,854,556
30-34 $867,662 $351,193 ($1,096,680) $12,726,937 ($229,018) $13,078,131 $12,849,113 $403,277 $3,986,580 ($8,876,718) ($29,662,882)
35-39 $1,712,444 $583,485 $13,094,992 $8,498,781 $14,807,436 $9,082,266 $23,889,702 $3,790,779 $5,099,490 $20,621,103 ($49,616,936)
40-44 $2,199,161 $171,694 $9,458,657 $13,251,557 $11,657,818 $13,423,251 $25,081,070 $5,186,528 $3,858,054 $752,795 $8,734,282
45-49 $2,239,972 $174,750 $8,631,712 $235,494 $10,871,684 $410,245 $11,281,929 $3,799,811 $1,963,905 $5,500,356 ($17,335,767)
50-54 $2,267,904 $745,566 $398,749 ($186,786) $2,666,653 $558,780 $3,225,433 $383,269 $179,224 $43,752 ($1,750,989)
55-59 $1,986,978 $670,657 $201,082 ($691,880) $2,188,060 ($21,223) $2,166,837 $78,780 $64,626 $198,898 ($1,777,037)
60-64 $2,449,042 $629,534 $177,249 ($417,639) $2,626,291 $211,895 $2,838,186 $97,236 $21,114 $64,230 ($462,759)
65+ $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
total $14,232,810 $3,411,769 $83,613,985 $49,913,935 $97,846,795 $53,325,705 $151,172,500 $28,008,537 $18,858,483 $35,151,485 ($82,421,381)
FCA/ 
HCA 5% 7% 20% -16% 14% -21% 32.8% 28% -427% 100% 100%
Welfare effects
Taxation effects
Taxation effects
Welfare effects
Human Capital
Mortality
Human Capital
Morbidity Total Production gains in 2003 
Friction Cost
Mortality
Friction cost
Morbidity Total Production Gains in 2003 
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Threshold analysis 
Type 2 
Diabetes 1 % drop :D iscount at 3.5%, Friction 3 m onth, gender based w age rates
M ale Fem ale M ale Fem ale M ale Fem ale Persons M ale Fem ale M ale Fem ale
15-19 $0 $0 $39,601 ($11,832) $39,601 ($11,832) $27,769 $10,741 ($1,897) $2,092 ($3,629)
20-24 $0 $0 ($37,858) $11,123 ($37,858) $11,123 ($26,736) ($4,917) $4,065 ($6,960) ($3,960)
25-29 $0 $0 ($25,102) $687,895 ($25,102) $687,895 $662,793 $23,346 $96,919 ($17,885) $111,888
30-34 $0 $0 $1,561,627 $1,025,867 $1,561,627 $1,025,867 $2,587,493 $384,733 $139,249 $95,838 $165,533
35-39 $0 $0 $6,659,179 $1,613,040 $6,659,179 $1,613,040 $8,272,219 $1,090,740 $179,450 $605,631 $303,270
40-44 $0 $0 $3,249,684 $2,502,425 $3,249,684 $2,502,425 $5,752,109 $550,488 $222,004 $250,437 $438,856
45-49 $0 $0 $1,583,627 $777,660 $1,583,627 $777,660 $2,361,287 $289,739 $108,621 $128,159 $126,152
50-54 $0 $0 $1,822,078 $903,041 $1,822,078 $903,041 $2,725,120 $143,985 $72,944 $208,771 $210,017
55-59 $0 $0 $1,646,626 $313,224 $1,646,626 $313,224 $1,959,851 $116,161 $8,916 $240,586 $108,994
60-64 $0 $0 $686,043 $76,475 $686,043 $76,475 $762,517 $40,406 $1,440 $135,505 $38,404
65+ $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
total $0 $0 $17,185,505 $7,898,917 $17,185,505 $7,898,917 $25,084,422 $2,645,423 $831,711 $1,642,175 $1,495,524
M ale Fem ale M ale Fem ale M ale Fem ale Persons M ale Fem ale M ale Fem ale
15-19 $0 $0 $21,234 $5,571 $21,234 $5,571 $26,805 $6,017 $1,124 $2,092 ($3,629)
20-24 $0 $0 $29,216 $31,349 $29,216 $31,349 $60,565 $9,423 $7,022 ($6,960) ($3,960)
25-29 $0 $0 $152,151 $125,601 $152,151 $125,601 $277,752 $54,931 $28,923 ($17,885) $111,888
30-34 $0 $0 $628,957 $239,341 $628,957 $239,341 $868,298 $248,312 $62,563 $95,838 $165,533
35-39 $0 $0 $1,092,226 $274,796 $1,092,226 $274,796 $1,367,023 $419,801 $72,032 $605,631 $303,270
40-44 $0 $0 $665,845 $318,538 $665,845 $318,538 $984,383 $298,877 $81,117 $250,437 $438,856
45-49 $0 $0 $404,911 $229,723 $404,911 $229,723 $634,634 $198,483 $81,381 $128,159 $126,152
50-54 $0 $0 $231,688 $179,849 $231,688 $179,849 $411,537 $48,479 $46,913 $208,771 $210,017
55-59 $0 $0 $307,946 $64,610 $307,946 $64,610 $372,556 $58,823 $3,018 $240,586 $108,994
60-64 $0 $0 $264,785 $43,509 $264,785 $43,509 $308,294 $28,090 $682 $135,505 $38,404
65+ $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
total $0 $0 $3,798,960 $1,512,888 $3,798,960 $1,512,888 $5,311,848 $1,371,235 $384,774 $1,642,175 $1,495,524
FCA/HCA #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 22% 19% 22% 19% 21.2% 52% 46% 100% 100%
W elfare effects
Taxation effects
Taxation effects
W elfare effects
Hum an Capital
M ortality
Hum an Capita l
M orbidity Total Production gains in 2003 
Friction Cost
M ortality
Friction cost
M orbidity Total Production Gains in 2003 
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Type 2 
Diabetes 
10 % 
incidence 
drop :Discount at 3.5%, Friction 3 month, gender based wage rates
Male Female Male Female Male Female Persons Male Female Male Female
15-19 $0 $0 $396,011 ($118,319) $396,011 ($118,319) $277,692 $107,412 ($18,972) $20,921 ($36,294)
20-24 $0 $0 ($378,580) $111,225 ($378,580) $111,225 ($267,355) ($49,175) $40,645 ($69,597) ($39,602)
25-29 $0 $0 ($251,017) $6,878,951 ($251,017) $6,878,951 $6,627,933 $233,459 $969,185 ($178,849) $1,118,883
30-34 $0 $0 $15,616,267 $10,258,668 $15,616,267 $10,258,668 $25,874,934 $3,847,330 $1,392,494 $958,379 $1,655,331
35-39 $0 $0 $66,591,787 $16,130,399 $66,591,787 $16,130,399 $82,722,186 $10,907,401 $1,794,504 $6,056,308 $3,032,695
40-44 $0 $0 $32,496,843 $25,024,248 $32,496,843 $25,024,248 $57,521,091 $5,504,881 $2,220,040 $2,504,375 $4,388,558
45-49 $0 $0 $15,836,269 $7,776,597 $15,836,269 $7,776,597 $23,612,866 $2,897,391 $1,086,210 $1,281,592 $1,261,519
50-54 $0 $0 $18,220,783 $9,030,414 $18,220,783 $9,030,414 $27,251,196 $1,439,852 $729,444 $2,087,714 $2,100,166
55-59 $0 $0 $16,466,263 $3,132,243 $16,466,263 $3,132,243 $19,598,506 $1,161,615 $89,155 $2,405,859 $1,089,944
60-64 $0 $0 $6,860,426 $764,747 $6,860,426 $764,747 $7,625,173 $404,059 $14,404 $1,355,047 $384,036
65+ $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
total $0 $0 $171,855,050 $78,989,173 $171,855,050 $78,989,173 $250,844,223 $26,454,226 $8,317,109 $16,421,749 $14,955,236
Male Female Male Female Male Female Persons Male Female Male Female
15-19 $0 $0 $212,339 $55,708 $212,339 $55,708 $268,046 $60,169 $11,239 $20,921 ($36,294)
20-24 $0 $0 $292,159 $313,491 $292,159 $313,491 $605,650 $94,227 $70,218 ($69,597) ($39,602)
25-29 $0 $0 $1,521,506 $1,256,015 $1,521,506 $1,256,015 $2,777,520 $549,305 $289,230 ($178,849) $1,118,883
30-34 $0 $0 $6,289,569 $2,393,412 $6,289,569 $2,393,412 $8,682,981 $2,483,122 $625,630 $958,379 $1,655,331
35-39 $0 $0 $10,922,261 $2,747,965 $10,922,261 $2,747,965 $13,670,226 $4,198,006 $720,316 $6,056,308 $3,032,695
40-44 $0 $0 $6,658,451 $3,185,382 $6,658,451 $3,185,382 $9,843,833 $2,988,770 $811,171 $2,504,375 $4,388,558
45-49 $0 $0 $4,049,114 $2,297,231 $4,049,114 $2,297,231 $6,346,344 $1,984,826 $813,807 $1,281,592 $1,261,519
50-54 $0 $0 $2,316,882 $1,798,489 $2,316,882 $1,798,489 $4,115,371 $484,787 $469,130 $2,087,714 $2,100,166
55-59 $0 $0 $3,079,463 $646,096 $3,079,463 $646,096 $3,725,559 $588,233 $30,180 $2,405,859 $1,089,944
60-64 $0 $0 $2,647,852 $435,093 $2,647,852 $435,093 $3,082,945 $280,900 $6,822 $1,355,047 $384,036
65+ $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
total $0 $0 $37,989,595 $15,128,881 $37,989,595 $15,128,881 $53,118,476 $13,712,345 $3,847,741 $16,421,749 $14,955,236
FCA/HCA #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 22% 19% 22% 19% 21.2% 52% 46% 100% 100%
Welfare effects
Taxation effects
Taxation effects
Welfare effects
Human Capital
Mortality
Human Capital
Morbidity Total Production gains in 2003 
Friction Cost
Mortality
Friction cost
Morbidity Total Production Gains in 2003 
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Appendix 4: Sensitivity analysis for each 
intervention/disease/risk factor 
 
For each intervention we have varied the evaluation method (2), the wage rate used (2), 
the discount rate (4) and the friction period (4) to test the sensitivity of the production 
gains and losses ($M), and the transfer payments of taxation and welfare ($M), to 
variation in the modeling inputs. Production losses appear reported in brackets. The 
length of the friction period is irrelevant within the HCA estimates, while the discount 
rate and choice of wage rates can be important. When the use of gender free wage rates 
yields values higher than the gender based wages rates the health intervention benefits 
more females than males. When the use of gender free wage rates yields values lower 
than the gender based wages rates, the intervention benefits more males than females. 
The higher the discount rate applied the smaller the net present value of the production 
gains, taxation and welfare effects under both HCA and FCA. The welfare effects are 
identical across the HCA and FCA since its calculation is dependent on factors such as 
eligibility for a disability pension rather than alternative methods of calculating 
production gains. Production gains and taxation effects calculated using the HCA are 
far larger than the FCA estimates, across all other variables tested in this scenario 
analysis. When using the FCA, extending the length of the friction period from three 
months out to 24, increases the production gains and taxation effect by a less than 
proportional amount (i.e. less than 8 times) because of the inclusion of changes in short 
term absenteeism for the rest of the intervention beneficiary’s life. If an intervention 
only impacted on mortality and not on morbidity, then the change in production gains 
using FCA would be proportional to the change in friction period.  
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1 Brief GP intervention 
Method Impact Wage rate Discount rate
3 6 12 24
Human Capital Appoach Production Gains Gender specific zero (5.36)       (5.36)       (5.33)       (5.33)       
3.5% (1.92)       (1.92)       (1.91)       (1.91)       
5.0% (1.26)       (1.26)       (1.27)       (1.27)       
7.0% (0.75)       (0.75)       (0.75)       (0.75)       
Gender free zero (6.21)       (6.21)       (6.21)       (6.21)       
3.5% (2.47)       (2.47)       (2.49)       (2.49)       
5.0% (1.74)       (1.74)       (1.77)       (1.77)       
7.0% (1.15)       (1.15)       (1.16)       (1.16)       
Human Capital Appoach Taxation effects Gender specific zero (1.18)       (1.18)       (1.18)       (1.18)       
3.5% (0.48)       (0.48)       (0.47)       (0.47)       
5.0% (0.33)       (0.33)       (0.33)       (0.33)       
7.0% (0.21)       (0.21)       (0.21)       (0.21)       
Gender free zero (1.36)       (1.36)       (1.36)       (1.36)       
3.5% (0.54)       (0.54)       (0.54)       (0.54)       
5.0% (0.38)       (0.38)       (0.38)       (0.38)       
7.0% (0.24)     (0.24)     (0.24)       (0.24)      
Human Capital Appoach Welfare effects Gender specific zero (1.52)       (1.52)       (1.52)       (1.52)       
3.5% (0.82)       (0.82)       (0.83)       (0.83)       
5.0% (0.67)       (0.67)       (0.67)       (0.67)       
7.0% (0.53)       (0.53)       (0.53)       (0.53)       
Gender free zero (1.52)       (1.52)       (1.52)       (1.52)       
3.5% (0.82)       (0.82)       (0.83)       (0.83)       
5.0% (0.67)       (0.67)       (0.67)       (0.67)       
7.0% (0.53)       (0.53)       (0.53)       (0.53)       
Friction Cost Approach Production Gains Gender specific zero 0.04        0.04        0.05        0.07        
3.5% 0.19        0.20        0.21        0.24        
5.0% 0.20        0.21        0.22        0.24        
7.0% 0.19        0.19        0.20        0.23        
Gender free zero 0.01        0.03        0.05        0.12        
3.5% 0.18        0.19        0.22        0.29        
5.0% 0.18      0.20      0.23        0.29       
7.0% 0.18        0.19        0.22        0.28        
Friction Cost Approach Taxation effects Gender specific zero (0.00)       (0.00)       0.01        0.02        
3.5% 0.03        0.03        0.04        0.05        
5.0% 0.04        0.04        0.04        0.05        
7.0% 0.04      0.04      0.05        0.06       
Gender free zero (0.01)       (0.01)       (0.01)       (0.00)       
3.5% 0.02        0.02        0.02        0.03        
5.0% 0.03        0.03        0.03        0.03        
7.0% 0.03        0.03        0.03        0.04        
Friction Cost Approach Welfare effects Gender specific zero (1.52)       (1.52)       (1.52)       (1.52)       
3.5% (0.82)       (0.82)       (0.83)       (0.83)       
5.0% (0.67)       (0.67)       (0.67)       (0.67)       
7.0% (0.53)     (0.53)     (0.53)       (0.53)      
Gender free zero (1.52)       (1.52)       (1.52)       (1.52)       
3.5% (0.82)       (0.82)       (0.83)       (0.83)       
5.0% (0.67)       (0.67)       (0.67)       (0.67)       
7.0% (0.53)       (0.53)       (0.53)       (0.53)       
Friction period (months)
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2 Random Breath Testing 
Method Impact Wage rate Discount rate
3 6 12 24
Human Capital Appoach Production Gains Gender specific zero 168         168 167 167
3.5% 93           93 93 93
5.0% 76           76 75 75
7.0% 59           59 59 59
Gender free zero 144         144 143 143
3.5% 80           80 80 80
5.0% 65           65 65 65
7.0% 51           51 51 51
Human Capital Appoach Taxation effects Gender specific zero 41           41 41 41
3.5% 15           15 15 15
5.0% 10           10 10 10
7.0% 6             6 6 6
Gender free zero 32           32 31 31
3.5% 12           12 12 12
5.0% 8             8 8 8
7.0% 5           5 5 5
Human Capital Appoach Welfare effects Gender specific zero 0.5          0.5          0.5          0.5          
3.5% 0.3          0.3          0.3          0.3          
5.0% 0.3          0.3          0.2          0.2          
7.0% 0.2          0.2          0.2          0.2          
Gender free zero 0.5          0.5          0.5          0.5          
3.5% 0.3          0.3          0.3          0.3          
5.0% 0.3          0.3          0.2          0.2          
7.0% 0.2          0.2          0.2          0.2          
Friction Cost Approach Production Gains Gender specific zero 2.2          2.9          4.3          7.3          
3.5% 2.1          2.8          4.3          7.3          
5.0% 2.0          2.8          4.3          7.3          
7.0% 2.0          2.8          4.3          7.3          
Gender free zero 2.1          2.9          4.5          7.7          
3.5% 2.0          2.8          4.4          7.7          
5.0% 2.0        2.8        4.4          7.7         
7.0% 1.9          2.8          4.4          7.7          
Friction Cost Approach Taxation effects Gender specific zero 0.2          0.3          0.5          1.1          
3.5% 0.2          0.3          0.6          1.1          
5.0% 0.2          0.3          0.6          1.1          
7.0% 0.1        0.3        0.6          1.1         
Gender free zero 0.1          0.3          0.4          0.9          
3.5% 0.1          0.2          0.4          0.9          
5.0% 0.1          0.2          0.4          0.9          
7.0% 0.1          0.2          0.4          0.9          
Friction Cost Approach Welfare effects Gender specific zero 0.5          0.5          0.5          0.5          
3.5% 0.3          0.3          0.3          0.3          
5.0% 0.3          0.3          0.2          0.2          
7.0% 0.2        0.2        0.2          0.2         
Gender free zero 0.5          0.5          0.5          0.5          
3.5% 0.3          0.3          0.3          0.3          
5.0% 0.3          0.3          0.2          0.2          
7.0% 0.2          0.2          0.2          0.2          
Friction period (months)
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3 Cervical Cancer screening 
Method Impact Wage rate Discount rate
3 6 12 24
Human Capital Appoach Production Gains Gender specific zero 1,275      1275 1273 1273
3.5% 839         839 838 838
5.0% 725         725 724 724
7.0% 611         611 611 611
Gender free zero 1,671      1671 1672 1672
3.5% 1,098      1098 1098 1098
5.0% 950         950 949 949
7.0% 800         800 799 799
Human Capital Appoach Taxation effects Gender specific zero 184         184 183 183
3.5% 65           65 65 65
5.0% 43           43 43 43
7.0% 27           27 27 27
Gender free zero 294         294 294 294
3.5% 103         103 103 103
5.0% 69           69 69 69
7.0% 42         42 42 42
Human Capital Appoach Welfare effects Gender specific zero (27)          (27) (28) (28)
3.5% (18)          (18) (18) (18)
5.0% (16)          (16) (16) (16)
7.0% (13)          (13) (13) (13)
Gender free zero (27)          (27) (28) (28)
3.5% (18)          (18) (18) (18)
5.0% (16)          (16) (16) (16)
7.0% (13)          (13) (13) (13)
Friction Cost Approach Production Gains Gender specific zero 135         150 179 239
3.5% 91           106 134 193
5.0% 83           98 126 185
7.0% 77           92 121 179
Gender free zero 183         208 257 356
3.5% 124         149 199 299
5.0% 115       140 189 289
7.0% 107         132 182 282
Friction Cost Approach Taxation effects Gender specific zero 10           12 15 20
3.5% 8             9 12 17
5.0% 7             9 11 16
7.0% 6           8 10 16
Gender free zero 17           20 24 34
3.5% 13           15 20 29
5.0% 11           14 19 28
7.0% 10           13 17 26
Friction Cost Approach Welfare effects Gender specific zero (27)          (27) (28) (28)
3.5% (18)          (18) (18) (18)
5.0% (16)          (16) (16) (16)
7.0% (13)        (13) (13) (13)
Gender free zero (27)          (27) (28) (28)
3.5% (18)          (18) (18) (18)
5.0% (16)          (16) (16) (16)
7.0% (13)          (13) (13) (13)
Friction period (months)
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4 ACE inhibitors targeted at 10% risk group 
Method Impact Wage rate Discount rate
3 6 12 24
Human Capital Appoach Production Gains Gender specific zero 30           30 30 30
3.5% 21           21 21 21
5.0% 19           19 19 19
7.0% 17           17 17 17
Gender free zero 26           26 27 27
3.5% 18           18 19 19
5.0% 17           17 17 17
7.0% 15           15 15 15
Human Capital Appoach Taxation effects Gender specific zero 5.0          5.0          5.1          5.1          
3.5% 1.8          1.8          1.8          1.8          
5.0% 1.3          1.3          1.3          1.3          
7.0% 1.0          1.0          1.0          1.0          
Gender free zero 4.0          4.0          4.1          4.1          
3.5% 1.5          1.5          1.5          1.5          
5.0% 1.1          1.1          1.1          1.1          
7.0% 0.9        0.9        0.9          0.9         
Human Capital Appoach Welfare effects Gender specific zero 0.3          0.3          0.3          0.3          
3.5% 0.3          0.3          0.3          0.3          
5.0% 0.3          0.3          0.3          0.3          
7.0% 0.3          0.3          0.3          0.3          
Gender free zero 0.3          0.3          0.3          0.3          
3.5% 0.3          0.3          0.3          0.3          
5.0% 0.3          0.3          0.3          0.3          
7.0% 0.3          0.3          0.3          0.3          
Friction Cost Approach Production Gains Gender specific zero 10.2        11.0        12.6        15.7        
3.5% 4.9          5.7          7.2          10.1        
5.0% 4.2          4.9          6.4          9.3          
7.0% 3.7          4.4          5.9          8.8          
Gender free zero 9.8          10.6        12.2        15.5        
3.5% 4.8          5.6          7.2          10.4        
5.0% 4.1        4.9        6.5          9.7         
7.0% 3.6          4.4          6.1          9.2          
Friction Cost Approach Taxation effects Gender specific zero 1.2          1.3          1.6          2.1          
3.5% 1.0          1.1          1.4          1.9          
5.0% 1.0          1.1          1.3          1.8          
7.0% 0.9        1.0        1.3          1.7         
Gender free zero 1.1          1.2          1.3          1.7          
3.5% 0.9          1.0          1.2          1.5          
5.0% 0.8          0.9          1.1          1.5          
7.0% 0.8          0.9          1.0          1.4          
Friction Cost Approach Welfare effects Gender specific zero 0.3          0.3          0.3          0.3          
3.5% 0.3          0.3          0.3          0.3          
5.0% 0.3          0.3          0.3          0.3          
7.0% 0.3        0.3        0.3          0.3         
Gender free zero 0.3          0.3          0.3          0.3          
3.5% 0.3          0.3          0.3          0.3          
5.0% 0.3          0.3          0.3          0.3          
7.0% 0.3          0.3          0.3          0.3          
Friction period (months)
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5 ACE inhibitors targeted at 5% risk group 
Method Impact Wage rate Discount rate
3 6 12 24
Human Capital Appoach Production Gains Gender specific zero 583         583 589 589
3.5% 400         400 404 404
5.0% 359         359 360 360
7.0% 315         315 317 317
Gender free zero 503         503 508 508
3.5% 342         342 346 346
5.0% 305         305 308 308
7.0% 269         269 270 270
Human Capital Appoach Taxation effects Gender specific zero 111         111 112 112
3.5% 39           39 40 40
5.0% 28           28 28 28
7.0% 19           19 20 20
Gender free zero 87           87 88 88
3.5% 31           31 31 31
5.0% 22           22 22 22
7.0% 15         15 16 16
Human Capital Appoach Welfare effects Gender specific zero 22           22 22 22
3.5% 16           16 16 16
5.0% 14           14 14 14
7.0% 13           13 13 13
Gender free zero 22           22 22 22
3.5% 16           16 16 16
5.0% 14           14 14 14
7.0% 13           13 13 13
Friction Cost Approach Production Gains Gender specific zero 148         158 182 223
3.5% 63           73 93 129
5.0% 52           61 79 116
7.0% 43           52 70 107
Gender free zero 133         143 167 205
3.5% 59           68 87 125
5.0% 48         57 76 113
7.0% 41           50 69 106
Friction Cost Approach Taxation effects Gender specific zero 22           24 28 35
3.5% 17           19 24 31
5.0% 16           18 22 29
7.0% 14         16 20 27
Gender free zero 18           19 22 28
3.5% 14           16 19 24
5.0% 13           15 17 23
7.0% 12           13 16 21
Friction Cost Approach Welfare effects Gender specific zero 22           22 22 22
3.5% 16           16 16 16
5.0% 14           14 14 14
7.0% 13         13 13 13
Gender free zero 22           22 22 22
3.5% 16           16 16 16
5.0% 14           14 14 14
7.0% 13           13 13 13
Friction period (months)
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6 Beta blockers targeted at 15% risk group 
Method Impact Wage rate Discount rate
3 6 12 24
Human Capital Appoach Production Gains Gender specific zero 2.80        2.80        2.79        2.79        
3.5% 2.19        2.19        2.18        2.18        
5.0% 2.03        2.03        2.02        2.02        
7.0% 1.86        1.86        1.85        1.85        
Gender free zero 2.55        2.55        2.54        2.54        
3.5% 1.98        1.98        1.97        1.97        
5.0% 1.83        1.83        1.83        1.83        
7.0% 1.68        1.68        1.67        1.67        
Human Capital Appoach Taxation effects Gender specific zero 0.46        0.46        0.46        0.46        
3.5% 0.13        0.13        0.13        0.13        
5.0% 0.09        0.09        0.09        0.09        
7.0% 0.06        0.06        0.06        0.06        
Gender free zero 0.38        0.38        0.38        0.38        
3.5% 0.12        0.12        0.12        0.12        
5.0% 0.08        0.08        0.08        0.08        
7.0% 0.05      0.05      0.05        0.05       
Human Capital Appoach Welfare effects Gender specific zero (0.01)       (0.01)       (0.02)       (0.02)       
3.5% (0.01)       (0.01)       (0.01)       (0.01)       
5.0% (0.00)       (0.00)       (0.01)       (0.01)       
7.0% (0.00)       0.05        (0.01)       (0.01)       
Gender free zero (0.01)       (0.01)       (0.02)       (0.02)       
3.5% (0.01)       (0.01)       (0.01)       (0.01)       
5.0% (0.00)       (0.00)       (0.01)       (0.01)       
7.0% (0.00)       (0.00)       (0.01)       (0.01)       
Friction Cost Approach Production Gains Gender specific zero 0.66        0.74        0.92        1.25        
3.5% 0.43        0.51        0.67        1.00        
5.0% 0.39        0.48        0.64        0.97        
7.0% 0.37        0.45        0.61        0.94        
Gender free zero 0.65        0.74        0.93        1.29        
3.5% 0.42        0.51        0.70        1.06        
5.0% 0.39      0.48      0.67        1.03       
7.0% 0.37        0.46        0.64        1.01        
Friction Cost Approach Taxation effects Gender specific zero 0.06        0.07        0.10        0.14        
3.5% 0.05        0.06        0.09        0.14        
5.0% 0.05        0.06        0.08        0.13        
7.0% 0.04      0.06      0.08        0.13       
Gender free zero 0.05        0.06        0.08        0.12        
3.5% 0.05        0.06        0.08        0.11        
5.0% 0.04        0.05        0.07        0.11        
7.0% 0.04        0.05        0.07        0.11        
Friction Cost Approach Welfare effects Gender specific zero (0.01)       (0.01)       (0.02)       (0.02)       
3.5% (0.01)       (0.01)       (0.01)       (0.01)       
5.0% (0.00)       (0.00)       (0.01)       (0.01)       
7.0% (0.00)     (0.00)     (0.01)       (0.01)      
Gender free zero (0.01)       (0.01)       (0.02)       (0.02)       
3.5% (0.01)       (0.01)       (0.01)       (0.01)       
5.0% (0.00)       (0.00)       (0.01)       (0.01)       
7.0% (0.00)       (0.00)       (0.01)       (0.01)       
Friction period (months)
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7 Beta blockers targeted at 5% risk group 
Method Impact Wage rate Discount rate
3 6 12 24
Human Capital Appoach Production Gains Gender specific zero 410         410 410 410
3.5% 283         283 283 283
5.0% 254         254 253 253
7.0% 224         224 224 224
Gender free zero 355         355 355 355
3.5% 244         244 243 243
5.0% 218         218 217 217
7.0% 191         191 191 191
Human Capital Appoach Taxation effects Gender specific zero 77           77 77 77
3.5% 27           27 27 27
5.0% 19           19 19 19
7.0% 14           14 13 13
Gender free zero 61           61 61 61
3.5% 22           22 22 22
5.0% 16           16 15 15
7.0% 11         11 11 11
Human Capital Appoach Welfare effects Gender specific zero 14           14 13 13
3.5% 10           10 9 9
5.0% 9             9 9 9
7.0% 8             8 8 8
Gender free zero 14           14 13 13
3.5% 10           10 9 9
5.0% 9             9 9 9
7.0% 8             8 8 8
Friction Cost Approach Production Gains Gender specific zero 105         112 122 149
3.5% 44           51 64 89
5.0% 36           42 55 81
7.0% 30           37 49 75
Gender free zero 96           103 113 140
3.5% 42           48 61 87
5.0% 34         41 53 80
7.0% 29           35 48 75
Friction Cost Approach Taxation effects Gender specific zero 15           17 18 24
3.5% 12           14 16 21
5.0% 11           13 15 20
7.0% 10         12 14 19
Gender free zero 13           14 15 19
3.5% 10           11 13 16
5.0% 9             10 12 15
7.0% 8             9 11 14
Friction Cost Approach Welfare effects Gender specific zero 14           14 13 13
3.5% 10           10 9 9
5.0% 9             9 9 9
7.0% 8           8 8 8
Gender free zero 14           14 13 13
3.5% 10           10 9 9
5.0% 9             9 9 9
7.0% 8             8 8 8
Friction period (months)
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8 Combination of CHHP, drugs and counselling targeted at 15% risk group 
Method Impact Wage rate Discount rate
3 6 12 24
Human Capital Appoach Production Gains Gender specific zero 71           71 72 72
3.5% 51           51 52 52
5.0% 47           47 48 48
7.0% 43           43 44 44
Gender free zero 62           62 63 63
3.5% 45           45 45 45
5.0% 41           41 41 41
7.0% 37           37 37 37
Human Capital Appoach Taxation effects Gender specific zero 12           12 12 12
3.5% 4             4 4 4
5.0% 3             3 3 3
7.0% 2             2 2 2
Gender free zero 9             9 10 10
3.5% 3             3 3 3
5.0% 3             3 2 2
7.0% 2           2 2 2
Human Capital Appoach Welfare effects Gender specific zero 2             2 2 2
3.5% 2             2 2 2
5.0% 1             1 2 2
7.0% 1             1 2 2
Gender free zero 2             2 2 2
3.5% 2             2 2 2
5.0% 1             1 2 2
7.0% 1             1 2 2
Friction Cost Approach Production Gains Gender specific zero 24           26 30 38
3.5% 12           14 18 25
5.0% 10           12 16 24
7.0% 9             11 15 22
Gender free zero 22           24 28 36
3.5% 11           13 17 25
5.0% 10         12 16 24
7.0% 9             11 15 23
Friction Cost Approach Taxation effects Gender specific zero 3             3 4 5
3.5% 2             3 3 4
5.0% 2             3 3 4
7.0% 2           2 3 4
Gender free zero 2             3 3 4
3.5% 2             2 3 3
5.0% 2             2 2 3
7.0% 2             2 2 3
Friction Cost Approach Welfare effects Gender specific zero 2             2 2 2
3.5% 2             2 2 2
5.0% 1             1 2 2
7.0% 1           1 2 2
Gender free zero 2             2 2 2
3.5% 2             2 2 2
5.0% 1             1 2 2
7.0% 1             1 2 2
Friction period (months)
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9 Community Heart Health Program 
Method Impact Wage rate Discount rate
3 6 12 24
Human Capital Appoach Production Gains Gender specific zero 2,745      2745 2754 2754
3.5% 1,715      1715 1721 1721
5.0% 1,465      1465 1472 1472
7.0% 1,219      1219 1224 1224
Gender free zero 2,331      2331 2341 2341
3.5% 1,456      1456 1464 1464
5.0% 1,246      1246 1252 1252
7.0% 1,039      1039 1047 1047
Human Capital Appoach Taxation effects Gender specific zero 592         592 591 591
3.5% 228         228 226 226
5.0% 162         162 161 161
7.0% 111         111 109 109
Gender free zero 452         452 453 453
3.5% 174         174 173 173
5.0% 124         124 123 123
7.0% 85         85 85 85
Human Capital Appoach Welfare effects Gender specific zero 90           90 89 89
3.5% 60           60 59 59
5.0% 53           53 52 52
7.0% 45           45 44 44
Gender free zero 90           90 89 89
3.5% 60           60 59 59
5.0% 53           53 52 52
7.0% 45           45 44 44
Friction Cost Approach Production Gains Gender specific zero 644         671 725 828
3.5% 259         285 336 440
5.0% 195         220 270 371
7.0% 147         173 220 318
Gender free zero 583         610 664 771
3.5% 241         266 319 420
5.0% 184       211 261 362
7.0% 143         169 219 319
Friction Cost Approach Taxation effects Gender specific zero 120         125 134 155
3.5% 87           92 101 120
5.0% 77           82 92 110
7.0% 67         72 81 100
Gender free zero 98           102 109 125
3.5% 71           75 82 98
5.0% 63           67 74 89
7.0% 54           58 66 80
Friction Cost Approach Welfare effects Gender specific zero 90           90 89 89
3.5% 60           60 59 59
5.0% 53           53 52 52
7.0% 45         45 44 44
Gender free zero 90           90 89 89
3.5% 60           60 59 59
5.0% 53           53 52 52
7.0% 45           45 44 44
Friction period (months)
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10 Dietary counselling targeted at 10% risk group 
Method Impact Wage rate Discount rate
3 6 12 24
Human Capital Appoach Production Gains Gender specific zero 19           19 20 20
3.5% 14           14 14 14
5.0% 12           12 12 12
7.0% 11           11 11 11
Gender free zero 17           17 17 17
3.5% 12           12 12 12
5.0% 11           11 11 11
7.0% 10           10 10 10
Human Capital Appoach Taxation effects Gender specific zero 3.3          3.3          3.3          3.3          
3.5% 1.2          1.2          1.2          1.2          
5.0% 0.9          0.9          0.9          0.9          
7.0% 0.7          0.7          0.7          0.7          
Gender free zero 2.6          2.6          2.6          2.6          
3.5% 1.0          1.0          1.0          1.0          
5.0% 0.8          0.8          0.8          0.8          
7.0% 0.6        0.6        0.6          0.6         
Human Capital Appoach Welfare effects Gender specific zero 0.2          0.2          0.2          0.2          
3.5% 0.2          0.2          0.2          0.2          
5.0% 0.2          0.2          0.2          0.2          
7.0% 0.2          0.2          0.2          0.2          
Gender free zero 0.2          0.2          0.2          0.2          
3.5% 0.2          0.2          0.2          0.2          
5.0% 0.2          0.2          0.2          0.2          
7.0% 0.2          0.2          0.2          0.2          
Friction Cost Approach Production Gains Gender specific zero 6.9          7.4          8.3          10.3        
3.5% 3.3          3.7          4.7          6.6          
5.0% 2.8          3.2          4.2          6.1          
7.0% 2.4          2.9          3.9          5.7          
Gender free zero 6.6          7.1          8.1          10.1        
3.5% 3.2          3.7          4.7          6.8          
5.0% 2.7        3.2        4.2          6.3         
7.0% 2.4          2.9          3.9          6.0          
Friction Cost Approach Taxation effects Gender specific zero 0.8          0.9          1.0          1.3          
3.5% 0.7          0.8          0.9          1.2          
5.0% 0.7          0.7          0.9          1.2          
7.0% 0.6        0.7        0.8          1.1         
Gender free zero 0.7          0.8          0.9          1.1          
3.5% 0.6          0.7          0.8          1.0          
5.0% 0.6          0.6          0.7          0.9          
7.0% 0.5          0.6          0.7          0.9          
Friction Cost Approach Welfare effects Gender specific zero 0.2          0.2          0.2          0.2          
3.5% 0.2          0.2          0.2          0.2          
5.0% 0.2          0.2          0.2          0.2          
7.0% 0.2        0.2        0.2          0.2         
Gender free zero 0.2          0.2          0.2          0.2          
3.5% 0.2          0.2          0.2          0.2          
5.0% 0.2          0.2          0.2          0.2          
7.0% 0.2          0.2          0.2          0.2          
Friction period (months)
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11 Dietary counselling targeted at 5% risk group 
Method Impact Wage rate Discount rate
3 6 12 24
Human Capital Appoach Production Gains Gender specific zero 225         225 227 227
3.5% 153         153 152 152
5.0% 136         136 135 135
7.0% 119         119 119 119
Gender free zero 193         193 194 194
3.5% 129         129 129 129
5.0% 115         115 114 114
7.0% 101         101 100 100
Human Capital Appoach Taxation effects Gender specific zero 43           43 43 43
3.5% 15           15 16 16
5.0% 11           11 11 11
7.0% 8             8 8 8
Gender free zero 33           33 33 33
3.5% 12           12 12 12
5.0% 9             9 9 9
7.0% 6           6 6 6
Human Capital Appoach Welfare effects Gender specific zero 9             9 9 9
3.5% 7             7 7 7
5.0% 6             6 6 6
7.0% 6             6 6 6
Gender free zero 9             9 9 9
3.5% 7             7 7 7
5.0% 6             6 6 6
7.0% 6             6 6 6
Friction Cost Approach Production Gains Gender specific zero 60           64 75 89
3.5% 25           29 36 51
5.0% 20           24 31 45
7.0% 17           20 27 41
Gender free zero 55           58 68 82
3.5% 23           27 34 47
5.0% 19         22 29 43
7.0% 16           19 26 40
Friction Cost Approach Taxation effects Gender specific zero 9             10 12 14
3.5% 7             8 10 12
5.0% 7             7 9 12
7.0% 6           7 8 11
Gender free zero 7             8 9 11
3.5% 6             6 8 10
5.0% 5             6 7 9
7.0% 5             5 7 9
Friction Cost Approach Welfare effects Gender specific zero 9             9 9 9
3.5% 7             7 7 7
5.0% 6             6 6 6
7.0% 6           6 6 6
Gender free zero 9             9 9 9
3.5% 7             7 7 7
5.0% 6             6 6 6
7.0% 6             6 6 6
Friction period (months)
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12 Maintenance CBT for 5 years with a private psychiatrist 
Method Impact Wage rate Discount rate
3 6 12 24
Human Capital Appoach Production Gains Gender specific zero 580         580 580 580
3.5% 323         323 323 323
5.0% 266         266 266 266
7.0% 214         214 213 213
Gender free zero 546         546 545 545
3.5% 316         316 316 316
5.0% 265         265 264 264
7.0% 217         217 217 217
Human Capital Appoach Taxation effects Gender specific zero 122         122 122 122
3.5% 46           46 46 46
5.0% 32           32 32 32
7.0% 21           21 21 21
Gender free zero 108         108 108 108
3.5% 42           42 41 41
5.0% 29           29 29 29
7.0% 19         19 19 19
Human Capital Appoach Welfare effects Gender specific zero 38           38 38 38
3.5% 34           34 34 34
5.0% 33           33 33 33
7.0% 31           31 31 31
Gender free zero 38           38 38 38
3.5% 34           34 34 34
5.0% 33           33 33 33
7.0% 31           31 31 31
Friction Cost Approach Production Gains Gender specific zero 66           79 102 153
3.5% 53           66 90 141
5.0% 51           63 88 138
7.0% 48           61 86 136
Gender free zero 65           77 100 148
3.5% 52           64 88 136
5.0% 50         62 86 134
7.0% 47           60 83 131
Friction Cost Approach Taxation effects Gender specific zero 6             8 12 21
3.5% 6             8 12 20
5.0% 5             8 11 20
7.0% 5           7 11 20
Gender free zero 6             8 11 19
3.5% 5             7 11 18
5.0% 5             7 11 18
7.0% 5             7 10 18
Friction Cost Approach Welfare effects Gender specific zero 38           38 38 38
3.5% 34           34 34 34
5.0% 33           33 33 33
7.0% 31         31 31 31
Gender free zero 38           38 38 38
3.5% 34           34 34 34
5.0% 33           33 33 33
7.0% 31           31 31 31
Friction period (months)
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13 Maintenance CBT for 5 years with a public psychologist  
Method Impact Wage rate Discount rate
3 6 12 24
Human Capital Appoach Production Gains Gender specific zero 581         581 580 580
3.5% 323         323 322 322
5.0% 266         266 265 265
7.0% 214         214 213 213
Gender free zero 546         546 544 544
3.5% 317         317 315 315
5.0% 265         265 264 264
7.0% 218         218 217 217
Human Capital Appoach Taxation effects Gender specific zero 122         122 122 122
3.5% 46           46 46 46
5.0% 32           32 32 32
7.0% 21           21 21 21
Gender free zero 108         108 108 108
3.5% 42           42 41 41
5.0% 29           29 29 29
7.0% 19         19 19 19
Human Capital Appoach Welfare effects Gender specific zero 38           38 38 38
3.5% 34           34 34 34
5.0% 33           33 33 33
7.0% 31           31 31 31
Gender free zero 38           38 38 38
3.5% 34           34 34 34
5.0% 33           33 33 33
7.0% 31           31 31 31
Friction Cost Approach Production Gains Gender specific zero 65           78 103 154
3.5% 53           66 92 143
5.0% 51           63 89 140
7.0% 48           61 87 138
Gender free zero 64           77 101 150
3.5% 52           64 89 138
5.0% 50           62 86 135
7.0% 47           60 84 133
Friction Cost Approach Taxation effects Gender specific zero 6             8 12 21
3.5% 5             8 12 20
5.0% 5             7 12 20
7.0% 5           7 11 20
Gender free zero 6             8 11 19
3.5% 5             7 11 19
5.0% 5             7 11 19
7.0% 5             7 11 18
Friction Cost Approach Welfare effects Gender specific zero 38           38 38 38
3.5% 34           34 34 34
5.0% 33           33 33 33
7.0% 31         31 31 31
Gender free zero 38           38 38 38
3.5% 34           34 34 34
5.0% 33           33 33 33
7.0% 31           31 31 31
Friction period (months)
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14 Maintenance SSRIs for 5 years 
Method Impact Wage rate Discount rate
3 6 12 24
Human Capital Appoach Production Gains Gender specific zero 709         709 710 710
3.5% 388         388 388 388
5.0% 319         319 318 318
7.0% 256         256 256 256
Gender free zero 672         672 673 673
3.5% 387         387 388 388
5.0% 324         324 325 325
7.0% 268         268 267 267
Human Capital Appoach Taxation effects Gender specific zero 146         146 146 146
3.5% 57           57 56 56
5.0% 40           40 40 40
7.0% 26           26 26 26
Gender free zero 131         131 131 131
3.5% 52           52 52 52
5.0% 37           37 37 37
7.0% 24         24 24 24
Human Capital Appoach Welfare effects Gender specific zero 57           57 57 57
3.5% 52           52 52 52
5.0% 50           50 50 50
7.0% 47           47 47 47
Gender free zero 57           57 57 57
3.5% 52           52 52 52
5.0% 50           50 50 50
7.0% 47           47 47 47
Friction Cost Approach Production Gains Gender specific zero 94           112 149 219
3.5% 76           93 130 200
5.0% 72           90 126 196
7.0% 69           86 122 192
Gender free zero 92           110 145 213
3.5% 75           92 126 194
5.0% 71         88 122 190
7.0% 68           85 119 187
Friction Cost Approach Taxation effects Gender specific zero 8             11 17 29
3.5% 8             11 17 29
5.0% 8             11 17 28
7.0% 7           10 16 28
Gender free zero 8             11 16 27
3.5% 8             10 16 26
5.0% 7             10 15 26
7.0% 7             10 15 26
Friction Cost Approach Welfare effects Gender specific zero 57           57 57 57
3.5% 52           52 52 52
5.0% 50           50 50 50
7.0% 47         47 47 47
Gender free zero 57           57 57 57
3.5% 52           52 52 52
5.0% 50           50 50 50
7.0% 47           47 47 47
Friction period (months)
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15 Opportunistic screening and CBT 
Method Impact Wage rate Discount rate
3 6 12 24
Human Capital Appoach Production Gains Gender specific zero 91           91 91 91
3.5% 49           49 49 49
5.0% 40           40 41 41
7.0% 33           33 33 33
Gender free zero 87           87 87 87
3.5% 51           51 51 51
5.0% 43           43 43 43
7.0% 36           36 36 36
Human Capital Appoach Taxation effects Gender specific zero 18           18 18 18
3.5% 7             7 7 7
5.0% 5             5 5 5
7.0% 4             4 4 4
Gender free zero 17           17 17 17
3.5% 7             7 7 7
5.0% 5             5 5 5
7.0% 4           4 4 4
Human Capital Appoach Welfare effects Gender specific zero 10           10 10 10
3.5% 9             9 10 10
5.0% 9             9 9 9
7.0% 9             9 9 9
Gender free zero 10           10 10 10
3.5% 9             9 10 10
5.0% 9             9 9 9
7.0% 9             9 9 9
Friction Cost Approach Production Gains Gender specific zero 22           26 36 55
3.5% 19           23 33 52
5.0% 18           23 32 51
7.0% 18           22 32 50
Gender free zero 21           26 35 53
3.5% 18           23 32 50
5.0% 18         22 31 49
7.0% 17           21 31 49
Friction Cost Approach Taxation effects Gender specific zero 2             2 4 7
3.5% 2             2 4 7
5.0% 2             2 4 7
7.0% 2           2 4 7
Gender free zero 2             2 4 7
3.5% 2             2 4 7
5.0% 2             2 4 6
7.0% 2             2 4 6
Friction Cost Approach Welfare effects Gender specific zero 10           10 10 10
3.5% 9             9 10 10
5.0% 9             9 9 9
7.0% 9           9 9 9
Gender free zero 10           10 10 10
3.5% 9             9 10 10
5.0% 9             9 9 9
7.0% 9             9 9 9
Friction period (months)
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16 Active GP script 
Method Impact Wage rate Discount rate
3 6 12 24
Human Capital Appoach Production Gains Gender specific zero 29           29 29 29
3.5% 22           22 22 22
5.0% 20           20 20 20
7.0% 18           18 18 18
Gender free zero 27           27 27 27
3.5% 20           20 20 20
5.0% 19           19 19 19
7.0% 17           17 17 17
Human Capital Appoach Taxation effects Gender specific zero 5.2          5.2          5.2          5.2          
3.5% 1.6          1.6          1.6          1.6          
5.0% 1.0          1.0          1.0          1.0          
7.0% 0.6          0.6          0.6          0.6          
Gender free zero 4.5          4.5          4.4          4.4          
3.5% 1.3          1.3          1.3          1.3          
5.0% 0.9          0.9          0.8          0.8          
7.0% 0.5        0.5        0.5          0.5         
Human Capital Appoach Welfare effects Gender specific zero 0.2          0.2          0.2          0.2          
3.5% 0.1          0.1          0.1          0.1          
5.0% 0.1          0.1          0.0          0.0          
7.0% 0.0          0.0          0.0          0.0          
Gender free zero 0.2          0.2          0.2          0.2          
3.5% 0.1          0.1          0.1          0.1          
5.0% 0.1          0.1          0.0          0.0          
7.0% 0.0          0.0          0.0          0.0          
Friction Cost Approach Production Gains Gender specific zero 5.1          5.7          7.1          9.6          
3.5% 3.2          3.8          5.0          7.5          
5.0% 2.9          3.5          4.8          7.2          
7.0% 2.7          3.4          4.6          7.0          
Gender free zero 4.8          5.6          7.0          10.0        
3.5% 3.1          3.9          5.3          8.2          
5.0% 2.9        3.6        5.1          8.0         
7.0% 2.7          3.4          4.9          7.8          
Friction Cost Approach Taxation effects Gender specific zero 0.6          0.7          0.9          1.3          
3.5% 0.4          0.5          0.8          1.1          
5.0% 0.4          0.5          0.7          1.1          
7.0% 0.4        0.5        0.7          1.1         
Gender free zero 0.5          0.5          0.7          1.0          
3.5% 0.4          0.4          0.6          0.9          
5.0% 0.3          0.4          0.6          0.9          
7.0% 0.3          0.4          0.6          0.9          
Friction Cost Approach Welfare effects Gender specific zero 0.2          0.2          0.2          0.2          
3.5% 0.1          0.1          0.1          0.1          
5.0% 0.1          0.1          0.0          0.0          
7.0% 0.0        0.0        0.0          0.0         
Gender free zero 0.2          0.2          0.2          0.2          
3.5% 0.1          0.1          0.1          0.1          
5.0% 0.1          0.1          0.0          0.0          
7.0% 0.0          0.0          0.0          0.0          
Friction period (months)
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17 Referral to exercise physiologist 
Method Impact Wage rate Discount rate
3 6 12 24
Human Capital Appoach Production Gains Gender specific zero 12           12 12 12
3.5% 9             9 9 9
5.0% 8             8 8 8
7.0% 7             7 7 7
Gender free zero 11           11 11 11
3.5% 8             8 8 8
5.0% 8             8 8 8
7.0% 7             7 7 7
Human Capital Appoach Taxation effects Gender specific zero 2.3          2.3          2.3          2.3          
3.5% 0.7          0.7          0.7          0.7          
5.0% 0.4          0.4          0.4          0.4          
7.0% 0.2          0.2          0.2          0.2          
Gender free zero 2.0          2.0          2.0          2.0          
3.5% 0.6          0.6          0.6          0.6          
5.0% 0.4          0.4          0.4          0.4          
7.0% 0.2        0.2        0.2          0.2         
Human Capital Appoach Welfare effects Gender specific zero 0.1          0.1          0.2          0.2          
3.5% 0.1          0.1          0.1          0.1          
5.0% 0.1          0.1          0.1          0.1          
7.0% 0.1          0.1          0.1          0.1          
Gender free zero 0.1          0.1          0.2          0.2          
3.5% 0.1          0.1          0.1          0.1          
5.0% 0.1          0.1          0.1          0.1          
7.0% 0.1          0.1          0.1          0.1          
Friction Cost Approach Production Gains Gender specific zero 1.7          1.9          2.3          3.1          
3.5% 1.1          1.3          1.7          2.5          
5.0% 1.0          1.2          1.6          2.4          
7.0% 0.9          1.1          1.5          2.3          
Gender free zero 1.6          1.8          2.3          3.3          
3.5% 1.0          1.3          1.8          2.8          
5.0% 0.9        1.2        1.7          2.7         
7.0% 0.9          1.1          1.6          2.6          
Friction Cost Approach Taxation effects Gender specific zero 0.2          0.2          0.3          0.4          
3.5% 0.1          0.2          0.2          0.4          
5.0% 0.1          0.2          0.2          0.4          
7.0% 0.1        0.2        0.2          0.4         
Gender free zero 0.2          0.2          0.2          0.4          
3.5% 0.1          0.2          0.2          0.3          
5.0% 0.1          0.1          0.2          0.3          
7.0% 0.1          0.1          0.2          0.3          
Friction Cost Approach Welfare effects Gender specific zero 0.1          0.1          0.2          0.2          
3.5% 0.1          0.1          0.1          0.1          
5.0% 0.1          0.1          0.1          0.1          
7.0% 0.1        0.1        0.1          0.1         
Gender free zero 0.1          0.1          0.2          0.2          
3.5% 0.1          0.1          0.1          0.1          
5.0% 0.1          0.1          0.1          0.1          
7.0% 0.1          0.1          0.1          0.1          
Friction period (months)
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19 Bupropion 
Method Impact Wage rate Discount rate
3 6 12 24
Human Capital Appoach Production Gains Gender specific zero 72              72 72 72
3.5% 52              52 52 52
5.0% 47              47 47 47
7.0% 41              41 41 41
Gender free zero 68              68 67 67
3.5% 49              49 49 49
5.0% 44              44 44 44
7.0% 38              38 38 38
Human Capital Appoach Taxation effects Gender specific zero 13              13 13 13
3.5% 4                4 4 4
5.0% 3                3 3 3
7.0% 2                2 2 2
Gender free zero 12              12 12 12
3.5% 4                4 4 4
5.0% 2                2 2 2
7.0% 2                2 1 1
Human Capital Appoach Welfare effects Gender specific zero 3                3 3 3
3.5% 2                2 2 2
5.0% 2                2 2 2
7.0% 2                2 2 2
Gender free zero 3                3 3 3
3.5% 2                2 2 2
5.0% 2                2 2 2
7.0% 2                2 2 2
Friction Cost Approach Production Gains Gender specific zero 11              12 14 20
3.5% 7                8 10 15
5.0% 6                7 10 15
7.0% 5                7 9 14
Gender free zero 11              12 15 20
3.5% 7                8 11 16
5.0% 6                7 10 16
7.0% 6                7 10 15
Friction Cost Approach Taxation effects Gender specific zero 1                1 2 3
3.5% 1                1 2 2
5.0% 1                1 1 2
7.0% 1                1 1 2
Gender free zero 1                1 2 2
3.5% 1                1 1 2
5.0% 1                1 1 2
7.0% 1                1 1 2
Friction Cost Approach Welfare effects Gender specific zero 3                3 3 3
3.5% 2                2 2 2
5.0% 2                2 2 2
7.0% 2                2 2 2
Gender free zero 3                3 3 3
3.5% 2                2 2 2
5.0% 2                2 2 2
7.0% 2                2 2 2
Friction period (months)
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20 Call back counselling 
Method Impact Wage rate Discount rate
3 6 12 24
Human Capital Appoach Production Gains Gender specific zero 0.35        0.35        0.35        0.35        
3.5% 0.27        0.27        0.26        0.26        
5.0% 0.24        0.24        0.24        0.24        
7.0% 0.22        0.22        0.22        0.22        
Gender free zero 0.33        0.33        0.33        0.33        
3.5% 0.25        0.25        0.25        0.25        
5.0% 0.23        0.23        0.23        0.23        
7.0% 0.20        0.20        0.20        0.20        
Human Capital Appoach Taxation effects Gender specific zero 0.06        0.06        0.06        0.06        
3.5% 0.02        0.02        0.02        0.02        
5.0% 0.01        0.01        0.01        0.01        
7.0% 0.01        0.01        0.01        0.01        
Gender free zero 0.05        0.05        0.05        0.05        
3.5% 0.02        0.02        0.02        0.02        
5.0% 0.01        0.01        0.01        0.01        
7.0% 0.01        0.01        0.01        0.01        
Human Capital Appoach Welfare effects Gender specific zero 0.02        0.02        0.02        0.02        
3.5% 0.01        0.01        0.01        0.01        
5.0% 0.01        0.01        0.01        0.01        
7.0% 0.01        0.01        0.01        0.01        
Gender free zero 0.02        0.02        0.02        0.02        
3.5% 0.01        0.01        0.01        0.01        
5.0% 0.01        0.01        0.01        0.01        
7.0% 0.01        0.01        0.01        0.01        
Friction Cost Approach Production Gains Gender specific zero 0.06        0.07        0.09        0.12        
3.5% 0.04        0.05        0.06        0.09        
5.0% 0.04        0.04        0.06        0.09        
7.0% 0.03        0.04        0.06        0.08        
Gender free zero 0.06        0.07        0.09        0.12        
3.5% 0.04        0.05        0.06        0.10        
5.0% 0.04        0.05        0.06        0.10        
7.0% 0.03        0.04        0.06        0.09        
Friction Cost Approach Taxation effects Gender specific zero 0.01        0.01        0.01        0.02        
3.5% 0.01        0.01        0.01        0.01        
5.0% 0.00        0.01        0.01        0.01        
7.0% 0.00        0.01        0.01        0.01        
Gender free zero 0.01        0.01        0.01        0.01        
3.5% 0.00        0.01        0.01        0.01        
5.0% 0.00        0.01        0.01        0.01        
7.0% 0.00        0.00        0.01        0.01        
Friction Cost Approach Welfare effects Gender specific zero 0.02        0.02        0.02        0.02        
3.5% 0.01        0.01        0.01        0.01        
5.0% 0.01        0.01        0.01        0.01        
7.0% 0.01        0.01        0.01        0.01        
Gender free zero 0.02        0.02        0.02        0.02        
3.5% 0.01        0.01        0.01        0.01        
5.0% 0.01        0.01        0.01        0.01        
7.0% 0.01        0.01        0.01        0.01        
Friction period (months)
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21 Nicotine Replacement Therapy 
Method Impact Wage rate Discount rate
3 6 12 24
Human Capital Appoach Production Gains Gender specific zero 99           99 100 100
3.5% 72           72 72 72
5.0% 65           65 65 65
7.0% 57           57 57 57
Gender free zero 93           93 93 93
3.5% 68           68 68 68
5.0% 61           61 61 61
7.0% 53           53 54 54
Human Capital Appoach Taxation effects Gender specific zero 18           18 18 18
3.5% 6             6 6 6
5.0% 4             4 4 4
7.0% 2             2 2 2
Gender free zero 16           16 16 16
3.5% 5             5 5 5
5.0% 3             3 3 3
7.0% 2             2 2 2
Human Capital Appoach Welfare effects Gender specific zero 4             4 4 4
3.5% 3             3 3 3
5.0% 2             2 3 3
7.0% 2             2 2 2
Gender free zero 4             4 4 4
3.5% 3             3 3 3
5.0% 2             2 3 3
7.0% 2             2 2 2
Friction Cost Approach Production Gains Gender specific zero 14           16 20 27
3.5% 9             11 14 21
5.0% 8             10 13 20
7.0% 7             9 13 20
Gender free zero 14           16 20 28
3.5% 9             11 15 23
5.0% 8             10 14 22
7.0% 8             10 13 21
Friction Cost Approach Taxation effects Gender specific zero 1             2 2 4
3.5% 1             1 2 3
5.0% 1             1 2 3
7.0% 1             1 2 3
Gender free zero 1             2 2 3
3.5% 1             1 2 3
5.0% 1             1 2 3
7.0% 1             1 2 3
Friction Cost Approach Welfare effects Gender specific zero 4             4 4 4
3.5% 3             3 3 3
5.0% 2             2 3 3
7.0% 2             2 2 2
Gender free zero 4             4 4 4
3.5% 3             3 3 3
5.0% 2             2 3 3
7.0% 2             2 2 2
Friction period (months)
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22 SunSmart 
Method Impact Wage rate Discount rate
3 6 12 24
Human Capital Appoach Production Gains Gender specific zero 784         784 784 784
3.5% 422         422 427 427
5.0% 343         343 351 351
7.0% 270         270 280 280
Gender free zero 493         493 492 492
3.5% 216         216 218 218
5.0% 159         159 170 170
7.0% 117         117 125 125
Human Capital Appoach Taxation effects Gender specific zero 206         206 204 204
3.5% 89           89 87 87
5.0% 66           66 65 65
7.0% 47           47 46 46
Gender free zero 108         108 110 110
3.5% 59           59 59 59
5.0% 48           48 48 48
7.0% 38         38 37 37
Human Capital Appoach Welfare effects Gender specific zero (80)          (80) (80) (80)
3.5% (51)          (51) (51) (51)
5.0% (43)          (43) (44) (44)
7.0% (36)          (36) (37) (37)
Gender free zero (80)          (80) (80) (80)
3.5% (51)          (51) (51) (51)
5.0% (43)          (43) (44) (44)
7.0% (36)          (36) (37) (37)
Friction Cost Approach Production Gains Gender specific zero 337         344 340 360
3.5% 135         140 146 165
5.0% 98           102 109 127
7.0% 68           73 81 99
Gender free zero 370         374 363 381
3.5% 142         145 149 162
5.0% 101       105 110 124
7.0% 69           73 78 92
Friction Cost Approach Taxation effects Gender specific zero 62           63 64 68
3.5% 41           43 43 48
5.0% 36           38 38 43
7.0% 31         32 33 38
Gender free zero 68           69 67 69
3.5% 46           46 45 47
5.0% 40           40 39 41
7.0% 34           34 33 36
Friction Cost Approach Welfare effects Gender specific zero (80)          (80) (80) (80)
3.5% (51)          (51) (51) (51)
5.0% (43)          (43) (44) (44)
7.0% (36)        (36) (37) (37)
Gender free zero (80)          (80) (80) (80)
3.5% (51)          (51) (51) (51)
5.0% (43)          (43) (44) (44)
7.0% (36)          (36) (37) (37)
Friction period (months)
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Appendix 5: Most important sources of uncertainty in results by Intervention 
Table 42: Most important causes of uncertainty in modelling HCA production gains by intervention. 
Risk Factor 
 
Intervention Production gains 
HCA 
Taxation effects 
HCA 
Welfare effects 
HCA 
     
Alcohol use Brief GP intervention 20-24 / Exposed partic rate male 
25-29 / Exposed partic rate male 
20-24 / Exposed partic rate male 
25-29 / Exposed partic rate male 
20-24 / Exposed partic rate male 
25-29 / Exposed partic rate male 
Alcohol use Random Breath testing 20-24 / Exposed partic rate male 
20-24 / Aus partic rate male 
20-24 / Exposed partic rate male 
20-24 / Aus partic rate male 
20-24 / Aus partic rate male 
20-24 / Exposed partic rate male 
Cervical Cancer Cervical Cancer Screening 
(current practice) 
35-39 / Exposed partic rate fem 
30-34 / Exposed partic rate fem 
Wage multiplier 
30-34 / Exposed partic rate fem 
35-39 / Exposed partic rate fem 
30-34 / Exposed partic rate fem 
CVD risk factors ACE inhibitors targeted at 
10% risk group 
50-54 / Exposed partic rate male 
55-59 / Exposed partic rate male 
55-59 / Exposed absent rate male 
Wage multiplier 
50-54 / Exposed partic rate male 
55-59 / Exposed partic rate male 
CVD risk factors ACE inhibitors targeted at 
5% risk group 
50-54 / Exposed partic rate male 
45-49 / Exposed partic rate male 
55-59 / Exposed absent rate male 
50-54 / Exposed absent rate male 
50-54 / Exposed partic rate male 
55-59 / Exposed absent rate male 
 
CVD risk factors Beta blockers targeted at 
15% risk group 
50-54 / Exposed partic rate male 
50-54 / Exposed partic rate fem 
Wage multiplier 
60-64 / Exposed absent rate male 
50-54 / Exposed partic rate fem 
55-59 / Exposed partic rate fem 
CVD risk factors Beta blockers targeted at 
5% risk group 
50-54 / Exposed partic rate male 
45-49 / Exposed partic rate male 
55-59 / Exposed absent rate male 
50-54 / Exposed absent rate male 
50-54 / Exposed partic rate male 
55-59 / Exposed partic rate male 
CVD risk factors Combination  targeted at 
15% risk group 
50-54 / Exposed partic rate male 
55-59 / Exposed partic rate male 
60-64 / Exposed absent rate male 
55-59 / Exposed absent rate male 
50-54 / Exposed partic rate male 
55-59 / Exposed partic rate male 
CVD risk factors Community Heart Health 
Program 
35-39 / Exposed partic rate male 
40-44 / Exposed partic rate male 
Wage multiplier 
35-39 / Exposed partic rate male 
35-39 / Exposed partic rate male 
40-44 / Exposed partic rate male 
CVD risk factors Dietary counselling 
targeted at 10% risk group 
50-54 / Exposed partic rate male 
55-59 / Exposed partic rate male 
 
55-59 / Exposed absent rate male 
55-59 / Aus absent rate male 
50-54 / Exposed partic rate male 
55-59 / Exposed partic rate male 
CVD risk factors Dietary counselling 
targeted at 5% risk group 
50-54 / Exposed partic rate male 
45-49 / Exposed partic rate male 
55-59 / Exposed absent rate male 
50-54 / Exposed absent rate male 
50-54 / Exposed partic rate male 
55-59 / Exposed partic rate male 
Depression Maintenance CBT for 5 
years with private 
psychiatrist 
45-49 / Exposed partic rate fem 
25-29 / Exposed partic rate male 
25-29 / Exposed partic rate male 
Wage multiplier 
30-34 / Exposed partic rate fem 
45-49 / Exposed partic rate fem 
Depression Maintenance CBT for 5 45-49 / Exposed partic rate fem 25-29 / Exposed partic rate male 30-34 / Exposed partic rate fem 
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Risk Factor 
 
Intervention Production gains 
HCA 
Taxation effects 
HCA 
Welfare effects 
HCA 
years with public 
psychologist 
25-29 / Exposed partic rate male Wage multiplier 45-49 / Exposed partic rate fem 
Depression Maintenance SSRIs for 5 
years 
45-49 / Exposed partic rate fem 
25-29 / Exposed partic rate male 
25-29 / Exposed partic rate male 
Wage multiplier 
45-49 years / eligibility for dis 
pension male 
45-49 / Exposed partic rate fem 
Depression Opportunistic screening + 
CBT 
25-29 / Exposed partic rate male 
25-29 / Exposed partic rate fem 
Wage multiplier 
25-29 / Exposed partic rate male 
15-19 / Exposed partic rate fem 
30-34 / Exposed partic rate fem 
Physical inactivity Active GP script 50-54 / Exposed partic rate male 
45-49 / Exposed partic rate male 
55-59 / Exposed absent rate male 
50-54 / Exposed absent rate male 
55-59 / Exposed partic rate male 
50-54 / Exposed partic rate male 
Physical inactivity Exercise physiologist 40-44 / Exposed partic rate male 
40-44 / Aus partic rate male 
55-59 / Exposed absent rate male 
50-54 / Exposed absent rate male 
40-44 / Exposed partic rate male 
40-44 / Aus partic rate male 
Schizophrenia Vocational Rehabilitation na na na 
Smoking Bupropion 55-59 / Exposed partic rate male 
60-64 / Exposed partic rate male 
Wage multiplier 
60-64 / Exposed absent rate male 
60-64 / Exposed partic rate male 
55-59 / Exposed partic rate male 
Smoking Call back counselling 55-59 / Exposed partic rate male 
60-64 / Exposed partic rate male 
60-64 / Exposed absent rate male 
Wage multiplier 
60-64 / Exposed partic rate fem 
60-64 / Exposed partic rate male 
Smoking Nicotine Replacement 
Therapy 
55-59 / Exposed partic rate male 
60-64 / Exposed partic rate male 
Wage multiplier 
60-64 / Exposed absent rate male 
60-64 / Exposed partic rate male 
55-59 / Exposed partic rate fem 
Sunlight exposure SunSmart program 25-29 / Exposed partic rate male 
35-39 / Exposed partic rate male 
25-29 / Exposed partic rate male 
35-39 / Exposed partic rate male 
35-39 / Exposed partic rate fem 
30-34 / Exposed partic rate fem 
 
  199
 
Table 43: Most important causes of uncertainty in modelling FCA production gains by intervention. 
Risk Factor 
 
Intervention Production gains 
FCA 
Taxation effects 
FCA 
 
Welfare effects 
FCA 
 
     
Alcohol use Brief GP intervention 30-34 / Exposed absent rate 
male 
35-39 / Exposed absent rate 
male 
35-39 / Exposed absent rate 
male 
50-54 / Exposed absent rate 
male 
20-24 / Exposed partic rate male 
25-29 / Exposed partic rate male 
Alcohol use Random Breath testing 35-39 / Aus absent rate male 
35-39 / Exposed absent rate 
male 
35-39 / Aus absent rate male 
35-39 / Exposed absent rate 
male 
20-24 / Aus partic rate male 
20-24 / Exposed partic rate male 
Cervical Cancer Cervical Cancer Screening 
(current practice) 
Wage multiplier 
35-39 / training costs 
Wage multiplier 
45-49 / Exposed absent rate fem 
35-39 / Exposed partic rate fem 
30-34 / Exposed partic rate fem 
CVD risk factors ACE inhibitors targeted at 
10% risk group 
Wage multiplier 
60-64 / Exposed absent rate 
male 
Wage multiplier 
55-59 / Exposed absent rate 
male 
50-54 / Exposed partic rate male 
55-59 / Exposed partic rate male 
CVD risk factors ACE inhibitors targeted at 
5% risk group 
55-59 / Exposed absent rate 
male 
Wage multiplier 
 
55-59 / Exposed absent rate 
male 
50-54 / Exposed absent rate 
male 
50-54 / Exposed partic rate male 
55-59 / Exposed partic rate male 
CVD risk factors Beta blockers targeted at 
15% risk group 
Wage multiplier 
35-39 / training costs 
Wage multiplier 
55-59 / Exposed absent rate 
male 
50-54 / Exposed partic rate fem 
55-59 / Exposed partic rate fem 
CVD risk factors Beta blockers targeted at 5% 
risk group 
Wage multiplier 
55-59 / Exposed absent rate 
male 
55-59 / Exposed absent rate 
male 
50-54 / Exposed absent rate 
male 
50-54 / Exposed partic rate male 
55-59 / Exposed partic rate male 
CVD risk factors Combination  targeted at 
15% risk group 
60-64 / Exposed absent rate 
male 
Wage multiplier 
 
60-64 / Exposed absent rate 
male 
55-59 / Exposed absent rate 
male 
50-54 / Exposed partic rate male 
55-59 / Exposed partic rate male 
CVD risk factors Community Heart Health Wage multiplier Wage multiplier 35-39 / Exposed partic rate male 
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Risk Factor 
 
Intervention Production gains 
FCA 
Taxation effects 
FCA 
 
Welfare effects 
FCA 
 
Program 55-59 / Exposed absent rate 
male 
55-59 / Exposed absent rate 
male 
40-44 / Exposed partic rate male 
CVD risk factors Dietary counselling targeted 
at 10% risk group 
55-59 / Exposed absent rate 
male 
Wage multiplier 
55-59 / Exposed absent rate 
male 
Wage multiplier 
50-54 / Exposed partic rate male 
55-59 / Exposed partic rate male 
 
CVD risk factors Dietary counselling targeted 
at 5% risk group 
Wage multiplier 
55-59 / Exposed absent rate 
male 
55-59 / Exposed absent rate 
male 
60-64 / Exposed absent rate 
male 
50-54 / Exposed partic rate male 
55-59 / Exposed partic rate male 
Depression Maintenance CBT for 5 
years with private 
psychiatrist 
Wage multiplier 
35-39 / training costs 
Wage multiplier 
30-34 / Exposed absent rate 
male 
30-34 / Exposed partic rate fem 
45-49 / Exposed partic rate fem 
Depression Maintenance CBT for 5 
years with public 
psychologist 
Wage multiplier 
35-39 / training costs 
Wage multiplier 
30-34 / Exposed absent rate 
male 
30-34 / Exposed partic rate fem 
45-49 / Exposed partic rate fem 
Depression Maintenance SSRIs for 5 
years 
Wage multiplier 
35-39 / training costs 
Wage multiplier 
30-34 / Exposed absent rate 
male 
45-49 years / dis eligib male 
45-49 / Exposed partic rate fem 
Depression Opportunistic screening + 
CBT 
Wage multiplier 
35-39 / training costs 
Wage multiplier 
35-39 / Exposed absent rate 
male 
15-19 / Exposed partic rate fem 
30-34 / Exposed partic rate fem 
Physical inactivity Active GP script 50-54 / Exposed absent rate 
male 
Wage multiplier 
55-59 / Exposed absent rate 
male 
50-54 / Exposed absent rate 
male 
55-59 / Exposed partic rate male 
50-54 / Exposed partic rate male 
Physical inactivity Exercise physiologist 50-54 / Exposed absent rate 
male 
50-54 / absent rate m 
55-59 / Exposed absent rate 
male 
50-54 / Exposed absent rate 
male 
40-44 / Exposed partic rate male 
40-44 / Aus partic rate male 
Schizophrenia Vocational Rehabilitation na na na 
Smoking Bupropion Wage multiplier 
60-64 / Exposed partic rate male 
55-59 / Exposed absent rate 
male 
60-64 / Exposed partic rate male 
55-59 / Exposed partic rate male 
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Risk Factor 
 
Intervention Production gains 
FCA 
Taxation effects 
FCA 
 
Welfare effects 
FCA 
 
Wage multiplier 
Smoking Call back counselling 60-64 / Exposed partic rate fem 
Wage multiplier 
60-64 / Exposed absent rate 
male 
55-59 / Exposed absent rate 
male 
60-64 / Exposed partic rate fem 
60-64 / Exposed partic rate male 
Smoking Nicotine Replacement 
Therapy 
Wage multiplier 
60-64 / Exposed partic rate male 
60-64 / Exposed absent rate 
male 
Wage multiplier 
60-64 / Exposed partic rate male 
55-59 / Exposed partic rate fem 
Sunlight exposure SunSmart program Wage multiplier 
25-29 / Exposed absent rate 
male 
Wage multiplier 
25-29 / Exposed absent rate 
male 
35-39 / Exposed partic rate fem 
30-34 / Exposed partic rate fem 
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Appendix 6: Detailed structure of Excel model calculating 
production gains 
 
Table 44 Component structure of the labour model for each health intervention. 
Sheet 
# 
Sheet name Sheet Purpose 
1 Pop 1yr groups Reference population for 2003 in 1 year age 
groups 
2 2003 Inputs of all variables for Australians (columns A 
to J) and the exposed sub population of interest 
(columns L to AQ). 
Graphs comparing absenteeism and participation 
for Australians and the exposed sub population of 
interest (cells T130 to AQ170). 
3 HC Base case calculation using HCA for all 
production gains, taxation and welfare effects by 
age and sex 
4 FC Base case (friction period 3 months) calculation 
using FCA for all production gains, taxation and 
welfare effects by age and sex 
5 HC GFW Scenario analysis (gender free wages) calculation 
using HCA for all production gains, taxation and 
welfare effects by age and sex 
6 FC GFW Scenario analysis (friction period 3 months, 
gender free wages) calculation using FCA for all 
production gains, taxation and welfare effects by 
age and sex 
7 results • Reporting in detail by age and sex and 
method of production gains, taxation and 
welfare using different discount rates (cells 
A1 to Q155)  
• Reporting summary of 2000 @RISK 
iterations of the model comparing method 
and limited scenario analysis: (cells U3 to 
AK63) 
• Reporting full scenario analysis summary of 
2000 @RISK iterations of the model 
comparing method and every scenario 
tested: wage rates, discount rate, friction 
period length and method. (cells AM4 to 
AT54)  
8 Results gfw Reporting in detail by age and sex and method of 
production gains, taxation and welfare using 
different discount rates and gender free wage 
rates(cells A1 to R155)  
9 Summary Within a sample of limited scenarios (friction 
period and discount rates) 
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Sheet 
# 
Sheet name Sheet Purpose 
• Detailed reporting of the distribution of 
intervention cost over government and 
individuals  
• Identification of net impact of production 
gains/losses on society 
• Comparison of net cost per DALY (ICER) 
to the health sector and wider society 
(Cells A1 to S44) 
10 FC (2) Using a 6 months friction period calculation using 
FCA for all production gains, taxation and 
welfare effects by age and sex 
11 FC GFW (2) Scenario analysis (friction period 6 months, 
gender free wages) calculation using FCA for all 
production gains, taxation and welfare effects by 
age and sex  
12 Results (2) Using a friction period of 6 months: 
• Reporting in detail by age and sex and 
method of production gains, taxation and 
welfare using different discount rates (cells 
A1 to Q155)  
• Reporting summary of 2000 @RISK 
iterations of the model comparing method 
and limited scenario analysis: (cells U3 to 
AK63) 
13 Results gfw (2) Using a friction period of 6 months: 
reporting in detail by age and sex and method of 
production gains, taxation and welfare using 
different discount rates and gender free wage 
rates(cells A1 to R155) 
14 Outputs data report Detail of the 2000 iterations generated by @RISK 
for production gains, taxation and welfare using 
all scenarios modeled (cells A1 to CT2008) 
15 Copy of outputs data report Detail of the 2000 iterations generated by @RISK 
for production gains, taxation and welfare using 
all scenarios modeled (cells A1 to CT2008) plus: 
• Calculation of median, upper and lower limit 
values for each output variable from the 2000 
iterations generated by @RISK for 
production gains, taxation and welfare using 
all scenarios modeled (cells A1 to CT3). 
• Calculation of the percentage of the 2000 
iterations that yield production gains greater 
than the net cost to the health sector of the 
intervention. (cells A2009 to CT 2010) 
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Table 45 Excel files supporting the labour model for each health intervention 
File links Files purpose/content 
Frequencies.xls Number of people in the exposed or at risk 
group from the National Health Survey 
2004/5 
Days off and participation rates with ci 
from basic curf.xls 
For Australia and each of the sub 
populations of interest by age and sex 
from the National Health Survey 2004/5: 
• Absenteeism rates,  
• participation rates,  
• fulltime and part time proportions 
Intervention specific disease model ( 
heart, depression, smoking, cervical ca, 
skin ca, alcohol, physical activity) 
Disease intervention model using ACE 
methodology where the number of 
DALYs, deaths and incident cases of 
disease are calculated. 
Intervention specific labour model for 
longer friction periods: 12 and 24 months  
Presentation of combined results of all 
scenarios tested in sheet ‘results’. 
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